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ABSTRACT 
This disseJiation probes critical questions about the relationship between the 
production of cultural meanings, social power, and material objects. By using the public 
discourse on traffic accidents in the United States as a historical case study, this study 
investigates in particular the various ways by which social groups respond to unintended 
technological consequences and dangers within definitional processes of collectively 
constructing a social problem. The textual-thematic analysis draws largely upon theories 
from social problems literature and science & technology studies, as it looks at a number 
of salient historical claimsmakers, sites of discourse production, and cultural vehicles of 
meaning making. Specifically, the contributions of the private insurance industry, safety 
establishment, consumer market, automobile clubs, and printed media are closely 
dissected to flesh out the contours and content of the accident problem's construction and 
development through time. 
v 
In line with a contextual constructivist approach to social problems analysis, the 
research has observed the emergence, evolution, and eventual waning of the accident 
issue along several structural anchors that provide possible explanations for some of these 
dynamics. To a great extent, the traffic accident problem has gradually 'disappeared ' in 
America throughout the twentieth century- a disappearance that is not physical but 
conceptual. Specifically, it means that the troubling social condition is defined as 
something to live with, a necesswy evil of which there seems to be limited ability or 
desire to substantially affect or eradicate. The sociological concept I employ to name this 
particular trajectory towards problem attenuation is normalization. Applied to the case 
analyzed here, the findings offer a way to understand the processes by which traffic 
accidents become nom1alized in America as an acquiescent price to pay for the benefits 
of the automobile. 
Theoretically, these conclusions have laid the groundwork for producing a 
hypothetical model of social problems normalization. The model highlights the role 
played by several cultural devices of claimsmaking in affecting issue attenuation or 
' disappearance.' When the problem is constructed through high! y technicizing, 
commensurating, commodifying, and socially controlling modalities of sense making, the 
likelihood of its normalization and eventual floundering increases. 
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Introduction 
In opening, consider the following seven moments in the history of traffic accidents ias a 
social problem in the United States: 
• In early 1923 , prominent American political columnist Mark Sullivan, the 1920s 
and 1930s equivalent of a Thomas Friedman, 1 detects the emergence of a new 
public sentiment in the United States. Writing in The World 's Work, Sullivan 
suggests that the present mood pervading the country is one of "angry 
sullenness," an attitude "which expressed itself so violently in the recent 
election." What could have triggered this new collective state of mind? True, 
Sullivan admits, the World War' s traumatic impressions are still very much fresh 
on Americans' minds as is a general sense of dissatisfaction from the role played 
by the United States in the European crisis, which, in his view, "has caused us to 
suffer ever since from an aborted emotion." Yet, in a conclusion that may seem 
highly surprising to the contemporary reader, Sullivan points to a completely 
different cause for the low national morale: Traffic accidents. "The most 
reasonable answer . .. for the present mood ... is [the] resentment against the 
failure on the part of those responsible, to prevent the killing of thousands of 
children, the wounding of thousands more, and the intimidating of everyone, by 
the automobile."2 
• Nearly two years later, President Calvin Coolidge addresses the delegates 
attending the National Conference on Street and Highway Safety, a week-long 
meeting convened by his administration in light of the deteriorating automobile 
accident problem. "The evil you are combating is so widespread as to be of 
national concern and we do well to look at it with a countrywide vision," 
Coolidge says. 3 
2 
• In 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt publicly takes issue with the growing 
rate of traffic deaths by calling on all state governors to apply uniform laws to halt 
the carnage. "We should, as a people, be able to solve this problem which so 
vitally affects the lives and happiness of our citizens," Roosevelt asserts. 
"Realizing the seriousness of the situation and the urgent need for attention to the 
problem, I am confident that you will desire to participate in this effort."4 
• In a public address to the nation over a decade later, President Harry Truman calls 
for swift action to tackle the national accident crisis: " It is an appalling fact that 
34,000 Americans were killed in automobile accidents in 1946. I therefore call 
upon every state and every community in the land to work unceasingly through 
194 7 to promote highway safety. "5 
• Convening another White House Conference on Highway Safety in early 1954, 
President Dwight Eisenhower makes clear that solving the road accident menace 
3 
has become a top priority for his administration. "When any particular activity in 
the United States takes 38,000 American lives in one year," he says, "it becomes a 
national problem ofthe first importance. Consequently, this meeting was called, 
and you have accepted the invitation, in an understanding between us that it is not 
merely a local or community problem. It is a problem for all of us, from the 
highest echelon of Government to the lowest echelon: a problem for every citizen, 
no matter what his station or his duty. I was struck by a statistic that seemed to me 
shocking. In the last 50 years, the automobile has killed more people in the United 
States than we have had fatalities in all our wars, on all the battlefields of all the 
wars ofthe United States since its founding 177 years ago."6 
• In September 1966, upon signing the Highway Safety and Traffic Safety Acts, 
President Lyndon Johnson construes traffic fatalities as a grave public health 
concern. "For years we have spent millions of dollars to understand and fight 
polio and other childhood disease. Yet until now we have tolerated a raging 
epidemic of highway death, which has killed more of our youth than all diseases 
combined. Through the Highway Safety Act we are going to find out more about 
highway disease- and we aim to cure it."7 
• Incidentally, Johnson' s address proves to be, as of yet, the last time an American 
president treats traffic accidents as a pressing national public issue. 
4 
What happened to the accident problem? Why has it been removed since the late 1960s 
from national political agendas? Why has every American president in the past four and a 
half decades been near completely silent on this matter, while their twentieth century 
predecessors ranked it high on the country' s list of burning issues? Why, to look at one 
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Table 1. Newspaper editorials on traffic accident published between 1900 to 1990 in The New York Times , 
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Daily Tribune. 
measure, have newspaper editors lost a similarly substantial interest in debating this topic 
in the corresponding years (see Table 1)?8 Why, to look at yet another measure, has the 
National Safety Council, one of the nation's premier accident prevention organizations, 
largely shifted its treatment of traffic mishaps in this period from a central and broad 
issue to a narrowly-defined problem of drinking and driving and seat belt use?9 
And why would it just seem plain odd at present for Americans to talk about traffic 
accidents- traffic accidents! -as a national concern on par with such enduring limelight 
topics as the wars in the Middle East, the climate crisis, healthcare, abortion, or gun 
control? 
If we were to take an objectivist10 approach to understanding the transfonnation 
of social problems over time, the answers to the abovementioned puzzlements will be 
sought in the predicament' s real-life conditions. According to this view, a certain 
troubling situation declines in social prominence when it has largely been solved or 
neutralized. In other words, traffic accidents receded into the background of public 
concem in the second half of the twentieth century precisely because in reality it ceased 
to be a major problem. 
5 
One way to corroborate such a relationship may consist of examining longitudinal 
statistics of automobile-related deaths. Taking long-term fatality rates as a measure of the 
problem ' s severity, however, one sees that such a connection cannot be made 
umeservedly. Though statistics indicate that the number of deaths per 10,000 vehicles 
and per 100 million vehicle miles traveled has indeed steadily tapered off in the past few 
decades, the number of deaths per 100,000 people has not diminished considerably (see 
table 2).11 Evidently, while safer cars and improved highways have probably aided in 
reducing the death rate in correlation to the increase in the number of automobiles and 
miles traveled, especially in the second half of the century, curbing the behavioral 
contribution (i.e. the 'human element ' ) to the accident problem proved to be a thomy and 
lingering obstacle to purge. Depending on the element one chooses to highlight, these 
figures can obviously supply ammunition for either the optimists or pessimists reflecting 
on overall trends of the automotive mayhem. But assessing the issue outside of the 
framework of quantities, one would be hard pressed to categorically refute that traffic 
accidents constitute a protracted and widespread troubling condition that has spawned 
deep medical, social , and economic ramifications for the country as a whole in the past 
100 years. 12 
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I return then to the original puzzlement. Why have car accidents disappeared 
almost completely from the repertoire of pressing nationwide problems in America? (If 
anything, based on vital statistics alone we should have expected them to at least remain 
a fairly hot topic). Perhaps the answer does not lie in the bottom-line of figures and rate 
changes. Though numerical evidence constitutes in modern times a dominant mode of 
assessing a public problem ' s scope and severity - we must remember that it is not the 
only one. In fact, as I will want to argue in the upcoming pages (see chapter 2), 
quantification - probably the most salient vehicle of claimsmaking in the public discourse 
on traffic accidents in America- is not so much a description of reality as it is a means 
for constructing that reality itself. Representing accidents through numbers does not 
constitute an objective statement about social processes; it is a social process. 
Motor Vehicle Deaths Per 100,000 People 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
0 
1916 1926 1936 1946 1956 1966 1976 1986 
Year 
Table 2. Deaths in traffic accidents per I 00,000 people in the United States, I 916-1986 . Source : U.S. 
Department of Transportation. 
Thus we are gradually drifting away from objectivist interpretations of social 
problems to different terrains of inquiry. In this dissertation I investigate the evolving 
nature of the traffic accident problem through a sociological study on the level of social 
representations and collective definitions. In short, I mainly adopt a constructivist 
approach toward the analysis of social problems. But determining the degree of 
constructivism- whether strict, moderate/contextual , or other- is a caveat that will be 
become clearer later on, since it is a matter of theoretical and empirical significance.13 
For now it will suffice to state that I generally accept the constructivist premise that 
problems involve to a great degree a definitional character, emerging and evolving 
through social processes of making claims and statements about the nature of the world. 
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By probing critical questions about the relationship between the production of 
cultural meanings, social power, and technologies, the research presented here seeks to 
flesh out the contours and contents of a public discourse on the impacts of material 
objects in the United States. 14 Focusing on automobile accidents as a case study, I will 
employ a broad historical brush-stroke to illuminate important chmmels by which such a 
discourse has been constructed and circulated on the national level. What are the ways in 
which societies respond when the devices they create and implement go astray? How do 
particular unintended technological consequences become managed, negotiated, and/or 
accepted in modern settings? What are the means by which involved social actors and 
institutions make sense of such events? What is the role of power in molding and 
reproducing these significations? What happens to these social meanings over time? How 
can a problem "disappear" from the center of definitional processes? And what does 
"disappearance" mean in constructivist terms? 
Why Study Accidents? 
8 
The choice of placing the technological mishap in the center of my empirical study 
carries several incentives. First, looking into technological mishaps provides an 
opportunity to explore broader sociological quandaries relating to various intersections of 
social institutions, public discourses, cultural meanings, and material objects. To begin 
with, accidents are interesting for social analysis because they pose challenges to 
established orders and throw into doubt taken-for-granted worlds. As Judith Green has 
showed, the untoward event represents a particular troubling offense to several 
fundamental Modernist sensibilities, namely the ability to clearly discern cause and 
effect, confidently project into the future, and control the contingencies of nature through 
proactive human agency. 15 As a liminal 16 occurrence that exists between the poles ofthe 
explainable and the inexplicable, in Modernity the accident is already and always a 
contradiction. As such, the technological crash problematizes dominant Western binaries 
by instantaneously blurring the boundaries between ' inside' and ' outside,' ' object ' and 
'subject,' and 'observer' and ' participant.' 17 It is not surprising, then, that the accident 
has captured the imagination of several postmodern thinkers. For example, Baudrillard 
observes that the accident introduces a paradox by possessing "the fatality of necessity at 
the same time as the uncertainty offreedom." 18 By definition, accidents signal the loss of 
9 
mastery to mere chance - and hence are indeed inevitable. Yet they are also uncertain, 
since no particular accident is inevitable: It could have been avoided if a different course 
of action would have been taken. 19 
The automobile wreck in particular vividly calls into question some of the most 
cherished values embedded at the heart of the American cultural landscape. Beginning in 
the earliest days of the motor vehicle, the occurrence of the mishap confused established 
notions of civility and modernization that supposedly distinguished the United States 
from what were perceived as less advanced societies. "The number of motor accidents is 
a blot upon our modem civilization," decried one writer in 1922, making one of many 
such associations in this era between traffic accidents and the idea of progress?0 
Bemoaning the horrific state of "motor fodder" in America, another 1920s commentator 
asserted that, "Life in China is cheap. It is time for Americans to resolve that their 
country in this respect be not Chinafied."21 The highly frequent comparisons between 
traffic deaths and war fatalities also spoke to this sense of offended disillusion. By the 
end of the First World War, when the steady rise in automobile mortality exceeded that 
conflict's dead, Americans struggled again and again to make sense of this absurd. How 
is it possible that a larger loss of life takes place not on the bloody battlefields but on that 
mundane 'home front,' the highway? To put it in Foucauldian terms, the deeper affront 
posed by the inability to counter the accident menace seems to target the notion of 
'govemrnentality'- that is, the fundamental modus operandi by which the modem liberal 
nation-state seeks to ensure the safety and health of the social body through a wise and 
efficient management of its subjects ' conduct toward productive avenues. 22 
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Today motor vehicle use has become even more habitual and taken-for-granted, 
as such doubts related to its physical threat on people ' s well-being are largely muted or 
completely suppressed. The private car's practical advantages of flexible and speedy 
mobility are woven with an ideology of necessity, which precludes a wider vision of 
alternatives. To question auto hegemony is in essence an act of heresy and irrationality. 
As Freund and Martin put it: "To question the pervasiveness of auto use is, at worst, to be 
labeled a Luddite, an eccentric, or even an enemy of freedom. At best, one is likely to be 
dismissed as a critic of the necessary, the inevitable, or the trivial."23 While the objective 
problems of the automobile - environmental pollution, traffic congestion, and injuries 
and fatalities- are acknowledged, automobility as a dominant organizing system is not 
fundamentally questioned?4 
Still , the stubborn reality of the traffic accident carries an interesting incentive 
against abandoning a critical sociology of technological discourses. The car crash does 
not only have the potential to instantly shatter life, limb, metal, and glass; it is as if every 
accident also serves as a tacit reminder that the deeply rooted belief in humans ' ability to 
tame the forces of nature through scientific and technological means may also be 
dubious. The crash thus produces an irony, descending violently upon the ostensibly safe 
and unwitting driver/pedestrian without any warning or moral bias. 25 Describing a 
frightening accident experienced first-hand , Elizabeth Jordan starkly captures this odd 
change of fate in The Saturday Evening Post in 1926: "There is something appalling 
about being gloriously well and exuberant and carefree one moment, and in the next 
moment being part of a frantic, struggling, bloody human mass writhing in a ditch or 
11 
under an automobile, or both, and having added to one ' s physical agony the intolerable 
mental anguish of being unable to help loved ones in that mass."26 Representing one type 
of socio-technical interface, the crash accentuates our body's human, all too human 
frailty. On the one hand, the automobile is remarkably anthropomorphic in proportion 
and design. But absurdly, it is precisely this near perfect fit that upon the crash makes the 
destruction of man and machine so oddly intimate. As Jane Grimshaw puts it, "The 
attachments of the car have a human scale, things we touch, press, stroke, hold, grasp and 
manipulate: knobs, wheels, columns, buttons which have the power to tum on us. The 
wheel I' m holding, the seat I' m sitting on, the knobs I' m turning can become the 
. f d h d" fi "27 mstruments o my eat or 1s 1gurement. 
The modem road is thus a deceitful space where otherwise responsible individuals 
instantly tum into killers, and where secure and safe travelers transfonn with a blink of an 
eye into hapless victims. Indeed, the accident serves as a constant reminder of the 
contingency of life and the mortality of man. In other words, it is an undeniably social 
phenomenon. And it is precisely this uncanny ability to frustrate plans and expectations 
that make the accident a valuable topic for the study of the way social problems are 
constructed . The century-long effort to address the automobile ' s deadliness represents a 
fascinating saga in the public culture of America. This campaign, as will become 
apparent in the following pages, has been arguably one of the most intense programs of 
social engineering in the history of the United States, a multi-pronged crusade in which 
powerful social institutions set out to prescribe, mold, and manage individuals ' behavior 
in the automotive world, right down to the most minute details. In a dramatic display of 
national self-hate and slander, this discourse also produced some of strongest blanket 
indictments of the American public as careless, reckless, and selfish- a fascinating 
contrast to the traditional celebrated beliefs of self-confidence, moral superiority, and 
infinite openness to improvement. 
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The last motivation to study automobile accidents has more to do with silence 
than with the spoken or written word. Relying again on the standard of numbers, one sees 
that automobile fatalities have nowadays become the leading cause of unnatural death in 
the world . According to recent figures by the World Health Organization (WHO) 
Approximately 1.2 million people die each year in vehicular related situations, some 
3,000 every day. On average, 40,000 of them lose their lives annually on roads in the 
United States.28 Yet ifthese statistics serve as any impressionable measure of severity, it 
seems that they have failed to foster much intellectual curiosity among sociologists. John 
Urry has recently called attention to the lingering absence of the car and its social 
implications from both mainstream sociology and critical social science analyses?9 The 
literature on social problems has also neglected treating accidents.30 Thirty years after its 
publication, Joseph Gusfield ' s The Culture of Public Problems still remains one of the 
sole comprehensive sociological works to closely examine traffic accidents on the level 
of public representations, albeit through a fairly narrow focus on drinking and driving as 
deviant behavior.31 In the wake of this void, historians have traditionally been the ones to 
carry out most of the scholarly work on phenomena related to the motor vehicle. But even 
the profuse historiography32 on the automobile in America and its concomitant ' car 
culture ' has, curiously, either touched upon auto accidents only briefly or neglected the 
13 
subject altogether.33 Furthermore, the few historical studies focusing particularly on auto 
safety in America suffer from several major shortcomings.34 First, they tend to be 
descriptive in nature, failing to provide theoretically-based causal explanations for the 
historical processes related to the car. Second, these works are rather narrow in 
contextual scope, treating traffic safety as an isolated field , uncmmected to the broader 
discourses on automobility and the capitalist system of production and destruction in 
America. 
Research Methods and Data 
In order to delineate, characterize, and interpret various salient currents in the public 
discourse on traffic accident in America, I apply content and thematic analysis to a host 
of historical materials. Generally, I will subject these texts to a Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA). Stemming from Habermas ' 35 and Foucault's36 critical theories, and 
more recently reformulated among others by Fairclough37 and van Dijk? CDA aims at 
uncovering the ideological assumptions hidden in the words of the written text or oral 
speech in order to make transparent the relationships between discursive practices, texts, 
and events, and wider social and cultural structures, relations, and processes. In focusing 
on the ways in which words are shaped by social structure, culture, and systems of 
knowledge, CDA draws attention to power imbalances, social inequities, and other 
injustices in the representation and shaping of the world. 
14 
The empirical corpus for this analysis is based on material collected from five 
different prominent sites in which the discourse on traffic accidents has been 
continuously produced for the most part of the twentieth century: 1) automobile 
enthusiasts (these include promoters, individual users, and automobile clubs), 2) the 
safety establishment, 3) the insurance industry, 4) the printed media, and 5) the consumer 
market. In choosing these sites among the variety of claims and claimsmakers in the 
discourse of accidents I do not, and cannot, pretend to exhaust all the available historical 
actors involved in this particular issue. Indeed, the arena of traffic accidents is extremely 
multivocal and polysemic, ranging from individuals operators, neighborhood and 
community activists, local and state organizations, through drivers education classrooms, 
industrial safety courses, official government campaigns, to car crashes in Hollywood 
action films, pop music, and Grand Theft Auto video games. Rather, by spotlighting 
several key claimsmakers in this field , my goal is, following Ian Hacking 's approach to 
social history, to produce a hypothesis about the relationship between concepts and their 
historical sites. 
1. Automobile Enthusiasts. Here I study the ways in which early automobile advocates 
and enthusiasts have responded to the traffic accident problem. Together with car 
manufacturers, national, regional, state, and city automobile clubs, such as the American 
Automobile Association (AAA) and the Automobile Club of America (ACA), have 
historically shared the helm of motor vehicle advocacy in the United States. Wielding 
considerable political clout in the United States, these organizations quickly became 
15 
prominent actors in the pursuit of automotive interests, greatly determining both the 
physical dominance of the auto-centered transportation system and the saliency of car 
culture. Their membership has traditionally consisted of a wide range of individuals from 
diverse power circles, including auto industry personnel , financial elites, aristocratic 
socialites, and key political players. 39 Empirically I will study discussions on traffic 
accidents in early motor magazines and automobile club publications, roughly from 1895 
to 1940. These journals provided the proponents of the automobile with a platform for 
promoting and exchanging ideology, strategies, and perceptions on various issues 
concerning automobility. Altogether nine of these leading journals are combed and 
analyzed: Automobile Review (1899-1905), Automobile Topics (1900-1948), Automobile 
Trade Journal (1912-1928), Motor (1903-1988), Motor Age (1899-1928), Motor Travel 
( 1908-1931 ), The Automobile ( 1899-1917), The Club Journal ( 1909-1916), and The 
Horseless Age (1895-1918) . 
2. The Safety Establishment. In studying the safety establishment I focus mainly on the 
discursive contributions of the National Safety Council (NSC), one of the premiere 
institutions in the field of accident prevention. Established in 1913 in light of the 
mounting cost of industrial accidents, the NSC still reigns as a dominant authority on 
safety work in the United States. The Council compiles and disseminates statistics on 
various kinds of accidents, organizes awareness campaigns, conducts research, and 
devises policy strategies. Although a private-public NGO, the Council is recognized by 
the United States governn1ent as one of the leading actors within the safety establishment 
16 
and is partially funded by federal money. The organization's long-standing importance as 
one of the leading claimsmakers in the field of auto safety has been well-documented.40 
Empirically, I systematically investigate the treatment of traffic accidents in the National 
Safety News (NSN), the NSC' s key publication. First published in 1919, the NSN 
presents a wealth of material on the Council's various policies, viewpoints, documents, 
and methods. It carries regular commentaries by the organization ' s members and 
executives, reports on local Safety Council activities, pertinent accident statistics, 
transcripts of annual meetings and conferences, open discussions on relevant issues, and 
campaign suggestions such as posters and leaflets. 
3. The Insurance Industry. Here I study the major representations of traffic accidents 
within the field of private auto insurance. Empirically, I analyze the Travelers Book of 
Street and Highway Accident Data (1931-197 4 ), an annual publication of the Travelers 
Insurance Company, one of the country ' s largest insurers . The Travelers Book, a highly 
charged text imbued with statistics, policy outlines, political claims, and graphic images 
of the accident problem, enjoyed an extremely long reach. As a professional journal that 
successfully extended beyond the field of private insurance to schools, police 
departments, and safety agencies, the publication represents a particularly useful platform 
for interrogating an actuarial perspective on automotive mishaps. 
4. Media. Here I investigate the discourse on traffic accidents as it is produced in major 
newspaper editorials. Since editorials openly seek to make political claims and explicitly 
17 
frame social issues in particular ways, they can provide fruitful material for investigating 
a site of discourse production. Specifically, I look at the changing meanings and 
representations of accidents throughout the years in the editorials of four major national 
newspapers: The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Chicago Daily Tribune , 
and the Los Angeles Times. 41 
5. The Consumer Market. Here I interrogate the role of commodification and the 
consumer market in shaping the public discourse on traffic accidents as a social problem. 
In particular I focus on the popular entertainment genre of wrecking cars in front of live 
audiences. By providing the first ever scholarly socio-historical study of auto thrill shows 
and demolition derbies, I tease out the cultural logics of the deliberate car crash show in 
America and its contribution to molding the meanings attributed to the accidental crash, 
i.e. the ' traffic accident. ' The portrayal of this unique subculture will be carried out by 
gleaning and putting together bits and pieces of data from numerous primary and 
secondary sources, including historical American newspapers (national and regional), 
professional automobile journals, popular magazines, biographies, an autobiography, 
souvenir programs, posters, and photographs. 
Overview of the Dissertation 
The inquiry presented here proceeds in layers that are at once thematic and temporal. Yet 
the discourse on traffic accidents is not historicized around a simple diachronic axis . 
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Instead of providing a date-based periodization, the analysis is carried out by a systematic 
examination of the data in order to identify the birth, development, and evolvement of 
themes.42 Cross-sectioned in this way, the empirical corpus produces four distinct social 
constructions of the accident, each of which is discussed in a separate chapter that 
highlights different historical moments and movements. 
Chapter 1 presents the theoretical terrains of the dissertation. By critically 
reviewing relevant research, I situate my study within two main bodies of literature: 1) 
social problems, and 2) the sociology oftechnology. Works in the sociology of social 
problem are first highlighted in their various constructivist approaches to understanding 
the socio-cultural processes by which groups define particular troubling conditions as 
worthy of attention and intervention. Afterwards, several central vehicles of 
claimsmaking that may affect the trajectory of a given problem 's definition over time are 
discussed. I then tum to works in the sociology of technology to illuminate various social 
responses to technological hazards, risks, and catastrophes. In particular I focus on the 
role of power- political, economic, and organizational -to shape public perceptions of 
human-made dangers and shift the weight of risks unto other parties. 
Chapter 2, "The Rationalized Accident," explores the responses of early 
automobile enthusiasts to the phenomena of accidents in the first four decades of 
automobility, roughly from 1895 to 1940. By 'enthusiasts ' I mean the core group of 
pioneering technological users and promoters who did not possess only economic 
interests in the success of the automobile but were also emotionally, ideologically, and 
practically invested in the technology.43 As the prominent collective amongst all early 
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users, these devotees- auto club members and executives, individual owners, 
manufacturers and promoters, race car drivers- disproportionately bore the brunt of the 
growing accident problem. Quite ironically, during this era the auto's most passionate 
advocates were also its most prevalent victims. In light of such contradictions befalling 
those who labored extensively to charge the new mode of conveyance with positive 
meaning, examining early automobilists' response to traffic accident may thus provide an 
opportunity to vividly capture several key meanings imputed to automotive carnage in its 
initial stages. 
A number of central questions drive this chapter. First, how did automobile 
enthusiasts frame, . describe, and interpret the car crash? Specifically, what were the 
discursive strategies by which these groups negotiated their strong allegiance to the motor 
vehicle with the rising evidence of its destructiveness? And in what ways did these 
representations spell out both the present nature and future trajectory of the emerging 
technology? 
My answers to these questions are primarily based on a systematic reading and 
analysis on the multitude of discussions on accidents in early automobile publications. 
Ultimately, I rest a great part of my explanations for these responses on Bourdieu' s field 
theory. 
In Chapter 3, "The Quantified Accident," I investigate the use of statistics in the 
public discourse on traffic accidents in the United States. Highlighting quantification as a 
dominant vehicle for making claims on this issue, I consider the various meanings of 
numbers in the social representations of the car crash. Other than couching these practices 
in prevailing bureaucratic and professional epistemologies that prioritize abstract and 
universal knowledge, the chapter also delves into the particular institutions and 
significations of quantification in the arena of traffic safety. 
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The main questions motivating this chapter are: What have been the chief 
methods and strategies for collecting, disseminating, and interpreting statistical 
information of traffic accidents throughout the years? In which ways have these compiled 
numbers been employed in public discussions on the safety problem? What motivated 
these specific uses? How did these dominant cultural meanings affect the accident rate in 
reality? 
I seek answers to these questions by structurally mapping out the processes in 
which numbers are produced and circulated between the various active players 
participating in these public conversations. In doing so I apply in part a Foucauldian 
analysis of the conditions that make a discourse possible. 
Chapter 4, "The Controlling Accident," focuses on the element of social power in 
the discourse on traffic accidents . Examining the various techniques of persuasion, 
surveillance, labeling, and distribution of blame, I foreground the different avenues by 
which authoritative actors translated the occurrence of the auto mishap into a mode of 
social control. In doing so I aim to come up with a portrayal of traffic safety as a force-
field of influence and supervision in which not only modes of physical conduct are 
engendered (driving, walking, speeding, crashing, and so on), but forms of knowledge 
and meanings (safe dispositions, accident proneness, pedestrian subjectivities, and so on) 
as well. 
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Several crucial questions guide this chapter. What is the nature of social power 
present in various safety education campaigns, which constituted some of the twentieth 
century's grand programs of public health and social engineering? Have these modalities 
of power changed throughout the years? Who are the main institutional actors in this 
force-field and what motivates them? And what can be deduced about the intentionality 
and directionality of these power strategies? 
Again, I base my explanatory move on Foucault ' s insights into the dynamics of 
discourse, power, and discipline. 
Chapter 5, "The Planned Accident," explores a much neglected aspect in the 
history of the automobile and traffic accident in America: The highly prevalent practice 
of deliberately crash cars to entertain live audiences. By providing a socio-historical 
account of the birth and development through the years of auto thrill shows and 
demolition derbies, I highlight the role of consumption in shaping salient representations 
of the traffic accident. 
Leading this interrogation are several important questions. First, how can we 
explain the act of deliberately destroying the automobile, an iconic machine that is 
revered precisely for its wholeness and quality as an operational technology? When does 
it become possible to fathom, create, and popularize the staged car crash? Who are the 
central actors and institutions that invented, sanctioned, and carried out these spectacles? 
How have the imagery, aesthetics, and discourse emanating from this particular genre 
related to the public discussions on the traffic accident? 
The conclusion chapter summarizes the main findings, assesses the theoretical 
move in relation to the existing models, and, lastly, provides a hypothetical model for 
understanding the ways in which social problems become normalized. 
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Chapter 1. 
The Theoretical Grounds 
In situating the dissertation theoretically I build upon, critique, and supplement two main 
bodies of literature. The first is that nebulous yet sizeable and strictly sociological corpus 
of works tagged under the rubric of ' social problems. ' Within this expansive literature my 
review discusses the various constructivist approaches to analyzing social problems, 
several models for explaining the temporal element in definitional processes, and the 
different vehicles of claimsmaking that impact the evolvement and development of 
particular issues in public discourse. 
The second group of writings I engage- the sociology of technology - is 
embedded more strongly in the interdisciplinary and amorphous scholarly area of science 
& technology studies (STS). STS is a highly variegated body of literature that brings 
together approaches and empirical interests from diverse fields such as sociology, 
anthropology, cultural studies, political science, public policy, and risk analysis. In 
covering relevant STS research my overview centers on works that have dealt with 
various social-cultural responses- whether political , popular, or organizational - to risk, 
accidents, and unintended technological consequences. A special emphasis is put on the 
various ways in which dangers are attenuated, responsibility for damages is deflected, 
and harm is normalized. 
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1. Social Problems 
All social phenomena include a problematic element of a certain kind - even if the social 
scientist is the one to carry out the problematization in the name of initiating research. 
This intrinsic quality may help to explain the inability of 'social problems' to ever really 
establish itself firmly as a distinct subfield of study within sociology. As Spector and 
Kitsuse observed in 1977, while the term 'social problems' has no adequate definition, it 
functions primarily as a rubric for presenting sociological wisdom to undergraduates. 1 
Though both scholars attempted to remedy this situation by formulating a 'sociology of 
social problems , ' their level of success remains arguable. 2 Nevertheless, it still is 
possible to identify several theories that since the late nineteenth century have guided the 
sociological study of troubling social situations. 3 Broadly speaking, the shift in 
theoretical emphasis during this timeframe can be characterized as a change in focus 
from conditions to activities.4 Whereas earlier sociologists interested in social problems 
centered on the actual cumbersome realities and their possible remedies, later analysis 
primarily probed the ways in which putative conditions emerge as 'problems' through 
social actors' definitional processes of claimsmaking. Thus in the past four decades, it is 
the latter approach- generally known as constructivism - that has risen to prominence in 
the sociological studies of social problems. 5 
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The Constructivist Theory of Social Problems 
Representing a theory of social problems distinct from sociological theory used in 
research on undesirable conditions, constructivist writing and analysis now arguably 
consists of the most serious and sustained social theory in the field. 6 Laying the 
groundwork for this perspective, Fuller and Meyers/ Becker,8 and later Blumer,9 
advanced a definitional conceptualization of social problems. ' Problems,' they asserted in 
principle, are troublesome situations that are defined by the social group as such. In his 
seminal formulation, Blumer stated that, "A social problem does not exist for a society 
unless it is recognized by that society to exist." 10 Building on Blumer' s work to formulate 
a radical constructivist theory, Spector and Kitsuse argued that social problems exist 
independently of actual harmful situations. A problem does not comprise real life 
conditions but an "activity," which in essence consists of making claims about a 
distressing situation with the intent of eradicating, ameliorating, or otherwise changing 
it. 11 The task of sociologists interested in social problems is thus to examine the terms 
under which the so-called problem has been cast, debated, explored, and interpreted on 
the level of social discourse and representation. 
Predictably, proposing such a radical movement away from traditional 
understandings of social realities had exposed strict constructivism to several theoretical 
difficulties, most notably the risk of regression into deep relativism, a moral and political 
ambiguity, and an inability to distinguish between serious and spurious problems. As 
critiques of the strict version of constructivism mounted and several scholarly debates 
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ensued, 12 other students of social problems crafted theories that sought a middle-ground 
position. These 'contextual ' or 'moderate' constructivists aimed to locate claimsmaking 
within particular social and historical moments. Thus, while contextualists still agree that 
problems are socially constructed, they maintain that such constructs can also be 
measured against an objective condition capable of being concretely determined by 
certain scientific standards. This objective dimension, however, does not define the social 
problem, nor does it strictly determine subjective concern over it. 13 
The Focus on Emergence 
Constructivist works have generally focused more on the methods of emergence or 
"discovery" of issues within the definitional process of claimsmaking than on specific 
ways in which they may stagnate, wane or "disappear." A partial sample of issues 
scrutinized in recent decades for their emergence as a social problem includes child 
b 14 p 1 s d 15 h . . 16 . k" 17 lk" 18 a use, remenstrua yn rome, yperact1v1ty, cigarette smo mg, sta mg, new 
drugs, 19 and road rage.20 Other authors have concentrated on cases in which ostensibly 
troubling conditions never materialize into ' social problems. ' 2 1 Theoretical fommlations 
that have paid attention to a problem's dampening or disappearance had usually done so 
not exclusively, but rather within extended models that sought to account for overarching 
trajectories throughout the life course of the problem. These works are discussed below. 
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Trajectories of Social Problems 
If social problems are products of group definitions, it follows that they are open to 
change and exhibit a transformative character. Several scholars have attempted to lay out 
explanatory models that will uncover the dynamics of modification undergone by social 
constructs over extended periods of time. Though some overlapping exists in these 
theoretical works, for the sake of analytic clarity I will divide my discussion into three 
different kinds of models : sequential, ecological, and internal. 
Sequential 
In 1941 Fuller and Myers presented the first attempt to outline a general developmental 
sequence of social problems. According to them, problems progress within a "natural 
history" that consists of three main stages: 1) awareness, 2) policy formation, and 3) 
reform. 22 Somewhat similarly, Herbert Blumer later claimed that social problems have 
"careers," unfolding through a process of collective definition that comprises 1) the 
emergence of the problem, 2) the legitimation of the problem, 3) the mobilization of 
action, 4) the formation of an official plan, and 5) the implementation of the official plan. 
Yet unlike Fuller and Myers ' more rigid model, Blumer emphasized that movement from 
one stage to the next is highly contingent and uneven. Some problems never emerge, 
failing in this sense to make a "bid for attention." Other predicaments, even if recognized 
as such, may fall short of gaining legitimation, only to be left to flounder and languish 
outside the arena of public action. At about the same time, Downs argued that problems 
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often go through ' issue attention cycles,' wherein the public' s initial heightened interest 
gradually recedes into aloofness as attention shifts to other, newly exciting matters. An 
issue that enters such a "post-problem stage" moves into a "prolonged limbo - a twilight 
realm of lesser attention or spasmodic recurrences of interest. "23 While positing people' s 
realization of the difficulty and high cost of radical change, as well as simple boredom 
with a lingering problem, as viable explanations for the decline in the intensity of public 
interest, Downs' general and vague model falls short of accounting for the dynamic 
nature of a problem' s development. By employing the blanket concept of ' public,' he 
cannot pay attention to the variety of claimsmakers operating in any given arena and the 
different mechanisms and modalities they use for shaping the definition of the issue at 
hand. Spector and Kitsuse subsequently built on these works to refonnulate a 
comprehensive hypothetical24 model of a natural history of social problems. While 
concurring with Fuller and Myers and Blumer that social problems go through initial 
stages of emergence, legitimation, and action towards reform, they claim that these 
scholars have neglected to provide the extended story by failing to account for what 
happens to problems after these initial phases. They ask: What constitutes a social 
problem' s ' resolution'? When does it cease to exist? By adding two more stages to the 
model - 1) the reemergence of new kinds of claimsmaking activities that target the 
institutional responses to the original claims, followed by 2) the seeking of alternative, 
non-institutional avenues of claimsmaking- Spector and Kitsuse believe they have 
supplied a fuller portrayal of the general kinds of transformations undergone by social 
problem constructs. But their general acknowledgment that at each stage the problem 
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may falter or cease to exist, particularly "when [claimsmaking activities] culminate in the 
creation and establishment of procedures to deal with claims," still says little of how this 
might occur. 25 Furthermore, given that a problem constitutes a defined arena of 
claimsmaking activities, it remains unclear how the two added stages are cotenninous 
with a case in which the problem "disappears". 26 If anything, these extensions speak to a 
transformation in the nature claims and the target of claimants- not necessarily to the 
fading of the problem from public concern. In his study of drug use as a social problem, 
Peyrot adds a theoretical corTective to Spector and Kitsuse's potential drawback of 
linearity in their natural history model. Peyrot argues that the later stages of an issue 's 
development are dependent upon the earlier stages, the former comprising of a "second 
generation" in the overall cycle undergone by the problem. The remedial approach 
instituted in the early cycle of the problem shapes the context of the later approaches by 
creating a highly inert system of knowledge, expertise, and intervention. 27 
Ecological 
In part due to a theoretical dissatisfaction with the idea that problems evolve 
diachronically, in part related to new empirical misfits with existing models, other works 
in the past two and a half decades searched for synchronic explanations to account for the 
changes in problem definitions. Focusing on the environment where the social 
construction occurs, some authors have found that shifting structural circumstances, such 
as wars and financial crises, can influence the definition process.28 The rapidly changing 
nature of real problematic events may also attenuate demands for political solutions. Such 
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is the case, for instance, concerning the quick fading in the summer of 1988 of the 
"global warming scare." As the record-breaking heat waves dissipated by the fall , the 
issue soon gave way to other pressing matters, politicians retracted their initial promises 
for more radical solutions, and the ensuing green movement redirected its attention and 
activities toward more general environmental problems and diplomatic arenas. 29 
Yet the most comprehensive work in this category is probably the one by 
Hilgartner and Bosk. Pointing out the limitations afflicting the notion that social 
problems progress sequentially, they turn the focus away from chronological phases to 
exploring the element of competition within discursive arenas.30 They ask: Given that 
public attention is a scarce resource, what are the factors and forces capable of shifting 
people' s interest from one problem to another? The answer, they believe, lies in their 
'Public Arenas Model. ' According to this framework, competition occurs both within 
each substantive arena, as different "operatives" attempt to advance varying frames, 
goals, and interests, and between many other problem arenas that seek public attention. 
One important factor determining the outcomes of these contests is the "carrying 
capacity" of discourse producing institutions (e.g. media, legislators, advocacy groups) as 
well as individual activists (politicians, reporters, public relations consultants). The 
necessarily limited space to fully harbor and thoroughly treat a single problem will 
greatly decide its chances of earning either prime or marginal consideration. Other 
important "principles of selection" that bear on the probability of problems to survive 
competition include (1) the ability to present problems in a dramatic form, (2) the 
necessity of producing novel symbolic images of the issues at stake in order to avoid 
saturation, (3) the degree of congruency between the institutions involved in making 
claims about a problem and the broader cultural preoccupations and political biases 
prevailing at a particular historical moment, and ( 4) organizational constraints, 
characteristics, and cultures. Furthermore, social networks and patterned institutional 
relations between arenas act as feedback loops that either amplify or dampen problems. 
Social problems that first arise in one arena have a tendency to spread into others. 
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Moving away from linear natural history theories to ecological ones, the 'Public 
Arenas Model ' thus provides a highly beneficial analytic tool. Most importantly, it makes 
visible the broader contingencies facing problem construction in a necessarily 
heterogeneous social environment. The focus on the constraints of competition, selection, 
and adaptation in relation to other problems that vie for public attention helps to explain 
why some issues succeed in capturing the limelight while others fade away. Yet the 
authors themselves recognize that an ecological model still falls short of translating 
perfectly into a cultural framework. It says little about the ways key operatives "select 
some social problems, formulate them in special ways, and advance them to promote 
their interests and goals."31 This task has been partially done by what I call 'internal' or 
'frame shift ' theories of changing social problem definitions. These are discussed below. 
Internal 
The works in this category seek to explain modifications in problem definitions by 
examining the cultural devices employed within the construction process itself. In a 
comprehensive theoretical effort, Jamrozik and Nocella argue that social problems 
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emerge as a 'negative residue' ofthe pursuit of society ' s dominant values and interests. 
Seen in this light, changes in the problems ' understanding reflect shifts in these values.32 
Shifts in the public representations of social problems may also be attributed to variations 
in what Gamson and Modigliani call "cultural packaging." Such transformations occur 
when alternative sponsor groups emerge with new claims, media practices refocus their 
attention on novelty and drama, and frames resonate loudly with wider cultural themes.33 
Other authors have examined the impact of employing specific frames. Haines 
focused on the ways in which depoliticization may affect the fate of social problems. 
Although every social problem is essentially a political realm of making claims, at times 
it might appear apolitical as the debate subsides and a general consensus congeals around 
the nature of the issue and its solutions, thereby turning it into a matter "beyond 
argument." Such change - the problem's "enclosure" - usually occurs when the issue 
becomes highly scientized and judged through cognitive, rather than normative channels 
of meaning making. Enclosure thus occurs when a problem is transferred from a 
contested arena of struggle to a narrow and monopolized one where experts claim sole 
h. 34 owners 1p. 
The level , frequency, and magnitude of claims also affect the public 
representations of troubling matters. Building on research in communications and news 
frames, Kinnick et a! found that people may develop a "compassion fatigue" in their 
reaction to social problems. Such a "burnout" is attributed largely to media contributions 
to the problem' s construction, as overly pervasive coverage may lead to either 
desensitization, in which a bombarded populace develops a shield of indifference, or 
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hypersensitization, wherein emotionally overwhelmed audiences feel they lack the 
resources to cope with the troubling issue. Furthermore, when problems seem to have low 
personal salience and victims are perceived as the chief bearers of the blame, the public's 
empathy tends to fade .35 Indeed, rather than reflecting an objective response to the 
seriousness of a problem, sympathy has been found to be a culturally embedded and 
temporally variable sentiment. For example, ebbs and flows of public concern toward 
homelessness and famine are not only related to institutional responses to these problems 
but also to broader "cultural rhythms" and rituals such as annual holiday seasons.36 
Vehicles of Claimsmaking Affecting the Evolution of Social Problems 
In this section I will identify and review some of the major modalities that may affect the 
definition of a problem over time and direct its trajectory to a particular construct or 
outcome rather than another. These devices are not so much the frames employed by 
claimsmakers to place discursive content in particular perspectives, but the actual cultural 
sieves or 'grinders' that such content is processed through. They include: 
technicism/pragmatism, institutionalization, power and social control, medicalization, 
quantification, and commodification/consumerization. Again, though these categories are 
by no means mutually exclusive they will be treated separately to maintain descriptive 
and analytic clarity. Where available, each theoretical category will be supported by 
empirical cases on accidents in general and traffic mishaps in particular. 
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Technicality and Pragmatism 
As a device for the processing through, and shaping of real life events, a technical 
approach to worldly problems has its origin in the triumph of rationality, cognitivism, and 
science and technology in the Modernist cosmology. Modern states regularly choose to 
tackle complex problems and social tasks by applying rational-technical paradigms 
endemic to bureaucratic functioning. 37 This approach carries with it particular 
consequences for the construction of social problems in the public domain of discourse 
and representation. By consigning a difficult situation to the realm of administrators and 
experts, governments narrow the definition of issues since trained policy professionals 
usually seek objective technical answers to all matters placed before them. Solutions are 
drawn from the known reservoir of the do-able and applicable, that is, what ever can be 
put to practical use in clearly recognizable situations. Though these mechanisms and 
instruments often provide valuable input and data on both the problem and possible 
policy avenues, rarely do they call for structural change in resource allocation that might 
be necessary to effectively solve or attenuate the problem.38 Commissioned research into 
social problems often translates the political nature ofthe issue into a technical one that 
can only be solved, attenuated or controlled by means such as legislative or 
administrative measures. 39 Gusfield even maintains that the very definition of a condition 
as a 'social problem' rather than a 'public issue' may depoliticize the matter and serve as 
the antecedent to technocratization since it assumes the existence of a consensus around 
the undesirability of the situation. This may limit or ignore adversarial elements, turning 
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the problem into a technical or legal one in which alternative frameworks are not thought 
of.4o 
Institutionalization 
The degree of institutionalization- the processes by which structures, including schemas, 
rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social 
behavior41 -constitutes another key historical and political variable capable of 
detern1ining the trajectory of a social problem.42 Broadly speaking, when government and 
other official bodies take notice of a problem and work out a series of coping 
mechanisms to deal with it, the problem is institutionalized.43 The modalities of 
institutionalization may range from organizational integration into extant systems and 
structures, through various bureaucratic control and response mechanisms, to political 
and legislative action within established frameworks of incorporation. Governments 
faced with a social problem that calls for difficult policy decisions and elicits negative 
reactions from the electorate or an influential lobby, tend to relegate the issue to 
administrative or professional experts in the form of commissions of inquiry, private 
consultants, and accredited research.44 The range of institutionalization ' s effects on the 
collective definition and social representation of the problem may also vary. On the one 
hand, successful institutional integration of a troubling issue in the form of 
accommodating political demands may result in the mollification of the outspoken 
claimant group.45 Relegating a problem to the domains of particular organizational habits, 
routines, and procedures may neutralize its moral significance and political nature by 
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"cooling off the controversy"46 in the cold waters of bureaucratic operationalism. As 
Spector and Kitsuse put it, "Commissions may be the burial ground of a great many 
social problems."47 One reason for this outcome lies in the fact the responses to social 
problems often constitute not so much effective solution to troubling conditions but 
strategies of organizational self-preservation. A professional movement to address a 
social problem involves a theory and a body of presumed facts about the existence of the 
problem. Such theories constitute vital sources for a sense of professional esteem, client 
respect, and the ability to maintain legitimate occupational place.48 For example, shifting 
the response of work-related accidents primarily to insurance companies ' realm of dry 
actuarial calculations allows subcontractors to attenuate the emotional and moral burden 
of the fatality and tum it into a calm and rational legal procedure. Ultimately, such a 
move replaces the need to make actual safety changes that will prevent further 
accidents. 49 
Fitchen et a! have found that structured government intervention in dangerous 
conditions may attenuate affected people ' s perception of the risk involved. When official 
agencies stepped in to conduct the process of investigation and remediation in a town 
whose water sources were contaminated, the focus of the inhabitants shifted from the 
health hazards to the bureaucratic process of investigation, testing, and clean-up. 50 
Yet institutionalization does not necessarily spell the problem' s vanishing from 
the public limelight or its moral floundering in technocratic terrains. When new 
institutions are created to deal with the claims and complaints, or some exiting institution 
is mandated to expand its jurisdiction to include the issue under its responsibility, the 
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social problem cannot disappear so easily. Once created, such institutions assume a life of 
their own, as staff develop vested interest in addressing the problem and agencies lobby 
for larger budgets. 51 In fact , institutionalization often means a social problem' s finest 
hour: media coverage is at its peak, politicians vie for input, and claimsmakers may 
become public figures . 52 The establishment of an official agency assigned the task of 
finding a remedial solution or controlling the problem implies that the agency becomes 
the focal point for bringing the issue to the attention of the general public and other 
government agencies. 53 
Power and Social Control 
The application of social control as a mode of intervention into a hannful situation has 
been found to perpetuate the problem in several ways. In modem times, the 'helping 
professions' -psychiatrists, psychologists, specialist teachers, social workers, and social 
researchers -have become an integral part of the fom1al social control apparatus. Yet 
although members of these professions have gained considerable clout in evaluating and 
guiding people ' s behaviors, their power tends to be "anarchic and unpredictable."54 It is 
here that social control often generates the unintended consequences of amplifying rule-
breaking behavior and reproducing the problem it purports to solve or curtail. As Gary 
Marx has found, social control can ironically contribute to transgression by escalating 
deviancy, strategically non-enforcing specific laws, and covertly facilitating actions that 
encourage rule breaking. 55 One example of such boomeranging actions includes high-
speed police chases that often result in injurious or fatal automobile accidents. 
41 
Furthermore, a source for non-enforcement and covert facilitation is the bureaucratization 
of the agency of social control, wherein the organization seeks methods for self-justifying 
and perpetuating its own existence and displaying a veneer of productivity in the 
competition with other agencies over prestige and resources. This can be seen, for 
instance, in the quantification of traffic tickets issued or arrests made as a basis for 
performance evaluation, reward, and promotion, thereby elevating crime rates in order to 
meet monthly quotas. 56 
Social control can thus reproduce both the putative troublesome conditions and 
the very definition of these conditions as socially problematic. As Gary Marx puts it in a 
nice metaphor: 
The relationship between controllers and controlled may often be characterized as 
a movable equilibrium. As in sports or any competitive endeavor, new strategies, 
techniques and resources may give one side a temporary advantage, but the other 
side tends to find ways to neutralize, avoid or counter them. The action may 
become more sophisticated, practitioners more skilled, and the nature of the game 
may be altered - but the game does not stop. 57 
Yet it is important to note that the application of social control measures when facing 
problems that involve physical danger and risk does not always emanate from 
authoritative needs of power wielding and display. The relationship between insurance 
and the dividing practices of populations is a case in point. The theory of insurance is 
based on the notion of risk, that is the probability of future harm. 58 Yet as Ewald argues, 
this is as much a moral theory as it is a rational-practical one. An accident, which is an 
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instance of misfortune and suffering that strikes at one person and spares the other, is 
always individual. A risk of an accident, on the other hand, affects a population and can 
be calculated on that level alone. Therefore, "the work of the insurer is, precisely, to 
constitute that population by selecting and dividing risks."59 In the early days of modem 
insurance, the profitability of the institution rested on its ability to exclude risky groups 
and behaviors. This was done by subjecting the population to indefinite analysis into 
more and more finely detailed sub-classes of risk. "Insuring a population means 
classifying it, subdividing it in line with a scale of degrees of risk and with an analysis of 
behaviors, thresholds, marginal categories which are first excluded, then treated as 
special sub-classes while excluding still more marginal groups, and so on."60 
On the other hand, insurance individualizes in a unique way. Unlike juridical 
moralistic notions of personal fault and responsibility, in insurance each individual is 
distinguished by his or her probability of risk in relation to the population as a whole, an 
"individuality relative to that of other members of the insured population."61 This 
dividing operation is based on insurance's theory of justice: unlike judicial endeavors to 
find causes and determine blame, insurance seeks to distribute the sharing of the 
collective burden, to which each member's contribution can be fixed according to a 
rule. 62 In this sense, insurance is a moral technology. 
Medicalization 
Medicalization- the sociocultural process by which nonmedical problems become 
defined and treated as medical ones, usually in terms of illnesses or disorder- has figured 
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as a pivotal vehicle for making sense of troubling social phenomena in the past two 
hundred years. 63 Specifically, medicalization consists of defining a problem in medical 
terms, using medical language to describe a problem, adopting a medical framework to 
understand a problem, or using a medical intervention to "treat" it.64 Medicalization has 
been applied to both supposed deviant behavior (e.g. madness, alcoholism, 
homosexuality, gambling) and "natural life processes" (e.g. sexuality, childbirth, child 
development, aging). 65 A salient example of dramatic medicalization is found in the 
discourse on alcohol use in the United States, when after Repeal (1933) experts began 
viewing drunkards as victims of a disease that could be helped by peers and/or 
professional healers. 66 
In general , sociologists are critical about medicalization but ambivalent as to the 
recognition of certain gains and losses in its lasting social consequences. 67 On the one 
hand, medicalization is critiqued for decontextualizing social problems by advancing the 
assumption of moral neutrality, unquestioning the authority of experts, privatizating and 
depoliticizing human behavior, and unjustly dislocating responsibility. 68 For instance, 
conceptualizing weak academic performance as " learning disabilities" is charged for 
masking the effects of social power and hierarchy. 69 Similarly, medicalized conceptions 
of battering can lead to therapy and distract from a focus on patriarchal values and social 
inequality. 70 Thus, in highly stratified societies, medicalization may have serious 
implications for social justice. 71 
On the other hand, others recognize that medicalization' s decontextualization 
does not necessarily result in depoliticization. To cite one instance, the rise of post-
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traumatic stress disorder diagnosis in the military shifted the focus away from the 
individual soldier to the nature ofwar. 72 Likewise, the medical organizing against nuclear 
war allowed physicians to make political statements in the name of health, turning 
attention to the effects of apocalyptic war. 73 
Quantification 
Quantification constitutes an extremely widespread device in the definitional processes of 
social problems in the United States. 74 Though often employed for their ostensible 
objective and authoritative quality, numbers are in fact socio-cultural products that 
fm1her shape the way a problem will be represented in the public sphere. Joseph Gusfield 
has made this point lucidly in his analysis of the use of numbers in discussions of 
drinking-related accidents. Within this discourse, statistics are often presented as certain, 
clear, factual , and devoid of ambiguity. Yet this is hardly the case. Not only are numbers 
carefully chosen and represented to advance a pm1icular worldview, they often say little 
about the etiology of road mishaps, as "association is converted into causation."75 In 
similar vein, Amy Best argues that numerical figures constructing such discursive 
categories as 'Accidents involving teens,' ' Accidents involving teen drivers,' 'Teen 
drivers involved in fatal crashes,' or 'Teen driver fatalities,' make a facile and erroneous 
theoretical leap, pinning responsibility to teens where in reality much uncertainty lays: 
"As media reports accident statistics, the assumption is that an accident involving a teen 
must have been an accident caused by a teen." 76 Statistics on teen accidents are thus 
productive: By constructing a particular image of teenagers as a group signifying 
extraordinarily high ' risk' to themselves and others, such techniques of quantification 
reify and essentialize the phenomena they are purportedly merely counting. 
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Indeed, contrary to common belief, counting itself cannot be considered a simple 
cognitive operation of assigning numbers to a given quantity of objects; it is, rather, a 
context-bound and socially organized activity. Such contextual "work" is inseparable 
from the act of counting: Enumeration establishes what is in the world at the same time as 
it determines how much there is of it. Counting entities within social groups also means 
counting the conditions of the membership rights, its competencies, and its 
responsibilities. 77 
One reason public numbers are culturally charged has to do with the fact that 
statistics are reflections of organizational contingencies and processes rather than 
objective indices of certain forms of behavior. 78 The employment of numbers by the 
media during the drug scares ofthe 1980s and early 1990s was found to be determined by 
internal production processes imbedded in the journalistic enterprise. The creativity and 
professional skills of reporters, editors, and graphic designers, as well as the selective 
targeting of the media marketplace by social researchers, came together to create specific 
quantified knowledge. 79 Likewise, coroners searching the causes of mortality are not 
motivated by the pursuit of statistical bookkeeping but by classification practices that are 
underpinned by existing cultural definitions of death, and by environmental constraints 
such as family demands for specific rulings. 80 The production of crime rates through 
police reports and records are similarly tied to organizational pressures that make 
particular figures visible while obscuring others. 81 Indices frequently used in evaluating 
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the effectiveness of mental health institutions -re-admission rates, ratios of staffers to 
patients, and waiting list lengths- serve primarily to marshal action on short-term 
organizational goals while blurring the long-term consequences of such assessments. The 
result may be an increase in the skepticism and mistrust from the public toward the 
profession and its institutions. 82 
Other works have called attention to the ways by which statistics "mutate" across 
the social landscape, reconfiguring the public discourse as they are echoed, remolded, or 
rejected by the various actors. On one hand, once quantified, things tend to become 
routinized; in bureaucracies they tum increasingly reified and fateful. Each use by 
politicians, the media, and social scientists gives them meaning, consequences, and a 
certain authority. On the other hand, the original purpose of numbers often changes as 
they travel across time and space.83 For one, these transmutations may highly distort the 
images of issues. Inflated numbers have the power to stir unwarranted concern or 
political intervention. They also have a tendency to linger in the public imagination 
despite exhibiting only a flimsy connection to the real conditions they originally 
purported to define. 84 In the intense process of symbolization taking place specifically 
during moral panics, sets of terms, events, or objects, such as statistics, lose ties to their 
original contexts and become increasingly self-referential. 85 Such is the case, for 
example, in the discussion of teenage drivers ' involvement in car accidents. While in 
reality teens' portion pales in comparison to larger accident trends, the media over-
dramatizes the statistical risk posed by this age group. 86 
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Commodification and Consumerization 
Karl Marx had long ago pointed to the tendency of capitalism to commodify ever-
increasing aspects oflife.87 Following his observations, scholars oflate-capitalism have 
noted that such relentless commodifaction continues to be one of the defining characters 
of contemporary market dynamics . Today, such expansionism reaches to the household 
economy, health care and education, public welfare and prisons, news, entertainment and 
information, public space and personal relations. 88 
One critical interpretation of the consequences of commodifying social problems 
relates to the perpetuation of the existing social order and power structure.89 Frankfurt 
School critiques of 20th century capitalism and the rise ofthe ' culture industry,' reflect 
this position. Mass-produced culture continuously conquers more and more segments of 
the public sphere, effectively socializing individuals into passivity and conformism while 
destroying competition, autonomous social institutions, and cultural diversity. By 
increasingly coming under the logic of the market, culture loses its critical, resistant, and 
creative abilities to envision and realize alternative realities. The kind of "pleasure" 
propagated by the culture industry, say Adorno and Horkheimer, engenders "flight not 
from a wretched reality, but from the last remaining thought of resistance."90 Others have 
investigated the effects of consumerism on the social definitions of risk and threats. Barry 
Glassner argues that the proliferation of misguided scares and irrational anxieties in 
contemporary society is caused in great part by the immense profit reaped by an entire 
fear-mongering industry, which shrewdly capitalizes on the marketing and selling of 
dread and danger. 91 
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Some authors have exposed the micro-political consequences of commodifying 
social problems on people 's daily lives. Recent changes in official welfare criteria for 
chronically ill individuals have spumed a perverse effect wherein the disease becomes a 
commodity in the hands of those steeped in deep poverty. The newly introduced 
possibility of losing or being denied benefits on the basis of improving health has created 
a situation in which chronic illnesses are essentially commodities that the poor must use 
to barter with the public welfare system in order to obtain a stable income and access to 
health care. In such situations wherein the diagnosis appears more "valuable" as the 
disease progresses, illnesses tum into assets that can be used as bargaining chips by the 
extremely destitute in order to negotiate for income and services. 92 
A second central critique of commodification asserts that subsuming social problems 
under the logic of the market leads to an a-historical, skewed, and ultimately 
depoliticized grasp of troubling conditions.93 This criticism has its origin in Marx 's idea 
of commodity fetishism. Though it has undergone several complex reformulations and 
interpretations since coined by Marx in the third volume of Capital, in its broadest sense 
commodity fetishism pertains to the processes though which capitalist commodity 
exchange detaches the value and meaning of objects from their social and material origin. 
A commodity is fetishized when it assumes an autonomous and "mysterious" form 
divorced from its roots in exploitative relations of production; in short, when production 
is fatally severed from consumption. Quail et al's work on the commodification of 
problems on television talk shows embraces this stance.94 By frequently plugging 
merchandise, selling live audience to experts and viewers to advertisers, and turning 
problems into sensationalized spectacles of individual malfunction, talk shows forge a 
site wherein real social problems are turned into commodified content. Ultimately, the 
result is a privitization and depoliticization of the broader social dilemmas. 
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Third, commodification induces a certain decontextualization that amplifies the 
discordant meanings of social discourse in late capitalism.95 Commodity culture presents 
us with an endless flow of depthless images that often produce satiated detachment and 
disorientation, rather than sympathy for and commitment to social change.96 The 
commodification of roadkill through the production of consumer goods such as T -shirts, 
road-kill cookbooks, teddy bears and other dead animal mementos reinforces the 
tendency of commodity culture to regard animal bodies as things whose routine 
destruction inspires morbid curiosity, but not empathy or concem.97 
2. The Sociology of Technology 
Broadly speaking, sociological and historical studies of technology have proceeded 
within two main theoretical blocs: internalist and contextualist. Intemalist theories seek 
to explain technological developments from-within by focusing primarily on the inner 
dynamics and social trajectories of particular artifacts. Processes of technical evolution 
are conceived here primarily as self-contained linear, emanating from the actions of key 
actors such as inventors, innovators, and entrepreneurs. In this light, material objects are 
often seen as forces that exhibit "technological determinism," that is the power to shape 
social phenomena. Contextualists, in contrast, approach questions of technological 
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change and meaning from a different perspective. Springing up in recent decades partly 
as criticism against internalist and detern1inistic analyses of technology, contexualists 
favor context-sensitive and constructivist models. For them, any analysis of technological 
devices cannot be detached from the wider socio-cultural environment in which they are 
conceived, created, and applied. In line with the general constructivist approach to social 
questions adopted in the dissertation I focus below on the latter theory. In doing so I 
review the various ways contextualist theories and models inform our understanding of 
risk, technology, and accidents. 
The Social Construction of Technology 
A critique against overly mechanistic approaches to understanding technological 
development and change, The Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) theory was 
originally put forth by Bijker and Pinch,98 and later elaborated in their edited volume with 
Hughes99 and more recently by Bijker. 100 They view technology not as being driven by its 
own momentum or rational , goal-oriented, and problem-solving path carved out by 
particular key individuals and internal dynamics, but instead as being produced by 
various social factors. Specifically, this constructivist perspective contextualizes 
technological artifacts through the meanings given to them by social actors or 'relevant 
social groups' (RSGs), which are essentially involved in trying to fix a particular 
articfacts ' dominant meaning. Since various groups or individuals may imbue specific 
parts of a technological system with different functions or significations, a technological 
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controversy is negotiated through public opinion, not merely by technically "solving" the 
issue. Pinch and Bijker note that these RSGs, which may or may not be homogenous, 
define which technological issue or artifact constitutes a problem to be addressed. Thus, 
there are as many artifacts as there are RSGs, and there is no artifact that is not 
constituted by a RSG. RSGs initially convene around a new technology within 
' interpretative flexibility ' of its possible meanings; later, 'closure ' and ' stabilization' of 
particualr salient meanings, assigning dominance to some technologies while others are 
forever lost in a technological oblivion. In short, ' closure ' and ' stabilization' refer to the 
process that initiates when the ' interpretative flexibility' of an artifact is diminishing, and 
can lead to a congealing of a single dominant meaning. 
MacKenzie and Wajcman, in their book The Social Shaping ofTechnology, 
further conceptualize the constructivist theory oftechnology.101 The authors investigate 
the ways in which social , institutional, economic and cultural factors have shaped: 1) the 
direction as well as the rate of innovation; 2) theform oftechnology; and 3) the outcomes 
of technological change for different groups in society. Thus, moving away from 
traditional technological deterministic approaches, which are concerned merely to assess 
the social impacts oftechnology, MacKenzie and Wajcman are interested in the 
multitude of socio-cultural forces that act upon the technology, thereby generating these 
impacts. 
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Risk as Sociocultural Phenomenon 
The 1980s saw a similar ' cultural tum' in risk studies, a trend that sought to broaden the 
hitherto dominant psychometric perspective.102 Cultural constructivist approaches to 
questions of risk argue that behaviorist rational-actor theories are inadequate because the 
idea of risk-calculus fails to account for the complexity involved in perceiving threats and 
dangers. Blazing the trail for this paradigmatic shift, Douglas and Wildavsky' s work on 
risk and culture argued that risk is not so much a reflection of any objective reality as it is 
a cultural phenomenon that minors societal and group values.103 People ' s perceptions of 
danger and safety do not conespond to accurate assessments about threats; instead, they 
are generated intersubjectively within cultural, political, social , economic, ideological , 
and geographical contexts. To be sure, a social constructionist approach to risk does not 
claim that harm does not exist. Rather, it assumes that "the basic sociological task is to 
explain how social agents create and use boundaries to demarcate that which is 
dangerous ." 104 While acknowledging that there are indeed risks "out there" in the world, 
Eugene Rosa similarly claimed that knowledge about risks exists on a continuum ranging 
from the well understood, empirically grounded and quantifiable, to the constructed. 105 
Kasperson and Kasperson, in their model of"The Social Amplification of Risk", point 
out that "each society has its worry beads, the particular risks that we choose to rub and 
polish assiduously while relegating others to inattention." 106 Some risks are attenuated 
because they lie entangled in society's web of values and assumptions that either 
denigrates the importance of their consequences or deems them acceptable, elevates the 
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associated benefits of risk-taking, and idealizes certain related notions and beliefs. In the 
past two decades, the influential works of Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck have gone 
beyond identifying risk as a component in particular situations to argue that Risk has 
become the defining and organizing principle of late modernity itself. 107 In light of 
increasingly manufactured global dangers, the rise of the expert and information society, 
and deepening individualism, negotiating the "riskiness" of everyday life becomes not an 
option but an imperative for men and women in contemporary society, who are forced to 
engage in private "risk management." In this sense, risk is not merely an element that 
appears occasionally when people relate to their living environment in specific ways and 
instances (for example, when driving a car, or when drinking wine), but defines and 
organizes both culture and social structure themselves. 
Any attempt at understanding individual attitudes towards risk and danger must 
first explore the collective risk discourses as they unfold in their respective social 
localities. 108 It is precisely such an investigation, argues Andrew Kirby, which exposes 
the difficulty of making easy inferences or predictions about risk, as personal discourses 
and public ones are found to be in frequent dissonance. 109 Why do some people engage in 
risky behavior while the dominant discourse clearly warns against it (e.g. smoking)? And 
why do others not act in line with objective probability calculations (e.g. fear of flying vs. 
the confidence in driving)? 110 
Perceptions of risk and their ensuing responses are dynamic, mutable, and may 
undergo change and reinterpretation through time. They take place as part of an 
interactive process that is continually negotiated by relevant actors. 111 Kirby points out to 
the difficulty of predicting when potentially health-threatening individuals will induce 
punitive measures from society. While both leprosy in the Middle Ages and AIDS in 
contemporary society elicited initial reactions of isolation, blame, and moral 
denunciation, other venereal diseases, such as the black plague, did not. 
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In other cases, the impalpable nature of invisible dangers posited a particular problem for 
risk management and required a unique cultural response. Early responses to "germ 
theory" around the tum of the twentieth century employed criminological models to 
describe the threat and its countermeasures. Germ diseases were equated with criminal 
attacks on the health of the social fabric , therefore calling for an authoritative response in 
fending off unhealthy persons. 1 12 In a different instance, many popular responses to the 
first two cholera outbreaks in the nineteenth century (1832-34, 1849) followed an 
' imminent justice' approach. Many Americans believed that the disease was God's 
judgment on the sinful and that righteous people had nothing to fear- a view that was 
successfully propagated at the time by orthodox ministers. 113 
Insurance practices, which in essence treat risk scientifically through an 
application of probability calculus to statistics, have also been subjected recently to such 
cultural analyses. Buying an insurance policy is more than simply a way of indemnifying 
oneself against possible future loss. As Patel shows, insurance embeds, collates and 
entrances us in ways that exceed the financial exchanges embodied in the acts of buying 
any one policy. 114 Purchasing insurance involves the scheming of a future-oriented 
fantasy to be completely absorbed into the daily business of living as desire for care, hope 
for change, and intimacy through loss. Zelizer has demonstrated that the move towards 
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insuring children at the tum of the twentieth century was driven by the changing 
sentimental value of children. More than a commercial enterprise, insuring the young was 
constructed as a powerful symbolic expression of parental love and concern in the face of 
. . d d 115 mcreasmg mo em angers. 
Other scholars point out the deeper symbolic and ideological logic governing 
private insurance enterprises. Skirting the reliance on the state for managing risk, liberal 
capitalist societies tum to private insurance as the natural market-based alternative in the 
case of compensatory loss. Yet as Ericson, Barry & Doyle show, this choice does not 
betray merely an economic preference. 116 Neo-liberalism fits comfortably with the 
economic individualism of private insurance, as both reinforce each other in discourse 
and practice. Insurance is required to the extent that the individual is defined as an 
autonomous economic unit, a classification amplified by the institution of insurance itself 
since it perpetuates conventions that individuals are to be responsible for risks. The 
classificatory practices that insurance presupposes thus foster subjects who are consistent 
with the logic of capitalism. These actuarial technologies entrench a vision of the social 
sphere wherein antagonisms have been displaced or are suspended by an overwhelming 
concern with the continuity of social and economic processes. 117 
The insurer is far from a mere passive register of existing risks, a financial 
technician who offers guarantees of compensations against them; s/he also 'produces 
risks ' , making them visible in a world that hitherto treated them resignedly as act of God 
and blows of misfortune. The insurance industry generates its own real risks to the 
insured by creating fragmented and unequal communities of policyholders, and by 
undertaking risky investments of premium dollars. 118 In sum, insurance affects the 
meanings of the events being insured: By objectivising a certain incident into a risk, it 
makes an obstacle into a possibility. 119 In the words of Ewald, "Insurance liberates man 
from fear. .. it allows enterprise and hence multiplies wealth." 120 
Risk, Accidents, and Power 
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Constructivist approaches to risk note that the general public's judgments about danger 
and safety do not develop in a vacuum. Rather, people are often influenced by 
organizational strategies that seek to frame risks in ways that benefit the interests of 
particular invested parties. And since power and resources are key determinants of 
persuasiveness, some groups, such as federal officials, lobbying organizations, and 
representatives of business are more likely to be able to get their cases heard than are 
others, such as workers and activists. 121 Lee Clarke, for example, points out that while 
members of the general public are typically characterized as those who make choices 
about risk, organizations are actually far more important decision-makers in these 
matters. 122 Many- if not most- decisions about 'acceptable' levels of risk are made by 
public and private organizations and governments, not members of the public, the latter 
often knowing very little about the risks they face. Furthermore, invested players often 
impose risks upon the public by framing and representing particular hazards as inevitable 
and even necessary. One method by which danger is normalized in his way consists of 
creating what Clarke calls 'fantasy documents ' - contingency plans in case of disasters 
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that bestow upon the responsible organization a veneer of control of the situation, while 
prompting the public to acquiesce to its riskiness. 123 The social production of knowledge 
about social risks is thus an ongoing process of perception framing, in which the general 
public is highly influenced by vested parties ' ability to employ material and symbolic 
resources, operate power structures, and meet institutional interests. 
The long history of industrial resistance to safety improvements and regulation in 
the United States is a well-documented case in point. 124 Mobilizing considerable political , 
financial , and ideological resources to deflect responsibility and curtail restrictive 
legislation, industry persistently labored to thwart government and union efforts to 
establish healthier and safer working environments. One strategy employed in response to 
workers' insidious injuries relates to the control of knowledge. Industry consistently 
labors to both limit the spread of information on real and potential harm, and produce 
counter-evidence through sponsored research. 125 Shifting culpability for accidents to the 
workers constitutes another prevalent tactic.126 Sometimes, responsibility is relegated to 
other, weaker industrial actors. In her study of complex organizations' responses to 
accident on building sites, Haines found that tenderers and powerful corporate actors on 
the job to shift the liability for deaths onto sub-contractors positioned lower on the 
. ' k" d 127 proJect s pee mg or er. 
Although motivations for profit and cutting production costs often serve as chief 
catalysts for such tactics of risk redistribution, they are not the only ones. Harmful 
conditions that materialize through a protracted incubation period that slowly accrues 
dangerous elements make it easier for organizations to ignore, normalize, or simply fail 
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to see the extent of problem. 128 In these cases it is more a development of an 
"organizational-sponsored complicity" or a "culture of silence" than the naked pursuit of 
dollars that leads actors to accept risks and perpetuate the hazardous situation. 129 At 
times, prosaic organizational contingencies amplify such outcomes. For example, in the 
case of the Guadalupe, California oil spill , the organizational isolation of the oil field 
personnel greatly reduced the incentives to report the disaster for over three decades. 130 
By the same token, elitist models of industry co-opting strategies cannot always explain 
government control agencies' response to technological hazards. When the dangers do 
not fit neatly into preexisting bureaucratic duties or jurisdictions, and when treatments are 
administered within the context of inter-organizational competition, the table is set for an 
inadequate response that allows the hazard to continue unabated. 131 Indeed, inter-
organizational relations in the regulatory process, such as the unquestioned sanctioning of 
cost-benefit analyses to determine risk, play a role in accepting ham1ful technologies.132 
Yet as the important works in the social studies of science have shown, even in 
presumably apolitical laboratory settings facts are "constructed" as much as they are 
"discovered." 133 Carefully crafted safety plans and risk assessments should thus be 
treated as data for sociological study, not as unquestioned representations of an 
organizational and technological reality. More often than not, the process of choosing 
among risks is not captured by rational theories of danger assessment that stress goal 
definition and choice among alternatives, but by collective disorganization among several 
involved agencies and 'garbage can models ' of decision making. 134 
Essentially, risk management involves a decision-making problem. Since there 
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are no universally accepted criteria as to how safe is "safe enough," a particular choice of 
action or inaction depends on the set of options, consequences, values, and facts 
examined in the process. 135 Such decisions are carried out by professionals from the 
supposed scientific field of risk-assessment, who themselves are influenced by value 
choices, group socialization, and organizational cultures.136 For instance, Henry 
Kendall ' s account of decades of systematic underestimation of the problems associated 
with nuclear power discusses in detail how various organizational entities, such as the 
Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission consistently advanced the idea that nuclear power plants were 
necessary, safe, and economical despite mounting evidence to the contrary.137 In another 
case, Tasca shows that legal and institutional pressures, especially the interests of 
organizations such as the U.S. Coast Guard and the various legal and administrative 
entities that regulate shipping, shape marine accident-report findings and conclusions. He 
also demonstrates how individualistic assumptions about blame serve to divert attention 
away from the structural sources ofthese mishaps, such as the production pressures ship 
I . k 138 owners p ace on manne wor ers. 
The nation-state ' s involvement in producing risks is often tied to its role in 
reproducing the political economy, which rests in tum on promoting conditions favorable 
to economic expansion and a positive business climate. 139 Governments at all levels seek 
to foster growth, even when accompanied by higher levels of risk. To cite one dramatic 
case, governmental pursuit of growth and indifference to hazards set the stage for the 
horrendous Bhopal disaster in 1984.14° Conditions like those that gave rise to Bhopal-
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lax or nonexistent land-use regulation, the proliferation of squatter camps in hazardous 
areas, environmental degradation, insufficient infrastructure to support the population and 
provide protection should a disaster occur, and governments that are only too willing to 
allow risks to be imposed on the poor for the benefit of elites- are increasingly common, 
as developing nations join the capitalist world system. 141 
By relaying information from institutions to the public, the mass media clearly 
embodies a key actor that further frames perceptions about risks, disasters, and accidents . 
Some have argued that the mass media promulgates and reinforces the notion that living 
is 'risky' in late modernity. 142 Media portrayal has been found to both reflect and 
influence people ' s attitudes towards health and environmental issues. 143 Detailed 
examinations have revealed that the mass media tends to portray technological accidents 
and risk in particular ways. Generally, accidents fall into routinized modes of reportage, 
which often draws upon standard cultural codes, social myths, and patterned story 
telling. 144 Accident reports are mostly factual and descriptive in nature, while lacking any 
substantial advice for the audience as to how they themselves can avoid them, 145 or 
necessary precautions in the event of one. 146 In other cases, failure to inform the public of 
the possibility of a major accident (such as a nuclear leaks) undermines people's ability to 
d 1 . k 147 assess an manage persona ns s. 
Robert Stallings analyzed news reporting on a bridge failure to illustrate how the 
media construct the causes of accidents. The causal factors selected for emphasis are 
related in part to the kinds of sources news reporters typically use. Reliance on particular 
sources is related in tum to journalists' knowledge of which organizations have been 
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linked in one way or another to the problem. Monocausal explanations, therefore, 
particularly those emphasizing individuals ' actions and failures, are favored over 
multicausal ones. 148 Clarke and Van Ameron found further evidence for a tendency of 
individualization in media portrayal of accidents. 149 In accidents happening to 
individuals, popular magazines usually valorize individual personalities and behaviors, 
both of victims and rescuers, while ignoring systemic issues that lie behind the causes of 
accidents. Blomkvist and Sjoberg showed that discussions of measures to be taken 
against accidents are often confused since there is usually no attempt to discuss these 
measures within a wider framework ofpriorities.150 "Because ofthis," they conclude, 
"the mass media may not contribute much towards a rational action against risks in 
society." 151 
Crash Cultures 
Concentrating on the discourse of risk is undoubtedly beneficial to the study of 
technological accidents; however, as I aim to show in this study, it also has several 
theoretical limits. These constraints can be illuminated and overcome by employing an 
alternative conceptual perspective. 
The first drawback of the risk paradigm relates to the epistemological basis laden 
in the concept itself. Risk is an essentially modernist notion. Since it is inseparable from 
the ideas of probability and uncertainty, risk comes into wide use only in a society that is 
future oriented. As a result, risk studies tend to view technological harm through the 
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framework of the rationalizing discourse on modernity. Thus, as Langdon Winner argues, 
to conceive technological danger through the discourse of risk is to enter an exclusively 
scientific rather than a moral-political discourse. 152 In his view, a risk-centered discourse 
is depoliticized because it seeks to reach a very narrow consensus: does a particular 
technology harm or not. In this respect, questions framed as 'risk' - as opposed to the 
more straight forward 'hazard' or 'danger' - do not seek to provide a general evaluation of 
the conditions of modern life affected by a technology. And yet, rational risk 
assessments, couched in the language of probabilities and scientific authority, tend to 
mask the fact that they constitute only one institutionalized motive within a complex of 
actions and meanings. "Objectivity", reminds us Alexander, "is a cultural norm, a system 
of social sanctions and rewards ." 153 Instead, he argues, technology must be viewed as a 
discourse, "a sign system that is subject to semiotic constraints and responsive to social 
and psychological demands". It is, in other words, an element in the culture and 
personality system, both "meaningful and motivated." 154 In a similar critique, Gusfield 
shows that knowledge generated in the fields of accident research and law constitutes 
rhetorical strategies as part of the cultural production of meaning surrounding the 
' drinking and driving problem.' 155 This arena is structured not by rational strategies, but 
by nonutilitarian and noninstrumental discursive tools such as myth, ritual , and social 
drama. 
The second critique of theories on risk relates to the limits it places on 
ascertaining the "deep play" 156 of technological malfunctions and their relation to other 
systems of meanings. The risk perspective on accidents tends to focus on the relationship 
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between people and technological harm. In doing so, it assumes the benefit in - and the 
ability of- avoiding damaging situations, which can be done by applying rational-
scientific solutions. Yet harm is only one dimension in an unintended event. Far from 
being an occurrence to necessarily be eradicated, we may ente11ain the possibility of 
accidents being invited and attracted. In other words, the rational discourse on risk and 
safety thus neglects the positive material and symbolic functions of technological 
malfunctions, which can be viewed as welcome, even necessary components of the 
system. Therefore, in order to tease out the wider array of the significations of 
technological breakdowns we must move beyond theories of ' risk society ' to what can be 
termed, following Arthurs and Grant, 'crash cultures. ' 157 This new perspective cropped 
up in recent years from a loose association of works on accidents, malfunctions, and 
disasters within diverse fields such as literature, cultural studies, philosophy, and film .158 
Recognizing the ubiquity and importance of collisions and breakdowns in modem life, 
these works seek to expose the multifarious symbolic dimensions of the crash as a 
cultural event in its own right, its meanings closely constructed in relation to other 
cultural and structural spheres within a particular social setting. Schnapp argues that the 
crash is actually a necessary and logical component in the thrill-based culture and 
experience of accelerated speed in modernity, not its aberration. 159 While novel transport 
technologies enabled unprecedented temporal and spatial sensations of rapid motion, in 
which speed became an addictive, distinctive "drug", the biggest threat to these new 
enthralling feelings was that speed itself would tum tedious, routine, and repetitive. The 
only way out of the loop is found in the crash, as encapsulating both a threat and promise 
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of the constant risk and danger laden within automotive mobility as well as a regenerative 
event that brings about a new loop of ever new exciting thrills and speeds. Gur-Ze ' ev too 
argues that traffic accidents are a necessary component oflate-capitalist societies. 160 In 
his abstract ontology of the automotive space, he claims that accidents clearly embody 
the futility of "rebelling" against and transcending the system, which presents itself as 
closed and self-referential: while individuality is supposedly gained through dangerous 
and "expressive" driving, the accident shows what happens when drivers try to "break the 
rules" . In his analysis of modem-day accidents, Virilio highlights the tight corollaries 
between production and destruction, substance and its breakdown. 161 By showing that 
every introduction of a novel technology or artifact is also an invention of a new accident, 
Virilio claims that repetition of standardized objects (machines, tools, products, vehicles, 
etc.) beginning in the Industrial Revolution meant also the introduction of mass-produced 
accidents occurring one after the other, from the sinking of the Titanic to the Chemobyl 
meltdown. 
Indeed, these works can be placed within a longer lineage of theories that posited 
the necessity of destruction as the regenerative onward force of linear progression in the 
era of modernity itself. "All that is solid melt into air", Marx and Engels famously 
summarized the nature of industrial capitalist expansionism in the Communist Manifesto, 
pointing out not only the positive innovative character of that economic system, but to its 
in-built mechanism of continual destruction; destruction not only of previous material 
worlds and modes of production, but of traditional ways of thought and belief as well. 
Later, Marcuse placed this theme in the center of his critique of advanced technological 
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societies, which he described as closed systems of"irrational rationality" characterized 
by "the union of growing productivity and growing destruction." 162 As Marshal Berman 
put it, in modem times, "catastrophes are transformed into lucrative opportunities for 
redevelopment and renewal ; disintegration works as a mobilizing and hence integrating 
force. " 163 Furthermore, the social organization of space, now meticulously engineered in 
plmming and urban design practices, increasingly created new shock waves that wrought 
destruction of previous patterns of life and behavioral habits. 
The 'crash cultures ' approach thus opens the door for more radical interpretations 
of accidents. I believe that employing this view, in addition to theories of risk, provides a 
means to understand the diverse ways in which auto wrecks are incorporated into larger 
extant system ofmeanings. Specifically, it allows for an investigation of such hitherto 
unexplored issues as accidents and social control , auto fatalities and sacrifice, the 
industrialization and commercialization of accidents themselves, and destruction as an 
emblem of Progress. 
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Chapter 2. 
The Rationalized Accident 
Early American Automobile Enthusiasts between Culprit and 
Victim 
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Before the Fordist revolution in production successfull y popularized the automobile by 
converting it into a fairly inexpensive commodity for mass consumption, the motor 
vehicle figured primarily as an exclusive high technology for the well-to-do. From 1895 
to the mid 191 Os, most cars were custom made by small or mid-scale manufacturers who 
tailored their devices to meet upper-class demands for leisure, sports, and conspicuous 
displays of speed, mobility, and mechanical awe. 1 Yet early automobilists quickly learned 
that they are taking in not only the motorcars ' boons but its curses as well. As the 
prominent group amongst all pioneering users, these enthusiasts - auto club members and 
executives, individual owners, manufacturers and promoters, and racecar drivers-
disproportionately bore the brunt of the growing traffic accident problem. Few could 
ignore the irony: The automobile's most passionate advocates were also its most 
prevalent victims. 
How did this powerful group of technology users make sense of the conflict? 
Examining early automobilists ' response to traffic accident can provide an opportunity to 
vividly capture the conflicts and difficulties befalling those who labored extensively to 
charge the new mode of conveyance with positive meaning. As highly committed actors 
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who placed great confidence in the novel machine and whose allegiance was 
continuously tested in the face of the auto ' s growing destructiveness, their need to clearly 
signify the accident was all the more heightened. For them, the car crash had to be framed 
in a framework that lucidly spelled out both the present nature and future trajectory of the 
fledgling automotive technology. 
The following pages will explore the various constructions of the auto accident 
within the discursive circles of motor vehicle enthusiasts in the first four decades of 
automobility. Specifically, looking at early racing competitions, travel narratives, auto 
club meetings, individual letters, and personal advice columns the analysis will flush out 
the chief cultural modalities they employed to make sense of the road mishap. 
Accidents in Early Racing: Thrill and Terror 
What may serve as a good starting point for those interested in producing a historical 
study into the discourse on traffic accidents in America? Surprisingly, perhaps, it is not so 
much the highway as the speedway. Since many of the first mishaps occurred during 
races and exhibition runs - the primary avenues designated by motoring enthusiasts to 
directly expose large publics to the novel machine- it may be fruitful to tum the initial 
attention to these sites. Indeed, as mentioned above, long before the car became a 
mundane middle-class household necessity, it was considered largely a highly 
adventurous machine for sport, experimentation, and recreation. Tinkering with what 
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Bijker and Pinch2 would consider a culturally 'flexible ' technology in its nascent stages 
of development, early automobile promoters and pioneering manufacturers were bent on 
prodding the full range of the motorcar ' s technical and social possibilities within an 
open-ended approach of trial and error. Such emphasis on exploration aided in the initial 
conceptualization of the car as a new wondrous instrument for game and entertainment. 3 
Whether through short-distance speed contests, long endurance runs, or grueling trials 
such as steep hill climbing- the frequent involvement in both competition and adventure 
couched an element of peril and high-risk within the automobile ' s earliest reservoir of 
dominant meanings.4 Crashes at automotive sporting events soon became a highly 
frequent sight. A lack of organization and institutional backing, shoddy or non-existent 
safety measures, the running of races on city streets, and the inexperience of novice 
drivers- all contributed to an astonishingly high rate of horrific wrecks and tragic 
mishaps. By dramatically mixing terror with electrifying excitement, hysteria with spine-
tingling thrill, the real and symbolic import of racing quickly transformed the sport into 
the newest sensation to conquer Fin-de-Siecle Americans' growing fascination with 
technological spectacles of catastrophe and destruction. 5 It will be valuable in this regard 
to consider at length the following telling description of a 1903 race at Brighton Beach, 
New York, printed in one popular automotive journal: 
The starter climbed to the roof of the judge's stand and by simultaneously 
shooting his pistol and waving his flag effected [sic] a satisfactory start. The eyes 
of the grand stand occupants naturally turned from one machine to another, and 
suddenly someone shouted that the Gray Wolf had crashed through the fence. It 
could be seen in the infield near the three-quarter mile post at rest. A rush for the 
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scene of accident ensued. Crowds rushed onto the track all along the line in front 
of the grand stand, clubhouse lawn and stables, in some instances exhibiting 
remarkable skill at fence vaulting, and ran across the track and down the infield 
toward the three-quarter mile post as fast as their feet would carry them. At this 
time two of the fastest flyers of the day were still circling around the track in hot 
pursuit of one another, and one could not suppress an apprehension of danger if 
the track should not be cleared by the time they came around to the grand stand . 
Two of the mounted police then charged down the stretch in a furious gallop, 
turning neither right nor left, and apparently intending to scare those who might 
feel tempted to cross the track. Excitement meanwhile reigned at the grand stand, 
a number of women giving suppressed shrieks. A hundred field glasses, more or 
less, were directed at the scene of an accident, but as it was over a quarter mile 
away and was surrounded in a moment' s time by spectators, who had occupied 
places along the outside fence at that point, little of importance could be seen. 
Presently someone among the attendance, realizing the need for a palliative to 
soothe the nerves, particularly of the women in the grand stand, started the report 
that the driver was not hurt badly, he having seen him rise to his feet. This had a 
quieting effect until three revolver shots rang out at the scene of disaster, intended 
as a signal for aid. A considerable number of cars at once started from the stable, 
the clerk of the course being already on the spot. There was considerable agitation 
also on the judges' stand, and an evident desire to allay any undue excitement 
reigning in the grand stand, for before any reliable report could have come from 
the scene of the accident the announcer informed the grand stand that ' Harry 
Cunningham is not badly injured. ' It was known to some occupants ofthe 
grandstand, however, that not Cunningham (who was mentioned in the 
programme) but Albe1i Champion had been driving the Gray Wolf in this event, 
and this showed that the information offered could not be credited with much 
reliability. 6 
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Feeding on the crash ' s apparent morbid magnetism, the specialized automobile press 
soon enjoyed playing on the irony of placing the accident- not the smoothly running race 
- at the center of the attraction. "The whole race from beginning to end was simply a 
chain of accidents, and those who attended it for the sake of excitement must have had 
their fill of it," claimed one writer for The Horseless Age in a report on an especially 
bloody 1902 meet in New York. " [W]hen the report of the first serious accident reached 
the grand stand the occupants lost practically all interest in the relative positions of the 
contestants and in the speed made, and waited only for repo1is of further accidents, 
expecting to see them occur before their very eyes."7 Another motor magazine admitted 
that a non-fatal accident during a Springfield, Massachusetts Automobile Club's hill-
climbing contest "added very materially to the excitement of the affair."8 
Yet interestingly, such inflated representations of the accident as a terrifying but 
captivating event did not remain in prominence for long. By the second decade of 
automobility, as fatal crashes in races became highly regular features , the motoring 
journals turned in large pmi to a more cursory, dreary, and generally unimpressed style of 
coverage. In 1915, for example, The Automobile related to the fatal wreck that killed a 
driver during a Sioux City, Iowa meet as "only one accident marred the race." Instead of 
elaborating on the driver' s violent death, the magazine focused on the holdup the accident 
caused to the leading car, which had unluckily been grazed by the ill-fated vehicle : "The 
wheel on Rickenbacher's Maxwell was slightly damaged, the most serious aspect of it, 
however, being the delay to change." Only at the end of the article the readers are 
informed, in dry tone, that "Cox died of his injuries on Sunday. His mechanic is expected 
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to recover."9 This is not to claim that fatal accidents were now considered wholesale as 
little more than dents in the world of motor sports. In fact, at times organizers decided to 
terminate the event altogether in the wake of a tragic mishap. Such was the case, to cite 
one instance, when a reporter for a Philadelphia newspaper died in a crash while 
pat1icipating in a relay sanctioned by the media outlet. 10 The point is, rather, to underline 
an intriguing shift in the nature of the dominant cultural representations of these wrecks 
from objects of thrilling attraction to common and somewhat unremarkable happenings . 
One expression that speaks of this transition involves the employment of new kinds of 
highly subtle literary devices. In the abovementioned Philadelphia crash, The Automobile, 
though reporting on the cancellation decision non-judgmentally, still employed the 
euphemistic passive trope "met with an accident" to describe the driver 's unfortunate 
fate. 11 In another case, when a young spectator was struck and killed during a race in 
Lowe! , Massachusetts, the same magazine referred to his death as an "unfortunate 
fatality," which occurred "much to the regret" ofthejoumal. 12 
A further budding pattern in early representations of racing consisted of 
reallocating blame for the occurrence of accidents, as automobilists pointed the finger of 
responsibility toward other parties. Time and again automobile magazines maintained 
that spectators were hit because they somehow entered into the car' s exclusively designed 
path. When two viewers were fatally run over during a racing exhibition in Staten Island, 
New York, the driver suggested that the victims bear the weight of the responsibility: 
"Mr. Baker, the driver, said after the accident that from his seat inside the conning tower 
of the car it appeared as if the spectators on the side of the road rushed by the car in a 
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semi-circle to the right just before the crash. " 13 Similarly, in the aforementioned Lowell 
death, The Automobile was quick to make clear that the car ' s operator could not be made 
culpable since "he did everything in his power to prevent the accident. So violently did he 
apply the brakes that the differential and wheel clutches were entirely destroyed. Reliable 
reports state that the boy tried to run across the road, and seeing the machine 
approaching, lost his head and remained rooted to the spot. Matson [the driver] tried to 
avoid him, but just before the car reached him the boy jumped directly in front of the 
machine. The radiator of the car was demolished, so severe was the impact. " 14 
Seeds of Callousness 
As automobiling gradually expanded into everyday traffic settings, a certain callous or 
condescending attitude towards mishaps becomes apparent within automobiling circles. 
Perhaps less a moral obliviousness than a result of an attempt to rationalize accidents as a 
regrettable but ineluctable fact of motoring, such an approach took on numerous fom1s. 
One expression relates to the rise of laconic reporting on mishaps that occur on 
city streets. As early as 1902, the Horseless Age incorporates a regular column devoted to 
relaying information on automobile accidents. The tone of the section is highly terse, 
matter-of-factual, and very uninvolved - including when talking of fatal wrecks that 
befall prominent members of the automobiling community. At other times, motorists ' 
prominent standing in the community seemed to have contributed to a position of 
deference and leniency towards their involvement as the chief responsible parties. When 
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the president of the Automobile Club of Maine mortally crashed into a bicyclist during 
the club's first annual run, The Automobile emphasized that it was he - not the dead 
victim- who, following a nervous breakdown, "received the deepest sympathy of the 
whole city for his part in the unfortunate affair." 15 Similarly, in her vivid narrations of 
several collisions in which she had figured as a victim, Elizabeth Jordan is dumbfounded 
to discover again and again that the culprit motorist is the one to receive the bulk of 
public and institutional sympathy. "Once this was done [the meager pecuniary 
compensations meted out by the judge in one of the case], and the victims were able to 
crawl around, the sympathy of the community began to flow in a warm human tide 
toward the reckless driver. From innumerous callers - insurance man [sic] , policemen, 
sheriffs, lawyers, neighbors- we received the same plea. ' You won ' t be too hard on the 
poor chap, will you?' they urged. 'He's had trouble enough. "' 16 In a different accident, 
involving a young driver who killed two women, the disproportional understanding 
towards the motorman's plight further appalls Jordan. "There was intense public 
sympathy for him because ' his life was spoiled.' Seemingly there was less sympathy for 
the fine young working girl whose useful life was ended at twenty by him, for the active 
middle-aged mother he also sent to her grave, and for the helpless and dependent aunt 
whose fate is worse than death." 17 
In other cases it was the motorists themselves who displayed an aura of 
entitlement and superiority over the victims of their crashes, an approach that 
underscored both the shifting of the blame for individual mishaps, and the mollification 
of the seriousness of accidents as a problem that may cripple the entire burgeoning 
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system of automobility. In a letter to The Horseless Age, a St. Louis motor enthusiast 
irritatingly complained of being prosecuted in the courts for felonious assault, "all 
because my automobile happened to frighten a fractious horse and overturn a buggy." His 
central grievance, though, was aimed at the Automobile Club of America, from which he 
has received "no offer of assistance, either moral or financial. .. Are they asleep?" After 
bemoaning that his pleas for help have thus far gone unanswered, he proudly displayed 
his personal power to feel unthreatened by the institutional response to the accident: 
"Does not the club know that I might easily enter the plea of guilty and escape with a 
small fine; but yet the court ' s decision would be a lasting blight upon the entire 
automobile industry? Of course I would not be such a knave as to stoop to such a 
proceeding, but I merely mention what might possibly occur." 18 Brimming with 
confidence in his ability to get away with both legal and moral culpability, this 
automobilist's approach speaks to the kind of smug assuredness exhibited by many 
pioneering motormen when forced to make sense of theirs or others ' automotive mishaps. 
Another element buttressing a deprecating attitude towards accidents involved the 
frequent suspicion over the motivations of the automobile ' s victims. Numerous articles in 
the motoring press portrayed ostensible casualties as dishonest and cunning. One 1905 
piece warned enthusiasts to beware of "professional automobile victims," who, as in the 
early days of the trolley, "voluntarily" plant themselves in front of oncoming cars in the 
hope of collecting compensation. The rise of this new "profession" is a direct result of the 
fact that "[P]ublic prejudice has now largely turned toward the automobile." 19 Or 
consider the words of a Massachusetts doctor who lengthily narrated his motoring trials 
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and tribulations in The Horseless Age. During one trip in early 1901 , his car scared a 
buggy-carrying horse, causing the carriage to overturn and injure an old passenger 
woman. Then 
I offered to do all I could for them, offered to take the old lady to the hospital. 
"Oh," she yelled, "the hospital! Do you want me to die? Oh, dear, I would not go 
to such an awful place. People always die when they go to a hospital." Oh, no, she 
would never, never go to that awful place. Later she changed her mind 
completely, and I believe it was hard work for the doctor to get rid of her when 
she was well able to go home. She wanted her own doctor, so I went after him as 
fast as my machine would go. After a time I got the doctor, and together we 
returned and I assisted the doctor. We set the broken ann all in good shape, and I 
then offered to take the woman home, but not a bit of it. Oh, no, not in that awful 
thing. So I ordered a carriage, and the woman was taken home. I afterwards found 
out that the horse was a record breaker for nervousness, a kicker, balker and, in 
fact , a very dangerous brute for anyone to drive. Of course these people thought 
the proper thing was to jump onto me for all there was in it. They did. I measured 
the distance between where the horse turned and where the machine stood and 
found it to be just 99 feet, and yet it was my fault. I paid all of the doctor's bills, 
for a carriage to take the woman home, and in fact I did all I could for her comfort 
while she was at the hospital. Then I offered her a very reasonable settlement, but 
oh, no, they wanted big money. About three months after the accident the young 
man came to me with his wife, the young woman [who also rode in the carriage at 
the time of the accident] , and she complained that her ribs were cracked and in 
bad shape. This they inforn1ed me was a damage, and they wanted me to settle for 
it. I assured the woman that I would have her taken to the hospital and have a 
specialist from Boston make a very careful examination of her, and if her ribs 
were broken we would settle. What a cure this was. The woman would not stand 
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such treatment; was her word not good? Not much, madame. We must have proof 
She recovered in a second. That ended it. 20 
While on another pleasure ride, the doctor's car hit a dog. And again, the discussion of 
the mishap quickly swings to the animal owner' s supposed deceitfulness: 
About a week after the owner of the dog came to me to get a settlement. I suppose 
he thought I was dead easy prey for all of Laneboro [the town in which both 
accidents occurred] but he made a mistake. I do not carry insurances on dogs, so I 
did not propose to be done this time. I looked at the man for a second when he 
made known his business. Then I said: "Do you acknowledge that you are the 
owner of that dog?" Of course, he assured me that he was . Then I took his name; 
he wanted to know what all this meant. I told him I proposed to bring a heavy suit 
for damages to my machine on account of that dog. He stared at me in surprise, 
and when he realized that I might turn the tables on him he broke out with a laugh 
and said he was only fooling ; the darned dog was no good and that he did not 
really belong to him anyway; that a man gave the dog to him and he had not really 
taken him yet; so he could not be called the owner of the dog. Oh, how things do 
change at times! Well, if this is the case we will drop it, and we did.21 
Whether or not victims had indeed staged their injuries for compensatory reasons is 
beyond the point of my discussion here. 22 Of more important concern are the implications 
emanating from the regular use of the discursive techniques of doubt. By fashioning 
wholesale suspicion towards the automobile ' s victims, motorists were not only 
articulating something about the claimants ' nature, but constructing the meaning of the 
accident as well. Ultimately, such mistrust attenuated the gravity oftraffic mishaps as an 
issue to be reckoned amidst the emerging public debate on automobile-associated 
troubles. 
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The social construction of the non-motoring world as a realm of devious 
conniving was soon complemented by strategic advice on how to navigate such an 
untrustworthy surrounding. Automobile journals began offering their readers a multitude 
of suggestions for "taking the sting out of an accident."23 Automobilists were coached, 
for instance, on how to effectively maneuver witnesses in preparation for legal battles. 
"The car owner must remember that the witnesses of an accident are quite likely to be 
uncertain of memory, as he himself is," Motor Travel advised. "For this reason he should 
call to the attention of witnesses particular points in connection with the accident which 
he knows will help his case when it comes to court. For instance, he should point out to 
them and demonstrate that the emergency brake is set tight. If the mishap occurred at a 
street intersection he should impress upon their minds that he had slowed down his car 
for the crossing and had the vehicle well in hand. He should impress upon them that he 
sounded his warning signal, so that they will remember it when they go on the stand. If 
the pavement was wet or otherwise slippery at the time of the accident, he should show 
the witness that his chains were in place on the tires."24 During a meeting of the 
Automobile Club of America (ACA) in New York, one prominent member, 0. A. Parker, 
related an accident he caused wherein a street cleaner was slightly injured. Although the 
man did need medical attention, Mr. Parker insisted that "the injuries received were of a 
trivial nature," and that "the physician tried to make it out as a serious case." He then 
provided his fellow autoists with valuable insight. " It developed later," The Horseless 
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Age recounted , "that the physician had a brother, who was a lawyer, whose attention had 
been called to the case and who endeavored to bring a suit for damages against Mr. 
Parker in behalf of the injured street cleaner. Mr. Parker said that in addition to this he 
received notice from two other ' shyster ' lawyers that the case was in their hands, but he 
settled with the street cleaner direct, and avoided all litigation. What he wanted to call 
attention to particularly was that in this case the physician tried to bolster up the 
seriousness of the injuries received in order to get a case for his brother."25 
While many of these cases may be interpreted as clear manifestations of class 
conflict, they can also be viewed as transcending mere social status-based explanations 
by highlighting other questions that involve attitudes towards technological progress and 
accidents. Specifically, the abovementioned dilemmas deserve further attention within a 
perspective that explores connections between unintended consequences of novel 
material devices and the re-configuring of social relations that follow in their wake. The 
frequent debates over hit-and-run accidents in the automobile press underline the 
importance of framing the investigation in such a way. In the early years of the twentieth-
century, numerous articles grappled with the growing problem of autoists who flee the 
scene of a mishap. Discussing the increasing number of such accidents reported in the 
daily newspapers, The Automobile provides a complex and fascinating line of argument 
that, short of legitimizing, noticeably displays an understanding of such action. Though 
the writer starts by acknowledging that " [ A ]t first thought this line of action on the part of 
the automobilist seems dastardly," a shift in the reasoning soon follows: 
It should not be forgotten in this consideration that the man in the car who drives 
away after a serious accident may not know, and indeed is not likely to know, 
how serious it really is . For instance, he knocks down a man or woman in the 
street and dashes off, not waiting to discover whether it is a case of outraged 
dignity or fracture of the skull. The persons in the crowd who linger about the 
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spot have time to learn the full details and so have those who read the report in the 
newspapers and their measure of censure is the seriousness of the accident. 
Afterwards, while admitting that such behavior amounts to "a cowardly retreat," the 
author immediately explains that it happens because "in nine cases out of ten is the firm 
belief that the automobilist will not get fair play if he remains to meet the consequences 
of the accident, no matter who is at fault. " And yet again, while he makes clear that, 
" [W]e are not assuming the role of apologist for the man who gets into trouble and drives 
away", it is " [T]he very act of stopping a car after an accident, however slight, to make 
inquiry [that] is looked upon as a confession of weakness, if not of guilt, and is usually 
taken advantage of by the victim. The shyster lawyer of the ambulance-chasing type is 
often somewhere in the background." Finally, the zigzagging moral debate ends 
resolutely with the following conclusion:" [S]uch experiences are great provocation to 
disregard the man in the road when a mishap occurs and it is not an unusual manifestation 
of human nature that many do seek to escape."26 In a similar discussion, the Automobile 
Review first makes clear that it is not excusing hit-and-runners " in any way." But at the 
same time the journal reminds its readers that "there are people who dread publicity of 
any kind and who try to get away from the scene of an accident not because it was 
willfully or recklessly caused, but because to be mixed up in any kind of a public 
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disturbance is a source of distress to them."27 To cite yet another instance, after two 
automobilists mortally struck a little girl near Boston and fled the scene shortly thereafter, 
The Horseless Age chose to primarily castigate the local media for apparently rushing to 
judgment. " It has not yet been shown that the automobilists were exceeding the legal 
speed limit and were in any way to blame for the accident. As the girl was killed, they 
could have done nothing to mitigate the effects of the accident, although it would 
undoubtedly have been advisable to discontinue the journey for the sake of the moral 
effect. The responsibility of the automobilists will probably be tried in court, and the fact 
that they went their way almost without stopping is likely to be held up by the 
prosecution as evidence of recklessness for the purpose of prejudicing their case with the 
court or jury." The article ends with some practical advice for motorists: "The proper 
course for an automobilist to adopt in case of serious accident to others by his car is to 
stop and offer aid, or show willingness to do so, even if he is absolutely free from blame. 
The only justifiable exception to this rule is when the safety of the automobilist is 
threatened by a mob."28 
The foregrounding of these cases should not be taken as an argument for 
considering early automobilists as a group of egocentric maniacs who displayed little 
regard for life and limb. Far from it. In fact, abundant evidence shows that numerous auto 
clubs were deeply concerned about their members' involvement in serious accidents and 
took stern actions to combat any reckless indifference toward the safety of others. Some 
organizations openly cooperated with the police in efforts to curb dangerous drivers-
including their own members. 29 The Omaha Automobile Club even offered a public cash 
reward for any infom1ation leading to the arrest of a motorist who, after striking and 
severely injuring a young boy, had escaped from the scene.30 In similar fashion , the 
Louisville Automobile Club sent its members special mail-in forms on which to report 
any violations of the law by fellow drivers. 31 
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The point is, rather, to suggest that a certain element of callousness toward the 
accident problem in general , coupled with a buming need to rationally explain-away 
individual mishaps, was planted from the earliest days of motoring deep in the discourse 
on this social problem. Moreover, as will become evident in the next chapters, this initial 
ingredient germinated into some of the most salient meanings attached to automotive 
camage throughout the greater part of the twentieth century. 
The rapidly evolving power struggle to redefine the meaning of the American 
public road at the dawn of century provides for the wider context in which an oblivious 
attitude toward traffic accidents could be made possible.32 As several scholars have 
shown, the arrival ofthe automobile initiated a fierce social battle between those who 
wished to maintain the thoroughfare as a heterogeneous space for a variety of 
commercial, public, and personal uses, and others who sought to convert it into the 
primary domain of the automobile. It was, in essence, an epic fight over questions of 
legal rights, physical access, mobility opportunities, and the nature of the city. The 
occurrence of the accident embodied a microcosmic event that dramatically unwrapped 
these broader issues. Consider the time when the Cleveland Automobile Club expressed 
strong indignation after one of its members was killed when his car struck what the club 
tem1ed an "obstruction" on one ofthe city streets. Yet given that the obstruction was in 
reality a little elevated crosswalk built by a local resident to allow his family to cross 
without walking in the mud, the larger matters at stake, namely the power to 
conceptualize the purpose of the road, become all the more apparent. 33 
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Framing this ongoing struggle within Pierre Bourdieu ' s field theory may further 
advance our understanding of the particular choice of claims made by the various 
involved factions . According to Bourdieu, social life and action take place within a 
system of structures, or ' fields .' A field is always in fact a force-field - an arena of 
incessant power struggles, in which a division exists between dominant and dominated 
positions based on types and amount of capital. Since capital in each field is finite and 
distributed unequally, it is forever the locus of conflict. Social inequality is thus produced 
and reproduced by the investment, accumulation, and use of both tangible, i.e. material , 
and symbolic forms of capital. Specifically, symbolic or cultural capital is embodied in 
forms of knowledge, taste, comportment, language, and style, which provide their 
possessors with particular social advantages. Moreover, the struggle for cultural capital 
manifests itself in acts of distinction, wherein different classes mark symbolic group 
boundaries by ongoing perfonnances and attitudes towards the social world.34 Each class 
condition is defined, simultaneously, by its intrinsic properties and by the relational 
properties that it derives from its position in the system of class conditions, which is also 
a system of differences - i.e. by everything which distinguishes it from what it is not and 
especially from everything it is opposed to.35 Hence, "social identity is defined and 
asserted through difference. "36 
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Conceiving automobility as an incipient and growing field in the first decades of 
the twentieth century anchors enthusiasts ' portrayal of the accident and its victims in their 
structural alignments within this new arena. The need to define, then pursuit, the valuable 
cultural assets within this fi eld is translated in the relegation of the car ' s critics to the 
domain of low cultural capital. Specificaily, the driver thus is framed as victim, the critic 
as enemy of progress, the non-motorist as technologically backwards, and the road as the 
sole space of the automobile. A motorist whose car struck a little child complained 
bitterly in The Automobile that, " [T]here is a law which requires that cattle must be kept 
off our public highways, yet there is no law in regard to children being kept from playing 
in the middle of the streets." Making clear that "Six or eight people witnessed the 
accident and they all agreed that I was in no way to blame," he demanded that parents 
rein in their children ' s street activities: 
It is hardly possible that the government can control children directly or make 
them see the danger of playing in the street. It is also hardly possible that the same 
government can keep the children from becoming a menace to motoring. In fact, 
they are that already. But cannot the parents of these children teach them the right 
and wrong in regard to their actions in the street? What mother would see her 
offspring deliberately break an electric lamp without reprimanding him? What 
mother would stand by and let her child steal apples from a street vender? Yet 
parents feel no responsibility at all in regard to automobiles.37 
Recounting another instance, in which a young boy hurled a rock at his car, the same 
motorist berates: 
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Let the parents of American children wake up! Do you want your youngsters to 
become known to the automobile world as pests? Do you wish every driver to put 
on full speed the instant he sights a child? Which is the most dangerous, cars 
passing your house at the rate of speed far exceeding the limit to avoid your 
children or 15 miles an hour with the assurance to the motorist that he will not be 
annoyed. The common people of this country must decide and they must decide 
now.
38 
Automobilists thus employed the discursive tactic of shame to tarnish the doubters or 
incompetents as unsophisticated brutes. One concerted response that further demarcated 
the boundaries in the field consisted of initiating safety education campaigns in schools. 
Club members in Boston and New York, for example, distributed in classrooms 
pamphlets on 'How to Avoid Accidents,' and worked with school officials to come up 
with "rules in rhyme and have the children sing them so that they may be memorized 
more easily and quickly before the vacation season begins."39 
Such struggles to fix the value of symbolic capital in motoring intensified when 
automobilists and cars came under direct attack. Consider the reaction of The Horseless 
Age editor to an especially vivid attack against the automobile published in a letter to the 
journal by a certain "Dr. C. A. W." The doctor wrote: 
As a party of semi-invalids were returning home from my office, they met one of 
those hissing, rattling, puffing, smudging, modern Juggernauts, called an 
'automobile,' tearing down a steep grade at a terrific rate of speed ... The advent 
of these steam engines has inaugurated a reign of terror in this section hardly 
exceeded in the West a few years since by the murderous Jesse James and his 
robber gang, and it will take them only a few years to exceed his record of 
maimed and murdered victims ... They [cars] are of no practical good and never 
will be, and the public should unite as one for their own safety, for the safety of 
their wives and children, and bury the machine beyond a chance of resurrection. 
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But for The Horseless Age, the letter spoke to the writer ' s character and failed cultural 
attitude. His claims were outright dismissed : "No man with a worthy cause would indulge 
in such abusive language. The doctor is evidently a man of much temper and little 
judgment."40 
The Triumph ofTechnical Discourse 
When reading the various discussions on traffic accidents in early automobile journals 
one is struck by the highly technical nature - both in tone and content - characterizing a 
great deal of these texts. Confined to matters of pragmatics, the scope of such talk is at 
once narrow and detail-specific: How to avoid a tire blowout, teclmiques to ave11 
skidding, what to do when you hit a dog, and so on. 
To begin comprehending the saliency of this framework it will first be pertinent to 
recognize that the term ' accident' stood in the early days of motoring for a blanket 
concept that covers a wide range of automobile-related troubles. Not every mishap 
involved a crash event. Some incidents were self-contained (as in rollovers or ' tum turtle ' 
as they were commonly called). Others consisted of sliding off roads into embankments, 
skidding into ditches, or climbing onto sidewalk curbs. And still others simply meant a 
major mechanical failure , as in parts breaking off (e.g. wheels, axles). Given that a 
variety of situations were considered as 'accident,' it is easier to see why travel 
narratives, a popular literary genre in the rudimentary days of automobiling, often 
included instances of mechanical breakdowns as a fom1 of motor accidents. 
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Constructing the accident as primarily a technical-mechanical impediment or 
failure leads to several interesting consequences. First, it followed that motor vehicle 
mishaps should be approached cognitively and calmly since a rational-scientific paradigm 
presupposes the ability to clearly discern cause-and-effect and, therefore, locate specific 
solutions to particular problems. Within the limits of this lens, accidents can be 
incorporated smoothly as integral and inevitable parts of motoring, a mere aberration in 
the journey that presents a practical challenge to be overcome. For example, when one 
pioneering motorist experienced during a single ride two separate accidents - a skid into 
a ditch, and several explosions in the engine- all were relayed in his story in a cool-
headed and unfazed manner, openly promoting the advantages of a technical standpoint 
in all matters relating to automotive mishaps: " [E]very owner and every prospective 
owner should realize that while there is only a probability of accident, there is a certainty 
that the car will some time stop on the road, or certain contingencies will arise which will 
render it necessary to stop the car to prevent injury being done to the engine, chassis, 
body, or tires. It is inevitable, inescapable, that something will go wrong sometime, 
causing a longer or shorter delay, depending upon the seriousness of the cause, the ability 
of the driver to locate it, and his skill in remedying it when found. "41 
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The ability to weather accidents thus becomes a badge of technical dexterity in 
the motoring world, a golden oppot1unity to fine-tune the mastery of the automobile and 
its unintended difficulties. Consider in this sense another emblematic travel natTative : 
Our first accident came within the first two weeks, when the lubricator broke off 
from a slight jolt in going over a crossing on the boulevard. The escaping steam 
back off our legs caused a speedy realization that something was wrong. We 
whittled a plug from a piece of pine that was the only wood we could find , drove 
it into the opening and went on our way, trusting to luck that the cylinders would 
stand it without more oil until we reached a shop which was not more than 2 miles 
distant. 
Our next misfortune occun·ed one evening. The machine had no special 
means for lighting the water gauge, and we were obliged to rely upon the light 
from the street lamps. During one part of our run on this particular evening we 
went through a stretch of three or four blocks where the lamps were so dim that 
we could not see the water gauge. Although everything appeared to be working all 
right, we stopped the machine, and upon careful inspection found that the gauge 
contained no water. We then tried the gauge cocks and discovered that the water 
in the boiler was too low, although it still contained some. We then attempted to 
pump in water with a hand pump, but this proved a very tedious operation; finally, 
we blew off the steam and succeeded eventually in filling the boiler. Upon 
attempting to light the fire again we discovered that the torch had been 
accidentally left at home when we started, therefore one of us had to go and get it 
before we could get back to the stable. An attempt to discover the cause of our 
discomfiture led us to believe that practically all of the pipes about this machine 
were much too small, but the immediate cause of the trouble in this instance was a 
collection of dirt in the automatic cut-off. We found that all of the check valves 
and the pump were working properly, but not enough water had been supplied. It 
appears from this experience that the pumps are too small, that they will only 
supply sufficient water under the most favorable conditions, whereas they ought 
to have considerable reserve capacity."42 
The motoring press regularly praised innovative drivers for responding creatively to 
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accidents, thereby neutralizing their potentially hampering effects. In the wake of a wreck 
befalling a doctor and which involved a faulty machine, The Horseless Age labeled the 
misfortune an "instructive accident" since it prompted the physician to personally set out 
and improve the car's reverse lever and braking system.43 Similarly, after a young man in 
Salina, Kansas improvised a new axle for his crashed car by replacing it with a buggy's 
axle, he was applauded for demonstrating "that a little thing like losing the front wheels 
of an automobile need not worry or delay a chauffeur of any resourcefulness for more 
than a few minutes." Citing some folks' refusal to believe his feat , The Horseless Age 
quoted a local newspaper that advised the skeptics to witness the inventive recuperation 
firsthand: "Every one who has an automobile should go around to the Salina Implement 
and Seed Company's store [where the car is parked]. They may be caught in the same 
predicament some time and suggestions like this would be decidedly apropos."44 
Though pragmatism meant in essence the application of levelheaded approaches 
toward the accident, the capacity to technically surmount the mishap was often 
complemented by declarations of great emotional satisfaction. Automobile magazines 
enjoyed representing the ability to rise above mishaps as both a source of deserved pride 
and evidence of astuteness in the art of motoring. Witness, in this regard, the words of 
one novice automobilist: 
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It is now more than a year that I have owned and operated an automobile. While I 
have had trouble at times to keep it going, in most cases I have been at fault and 
not the machine. I have started out for a long drive and on the way discovered that 
the water failed to circulate because of a frozen radiator. I have driven 40 miles 
with no oil feeding, which resulted in a ruined bearing. In my early experience the 
water and gasoline plugs became exchanged, causing fitful running and finally 
stoppage. The penalty was some chagrin and a walk of 2 miles pushing that auto 
ahead of us . I have driven 30 miles in zero weather without an accident. I was 
pulled into the bam but once, and that was when the oil failed to feed in the crank 
case and the babbitting of the crank shaft was melted out. I have driven by 
lamplight and by moonlight, have been out in all kinds of weather and at all 
seasons of the year, yet I love the auto and would not be without one. I have been 
my own chauffeur and mechanic, making all adjustments and repairs, except in 
cases where breakage occurred. I have learned much about the care and the 
operating of an automobile during my first year's experience, and therefore 
anticipate great pleasure in caring for and driving my new 16 horse power auto 
during the coming season.45 
Did this preoccupation with the technical side of the accident mean that motorists 
were oblivious to the moral implications of the auto's destructiveness? Obviously, such a 
generalizing assertion can hardly be taken seriously. The emphasis on the technical is by 
no means a result of character, but of the conditions determining discourse and the 
location of the actors in the crystallizing field of automobility. It is evidence of the 
centrality of a technicized epistemology amongst those most invested in the success of the 
automobile, wherein problems involving the uses of material objects are addressed 
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through teclmical-rational solutions. Most importantly, such a narrow framing always 
falls short of questioning the necessity of the technology itself, thereby sketching the 
boundary between the spoken and unspoken: While accentuating the pragmatic, rational, 
and mechanical aspects of automobility and its problems, it marginalizes the moral , 
political , or systemic ones. 
Creative Destruction 
Another salient theme involved the representation of the accident not as a terminal event 
that may lead to a reevaluation of the technology ' s place in the social landscape, but a 
fertile occasion that strengthens its hold within the present settings. In some cases, 
enthusiasts seized mishaps as opportunities for channeling inchoate automobile interests 
into more distinct forms of political organization. Several motorists in East St. Louis 
established the local Automobile Club in 1909 not so much as a result of their shared love 
for the novel machine, but in direct response to an accident in which a young boy was 
seriously injured. Instead of prompting the newly formed group to enter into open 
discussions about the merits of the automobile and its appropriate role in the existing 
urban environment, the misfortune was used to set the goal of categorically barring 
children from street play. The Automobile explained that the club will now "seek to have 
the children prevented from running at large on the business streets, and to make it a 
misdemeanor to throw bottles, glass, tacks and similar articles out where auto tires may 
be affected."46 Sometimes accidents were even constructed as productive incidents that 
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can enhance the positive publicity of the automobile. When a New York socialite 
wrecked two cars, The Horseless Age chose to commend her for "advertising" the "value 
of the automobile" . The magazine proudly concluded that in her case, " [T]he press 
work ... was excellently managed." Not only did the vehicles ' reputation benefit from 
being "assessed for the occasion at $18,000 and $9,000 respectively," but " in connection 
with the fire the proprietress was described as having been cool , calm and collected, and 
having personally directed the work of the fire brigade" . The entire affair thus amounted 
to an "unprecedented success in gaining free advertising through the medium of the 
automobile. "47 
But the most significant form of creative destruction involved a much wider 
fantasy. Automobile enthusiasts soon began to employ the accident as an impetus for 
expanding the socio-technical system of automobility itself. The dramatic rise to power 
of the Good Roads Movement, a network lobby of private organizations that pressured 
government at all levels to improve and expand the country ' s thoroughfares for modern 
means of transportation , represents a notable case in point. Started by bicyclists in the 
1880s, the Good Roads Movement was led at the turn of the twentieth century primarily 
by bourgeoning automobile interests . Peaking at the dawn of World War I, the movement 
gained considerable success, putting in motion the political and administrative machinery 
that will build the first federal highways in the 1920s and the interstate systems of the 
1950s.48 Backed by the politically powerful social movement for improving roads to suit 
automotive needs, motordom' s dominant actors turned in part to mishaps as cautionary 
tales about the necessity of developing appropriate car-supported infrastructure. In one of 
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the era's highly vi sible cases, when two wealthy New Haven, Connecticut men lost their 
lives in an accident that occuned on an unpaved byway, their estates sued the city for not 
erecting a sign warning of the discontinuation ofthe road's paving beyond its vicinity. 49 
Other than a compensatory motion, the lawsuit also aimed at turning the tragic event into 
an opportunity for guaranteeing the broader rights of the town ' s motorists. 
The reverse was also true. Enthusiasts often couched the rationale against reckless 
driving in the fear that such behavior will ignite insurmountable public indignation 
against the automobile and ultimately hinder the expansionist interests of the movement 
as a whole. As The Horseless Age put it bluntly: "The interests of the industry, as well as 
those of the movement at large, demand that accidents be avoided as much as possible, 
and this is the reason why we revert to this subject again and again ."50 In similar fashion, 
another magazine wonied that the prominence given in the daily press to the accident 
problem "is liable to create a false and exaggerated impression on the public." This, 
despite the well known fact that, "automobiles are more easily managed than horses and 
kept more completely under control." 51 When accidents began to mount in Morristown, 
New York, one local motorist publicly berated " irresponsible" drivers from the 
Automobile Club of America for supposedly destroying the reputable name he had 
painstakingly established for the automobile in the community. "In these two years that I 
have been running about Monistown", he recounted, "I have never had an accident of 
any kind or even serious trouble in frightening horses, consequently the feeling toward 
the automobile was favorable and most satisfactory to the automobilist." In lieu of this 
general moralist approbation, the man uncompromisingly characterizes others' speeding 
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through heavily populated areas, which already led to several mishaps, as an "evil". And 
yet, at the same time it seems that he is mostly concerned with the possible backlash such 
driving may trigger against the motor vehicle. " [I]n one day this Automobile Club of 
America (so called) has undone my work of over two years by causing six serious 
accidents in our vicinity and arousing public indignation to a high pitch. How many more 
accidents were caused in this whole day's run we have yet to leam."52 In a different 
instance, a Kansas automobilist strongly scolded new wealthy car owners for desiring "a 
record breaking car which wil l tear along the public highways, striking tenor to the 
people's hearts." Again, in his view the main problem lies in that " little do they realize 
the setback it is giving the automobile. If these people would be contented with a 
moderate speed, say not over 25 or 30 miles an hour at the outside, and would see that 
more precaution was used while driving, the auto would be on a fair way to rapid 
advancement." For him, careful driving also served as a sign of distinct national 
character, providing a chance to distinguish the American system of automobility from 
that of other countries. "If the Frenchmen want to keep it up [speedy driving] let them do 
so, but let the automobi li sts of this country show their foreign brethren that we have a 
little more respect for other users of the road." All automobilists must therefore express 
their opinion against speeders "before we are confronted by an uprising of the populace 
which will come sooner or later unless something is done to stop this ' scorching fever' on 
the highways, where it is dangerous to life and limb."53 When Trustees of the New Jersey 
Automobile and Motor Club of Newark expelled a distinguished member from New York 
after he was involved in an accident, the organization published an open resolution 
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denouncing him for "recklessly and unlawfully driving an automobile through the public 
streets of Long Branch." In its statement, the club places the threat of dangerous 
automobiling to the public ' s wellbeing on par with the peril that such behavior poses for 
motoring in general. " [I]t is the opinion of this board that such an occurrence as it is 
understood took place on the above-mentioned date is not only detrimental to all users of 
the highway, but if left unnoticed would tend to bring automobilists in general into 
disrepute."54 Another magazine ' s response to a serious accident in Brooklyn, New York 
follows the same line of reasoning. While harshly reproving the moral evil of such 
technological hann , The Horseless Age constructs accidents at the same time as a 
comparably serious risk to the automobile ' s social acceptance as a novel apparatus: "The 
accident is very much to be deplored, not only because of the immediate damage and 
injury it caused, but because it will very likely be held up by the opponents of the 
automobile as a proof of its dangerous character." Finally, tipping the balance in favor of 
expanding automobility, the machine is exonerated as a possible cause in the said mishap: 
"It can be stated positively, however, from the information obtainable so far , that not the 
vehicle but only the operator's carelessness was to blame for the accident. " 55 
Again, this is by no means an essentialist argument about the nature of early 
autoists. The concerns they openly displayed over automotive carnage are undoubtedly 
genuine. It is only when the bulk of these wonies focus on the repercussions for the 
motor vehicle's reputation that the broader moral and social questions about the place of 
technology in America are necessarily sidelined. It is pertinent to emphasize that this 
does not mean they lacked the ability for systemic thinking- as nicely evidenced by the 
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h:mtasy of automotive expansionism. Rather, the automobile as larger socio-technical 
system only figures into the discussion in a narrow way that serves the interests of 
motorists, namely by harnessing the destructive element of the car for enlarging this very 
system. 
The general paradox of creative destruction, then, is encapsulated vividly by such 
representations of the auto mishap: In response to accidents, motorists seek to establish 
and enhance a socio-technical system that breeds more accidents. It will be fruitful to 
consider at length a piece from the motoring press that captures this perspective in stark 
colors. Admitting that the existence of danger in automobiling is "a fact , not a prejudice," 
and that "[t]his diminished degree of safety is a stable pm1 of the new order of 
locomotion; its reality cannot be dodged," a 1905 article in the Automobile Review goes 
on to construct a fascinating argument. " [P]aradoxical as it may seem," the writer says, 
"the flood of danger may only be stopped by increasing quickly as possible the 
conditions which gave it being. The more there be of automobiling and the chance of 
automobiling danger, the sooner will conditions adjust themselves to rid vehicle usage of 
the high factor of danger now existent in it. " His somewhat unexpected claim rests on the 
fact that the existing transportation system is not fully geared yet to meet the needs of the 
automobile: 
This is the whole story. As soon as the conditions of traffic are suited to all the 
vehicles of traffic, then the danger of traffic will be reduced to the minimum. To 
bring about such a relationship of conveyance and practice necessitates the 
abolition of mixed and conflicting requirements in practice. Granted the 
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superiority and final universality of the new conveyance and the problem of 
danger in traflic is simplified to the single purpose of getting rid of the older and 
inferior conveyances that with them may go the confusion of their concomitant 
use with the modern and superseding vehicles. 
Until that happens, 
there must be a period of turmoil in which one conveyance fights for precedure 
[sic] over another and in which customs and conditions gradually assume the 
proper character of their new relationship. This is the danger period now existing 
-now beginning. It is not so much a feature of motoring as it is a phase of 
traffic. To its existence is attachable no blame. It is natural, unpreventable and of 
a duration and extent controlled solely by the rapidity of the establishment of a 
new order of traffic conditions ... The paradox is true - the greater the immediate 
turmoil and consequent danger, the sooner the straightening out of highway 
affairs into a reorganized era of order and safety."56 
Shifting the Blame 
Another common response to early accidents exhibited by many motorists involved an 
instant attempt to reallocate culpability through unloading blame onto other involved 
parties. Elizabeth Jordan, who had been a victim of several accidents during the 1920s, 
wams other potential victims that upon suffering a mishap they will soon discover how 
the "other fellow' s immediate subsequent action is to sue him, the victim, for reckless 
driving! " . To counter such sudden reversal of fortune from victim to suspect, blameless 
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sides must act fast: " [l]fhe [the victim] is able to stagger about on his legs, he leams to 
lay his fellow victims in a more or less neat row by the roadside and to hustle about 
among the spectators with a notebook and pencil , jotting down the name and addresses of 
witnesses who will testify in his behalf when the case comes to court. His failure to do 
this may cost him thousands of dollars. "57 
Such strategies of redistributing guilt were not merely legal acts. As mentioned 
earlier, betraying a growing us-against-them mentality, automobilists were developing 
their own cultural capital in the novel field of motor traffic. Positions that used the 
accident as a conduit for critiquing automotive travel as a whole were constructed by 
leading motorists as a rival structural position within the field. Outsiders were thus 
increasingly being labeled in the auto joumals as ' anti-automobilists,' heretics who 
viewed mishaps in a different, necessarily harsher manner. One popular target was the 
printed press' supposed tendency to sensationalize accidents. Motorcar enthusiasts 
frequently slammed newspapers for publishing inflated reports on automobile wrecks. 
Describing an accident involving a Boston motorist and a bicyclist, The Horseless Age 
bitingly criticized several local joumalists for what it perceived as inaccurate reportage. 
According to the magazine, the motorist "was driving along at a fair rate of speed, when 
suddenly a cyclist rode in from a cross street and got right in front of the car. A collision 
was unavoidable and the cyclist broke through the glass front of the car with his head, 
which was the cause of the only injuries he received. No bones had been broken, as had 
been reported in the papers."58 Another auto joumal claimed that the press suffers from 
"blind prejudice," which "instead of helping to make easy the coming of the motor 
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vehicle by treating it dispassionately and explaining its great utility," leads it to "cater to 
the adverse prejudice of the general public which is but the result of ignorance." 
Newspapers in this sense are portrayed as enemies of progress, who by giving way to 
primeval fears and unbridled hysteria, exhibit low cultural capital when it came to 
judging modem technological developments. " It is certainly to be regretted that the daily 
press of this enlightened country in this advanced age cannot take a broader and saner 
view of the motor vehicle instead of treating it in a manner similar to that accorded to the 
steam locomotive, the telegraph and other great inventions that have proved sources of 
lasting benefit to the human race."59 The President of the ACA similarly rebuked a report 
in the New York Times on an accident that occurred on the city's streets and involved one 
of the club' s members, claiming that the facts were obtained from livery stable owners, 
"who were naturally very much embittered against the automobile movement because it 
injured their business."60 Auto enthusiasts even claimed that such uncouth sentiments had 
infiltrated the judicial system. After a New York court severely sentenced a local 
automobilist for his involvement in a serious accident in Yonkers The Horseless Age first 
concurred that, "the driver of the automobile was guilty of negligence, and in 
consequence shared in the blame for the accident." However, the harshness of the penalty 
imposed "seems unjustified and calls for resentment by the automobile interests." The 
magazine argues that is evident from the "hurry with which the proceedings were 
conducted, the uncompromising attitude of the judge and the severity of the penalty, that 
the anti-automobile feeling said to be prevalent in that locality was of undue influence in 
this case."61 
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The need to shift the blame for accidents unto other groups and thereby fix their 
structural position in the new field of automobility became a matter of life and death for 
the avid advocates of the motorcar. It is through these efforts, they believed, that the 
future trajectory of the motor vehicle will be determined. "All over the United States 
there is a cry for protection against the automobile," one auto magazine exclaimed 
worriedly, "In other words, the ' automobile problem ' has waxed acute and national and 
craves solution." The crucial difficulty is that, faced with the increase in accidents, "the 
majority [of the public] are less inclined to make nice distinctions and include the whole 
automobile movement in their curse." As a result, 
between cursing and being cursed the condition is gradually becoming equally as 
intolerable to the well intentioned user of automobiles as to the people at large 
who see their right to the pursuit of happiness threatened by the new tyrants of 
streets and highways." In fact, "among automobilists and automobile club 
members very few only show more than a perfunctory interest in any other class 
of self propelled vehicle than that which appeals to their demand for a new sport 
or pastime and exclusive fonns of fashionable living ... Under these circumstances 
the 'automobile problem' deals almost exclusively with sporting vehicles, and 
aims almost exclusively at reduction of the speed which is their most sensational 
feature. 
And although "the speed possibilities of automobiles form only one among many new 
factors affecting the safety of traffic," it is the speed question that "public opinion 
expresses itself most forcibly . It will solve itself in short order when the responsibility for 
automobile accidents is brought home in each case by prompt judicial consideration of all 
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the circumstances attending them."62 Referring to another accident reported widely in the 
press, the President of the ACA asserted, "the mistake made by nearly all autophobes was 
that they considered every automobilist a reckless driver, whereas ... the great majority 
were very careful and considerate." He then warned his fellow clubmen "not to fall into 
the error of their opponents, of being too radical in their statements. It must be admitted 
that there are some black sheep among automobilists who frequently exceed the bounds 
of reason in the matter of speed." He urged everyone to use personal influence to 
"caution friends who occasionally get reckless. "63 
Refusing to believe that problematic automotive technology can lead to accidents 
served as another strategy for transferring the blame unto the marginali zed category of 
deviant drivers. Berating the press for consistently faulting automobiles in a rash of 
recent mishaps, one motor magazine redirected responsibility to the operators. "Now, 
while a mishap to the steering gear is very likely to cause a serious accident, it is hard to 
believe that the steering gears of so many cars are so carelessly constructed that they 
break or drop to pieces on the road, and we are rather inclined to think that the greater 
portion of these accidents are simply the result of reckless driving, mostly by comparative 
novices, who, to free themselves from blame, put it on the steering gear. In some of the 
accounts it is evident that the explanations of how it happened have been fabricated. " 
Consequently, "Since it is a great injustice to the industry that accidents should in the 
public press be ascribed to failure of some parts of the machine, when in reality they are 
the direct cause of reckless, unlawful speeding, would it not be advisable for the National 
Association of Automobile Manufacturers to have an inquiry made into the causes of all 
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serious accidents, at least those which occur in or near the large cities?"64 In a different 
case, Automobile Topics maintained unequivocally that, " It is a fact that the average car 
of to-day is so well designed and constructed that its responsibility for accidents is almost 
a negligible quantity. Nearly all the mishaps are caused by the misbehavior of drivers-
and it is not always the culprit who comes to grief" Therefore, "If all the motorists drove 
sanely the number of accidents, serious and otherwise, which fill the columns ofthe daily 
newspapers at the present time would be enormously decreased."65 Another commentator 
similarly asserted that, " [t]he tendency still is to blame the car rather than the driver 
whereas the only time the car can be at fault is when it is in poor condition. But that, 
paradoxically enough, is also the fault of the driver, who should know better than to take 
out a car unless it is right. Or, if he doesn't know, should be made both to know and 
care. "
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Yet, when a prominent car manufacturer was killed in an auto accident involving 
his own product, the auto press found itself in a dilemma. Ultimately, the conflict was 
bridged by ente11aining a notion of ' autonomous technology,' 67 implying that the 
automobile acted as though having a mind of its own. "Mr. Anthony was riding with a 
friend in a Cadillac on one ofthe smoothest stretches of road in the course," the 
Horseless Age detailed in his obituary, "when, without any warning or known cause, one 
of the rear wheels splintered to pieces, letting the rear end of the car down. This caused 
one of the front wheels to completely dish, and the car turned completely over, pinning 
Mr. Anthony and his friend beneath. Mr. Anthony was crushed to death immediately, but 
his friend escaped with but few injuries."68 Assigning the motorcar to the realms of the 
arcane aids in rationalizing the fatal incident by unquestioning the taken-for-granted 
assumptions ofthe technology ' s supposed reliability and future promise. 
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Taking out insurance policies also aided in sharing liability and diffusing the 
responsibility for automotive mishaps. "Every user of a motor car has it within his power 
to habitually drive his machine in such a manner as never to incur any mora/liability for 
accidents to others. In other words, he may drive so carefully that he shall , so far as the 
judgment of his own conscience is concerned, be ' in the exercise of due care ' at all times. 
Unfortunately, however, on account ofthe hostility which still persists among the horse 
drivers of some sections in regard to the motor car, and the prejudice which appears to 
sway the decisions of many juries, he cannot always be sure of escaping !ega/liability for 
accidents alleged to have been caused by the operation of his machine .... Such litigation, 
no matter what its outcome, is naturally very distressing to the defendant, who, if not a 
person of wealth, may be seriously crippled financially in the event of a large adverse 
verdict." An insurance policy, consequently, " is a source of considerable satisfaction to 
the user to feel the protection which such a policy affords . .. No doubt if all owners 
enjoyed the protection of powerful liability companies, with their well organized legal 
departments, there would be very few suits brought, except those that were obviously 
justified by the facts. Suits brought in order to frighten the defendant into a settlement 
would probably be practically eliminated, as insurance companies are soulless and not 
readily scared."69 The president ofthe ACA thought that the best means of protection 
against lawyers who make a specialty of inducing people to bring damage suits was to 
take out accident policies. These policies are issued to cover all accidents, except those 
111 
on race tracks, and the holder of such a policy avoids all trouble with lawyers ."70 
Conclusion 
As users and promoters of a new technology, staunch automobile enthusiasts were forced 
to face head-on with the extreme contradictions represented by motor travel. The car ' s 
detrimental consequences, alarmingly claiming more and more lives and destruction in 
the early twentieth century, unleashed a public outcry for reconsidering Americans ' 
adoption of this new mode oftransportation.71 The uproar threatened to mar the novel 
technology ' s impetus as a revolutionary machine, touted by its proponents to forever 
change modem society. Frequently caught between the role of victim and culprit, auto 
club members had to explain to themselves and others the meanings of the car' s darker 
sides. The analysis of motoring literature between 1895 and 1930 demonstrates that they 
often chose to represent accidents in ways that would not threaten the dominant role they 
envisioned for the automobile. By first stressing the thrilling nature of the crash, then its 
routine nature, treating accidents as a technical rather than a sociopolitical and moral 
problem, constructing the mishap as a productive event to further the interests of 
automobility, and by continuously repudiating their own role in causing accidents- auto 
advocates crafted a set of claims that labored, ultimately, to attenuate the auto accident as 
a hazardous event. 
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Chapter 3. 
The Quantified Accident 
Car Crashes, Statistics, and Reactive Discourse 
Any close examination of the public discourse on traffic accidents in the United States is 
bound sooner than later to stumble upon one undeniably striking component: Statistics. 
The use of numerical quantities is probably the most visible and frequent medium of 
claimsmaking on the issue of automobile wrecks. From newspapers comparing the 
aggregate historical victims to the number of American soldiers killed in battle, through 
the National Safety Council ' s eerie holiday weekend predictions of how many traffic 
fatalities can be expected, to economists ' recurring translation of accident costs into 
workdays lost and consumer power wasted - talk of motor vehicle mishaps in America is 
rife with numbers . On the one hand, this may come as little surprise. As noted in Chapter 
1, the employment of quantities to illustrate the seriousness of a situation characterizes 
many other social problem debates in the United States. 1 Yet, on the other hand, the sheer 
dominance of statistics in the discourse of accidents merits fmiher investigation. What is 
the nature of such quantification? How does it affect the construction ofthe problem? 
Does the preoccupation with numbers marginalize other ways of representing and 
understanding mass automotive carnage? Is there a special significance to the 
quantification of accidents as opposed to other phenomena? 
In this chapter I explore these questions by looking at the various cultural 
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meanings emanating from the application of statistics in the historical di scourse on traffic 
accidents as a social problem. First I contextualize the saliency of quantification within 
Modernity ' s dramatic dominancy oftechnical-rational approaches to comprehending the 
world. Fallowing this background section is a brief presentation of the major actors and 
organizations that have traditionally been involved in the production and dissemination of 
statistics on traffic accidents in the United States. I then tum to the thematic analysis of 
this discourse, highlighting and dissecting important uses and consequences of 
quantification. These include the early deployment of relativist perspectives, the growing 
preoccupation with predicting fatality rates, and the idea of saving lives on a statistical 
level. 
Quantification and Statistics in the Modem Era 
To begin understanding the centrality of statistics in the di scourse on road accidents one 
must first view it within the broader context of the triumph of rationality and the pursuit 
of objectivity as two defining elements of Modernity. Part and parcel of the revolutions in 
science, medicine, and industry, the rise to dominance of quantification - through 
measurement, enumeration, calculation, and commensuration- signaled a deep 
epistemological shift in the way the world was to be understood and managed.2 The 
simultaneous erosion of determinism as an explanatory framework of events in the 
universe in favor of a probabilistic paradigm was accelerated by, and further supported, 
the paramount shift to numerical frameworks. 3 Quantification aimed at taming human 
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subjectivity by subordinating natural and social phenomena to a universal set of concepts 
and methods of inquiry. 4 The impact of these changes is hard to overestimate. Enjoying 
widespread authority in Europe and the United States in the past two hundred years, the 
"avalanche of numbers"5 is responsible for producing novel institutional gazes, new 
populations and individuals to be treated and managed, previously unknown problems to 
be solved, fresh issues to be tackled. Quantification soon penetrated both everyday life 
circumstances6 and the domains of professional activities. Sweeping not only the natural 
and social sciences,7 but liberal arts areas such as music and painting as well ,8 
quantification aided in inventing new categories for reflection in such variegated fields as 
I. d h )"C" 9 "d . I 10 d" . II bl" . . 12 d b fi marta 1ty an t e 11espan, ep1 em10 ogy, me Icme, pu IC opm10n, an cost- ene It 
analyses. 13 As Max Weber noted, capitalist bureaucracies function most effectively when 
they excise personal and non-calculable elements from official business. 14 Corporations, 
where bureaucracy is most highly developed, have as one of their central tendencies the 
rational calculation of all factors of production (e.g., taxes, transportation, government 
stability, the cost of utilities). That today public policy proceeds only within an evidence-
based, numerical framework constitutes a largely uncontested hegemonic practice in 
advanced industrialized bureaucracies. 15 
In the United States, the emergence of what Patricia Cline Cohen calls a 
"quantitative mentality" takes place roughly between 1790 and 1820.16 Buoyed by a 
changing social imaginary of the newly formed nation, private individuals and gazetteers 
competed in providing compendiums of "authentic facts"- comprehensive and dry 
portrayals that best capture the state ofthe budding country. Regularly advertising the 
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value of their almanacs for the shapers of law and public policy, these authors 
championed the idea that quantification is the essential foundation of good government. 
Complete possession of the facts , they claimed, would eliminate factionalism and allow 
government to rule in the best interest of the people.17 Governing bodies soon took up 
statistical pursuits beyond the initial interests in population and trade statistics, the 
original focus inherited from the British rule. Constructed gradually as a social 
"technology oftrust" 18 thanks to its mechanical objectivity and universalistic language, 
quantification became the strategy of choice deployed by federal and state bureaucratic 
agencies in administering complex tasks . By mid to late nineteenth century, efficient 
democratic government in the United States seemed to require continuously improved 
methods of accounting and statistics gathering. 19 
The rise of positivism in the West was compatible, then, with the prevailing 
political and economic desire to control nature and effectively manage social orders. 20 
When it came to facing and assessing danger, the turn to probabilism gave birth to a 
whole new regime of calculations, evocatively labeled by Gigerenzer eta! as the "empire 
of chance."2 1 Producing values of chance meant in essence that statistical representations 
describing past events serve as computational bases for predicting or shaping future 
probabilities. Emanating from their origins in science and game theory, such 
measurements have in contemporary settings become one of the staple characteristics of 
what some sociologists have called "risk societies."22 Of course, natural or human-made 
threats to people's wellbeing have existed well before the invention of probabilistic risk 
analyses. But never have such adverse effects been understood primarily in terms of 
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mathematical odds. The ramifications for the ways we respond to, and contemplate, life 's 
misfortunes have been nothing short of dramatic. 
The Production of Statistics on Traffic Accident: Key Players, Sources, and 
Methods 
The rapid industrialization of the United States in the nineteenth century exposed its 
citizens to an entire anay of previously unknown human-made risks and dangers. 
Engaging with novel production and transportation technologies bred new kinds of 
accidents, wrecks, and disasters. In general, antebellum efforts to assess these dangers by 
collecting accident statistics were highly local and idiosyncratic. In the mid nineteenth, 
progressive refom1ers, many of them self-trained statisticians, began gathering numerical 
data about accidents as one strategy to call attention to the human costs of 
industrialization and to justify state intervention in factories, railroads, and other 
capitalist enterprises.23 Although their declared audience was "the public," in practice, the 
information they assembled was mostly used in a much nmTower conversation between 
labor advocates, employers, and policymakers. The first large-scale government efforts to 
compile accident statistics took place in the 1830s and focused on steamboat explosions. 
During these years, the federal government created the apparatus to collect data, hold 
hearings, and use the conclusions to regulate this new technology.24 In the 1850s state-
level railroad commissions began to compile similar statistics on train wrecks. But it was 
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not until the 1870s, with the creation of state-level bureaus of labor statistics and bureaus 
of factory inspection, that systematic, state-sponsored projects started to count accidents 
befalling a broad population group rather than on the basis of specific technologies . By 
concentrating on injurious incidents in the workplace, industrial accidents became the 
first subject of yearly and widespread censuses in multiple states. 25 In addition to 
focusing on a social group rather than on specific technologies, labor statistics on work-
related accidents provided the most significant source of quantitative data for the 
Progressive-era journalists and reformers who first tried to speak directly to the public 
about risk . Industrial safety was also the training ground for the people who went on to 
create the "safety movement" in the early twentieth century. 26 The movement began 
employing statistics as both a tool used by professionalizing safety experts to identify 
risk, and as a means for creating a much broader cultural shift in public attitudes about 
risk . But by 1912, the refonnist voices began losing control of this discourse to the 
emerging private, business-oriented outfits that had begun to coalesce into a set of local 
and national organizations. This "safety-first movement," as it was sometimes called, 
offered a more conciliatory message about managing risk than the social progressives, 
whose ideological roots were in socialist critiques of capitalism. Led by the National 
Safety Council (NSC) the movement drew upon a tradition of technocratic reform that 
gave rise to scientific management, emphasizing individual responsibility for safe 
behavior over corporate culpability. 27 However, it also encouraged corporate investment 
in safety, arguing that it would save money in the long run.28 
121 
In the first two decades of automobility no single body took the helm of regularly 
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating statistics on traffic accidents as part of consistent 
contribution to the public discourse on such mishaps. 29 Though the U.S. Census Bureau 
began during the 191 Os to include automobile fatalities as a distinct category in its tallies 
of nationwide deaths, the data remained for the most part in the confines of Bureau ' s 
compendiums and did not figure prominently in ongoing public discussions on the 
negative effects of the motoring. In the absence of a centralized collecting and 
disseminating body, the task of amassing data was left to local organizations, giving it a 
rather sporadic and fragmented nature. City and town morgues, local police departments, 
state health officials, private insurance companies, and automobile trade groups - all 
produced statistics figures on traffic accidents. The result was a disjointed and patchy 
picture that opened the gates for much political pliability. Whenever an interested group, 
such as the major automobile clubs or manufactures, could get their hands on a dataset, 
they introduced it to the discourse with a corresponding angle (on the earliest of such 
uses of statistics see below). 
The establishment of the Committee on Statistics within the NSC in July 1919 
marked the first comprehensive and centralized effort at tackling the accident problem 
statistically, transforming the Council into the dominant, if not the most vocal , actor to 
engage in the collection, dissemination, and interpretation of accident statistics in the 
decades to come. How did the Council produce statistics? As an organization that brought 
together both public and private elements, the NSC utilized its wide outreach to amass 
data from a variety of sources: 1) Reports from municipal health departments or police, 
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regularly compiled by its local Safety Council chapters; 2) The National Bureau of 
Casualty and Surety Underwriters (NBCSU), an association of various private insurance 
companies based in the East Coast, which set out to coordinate premium rates and 
cooperate in public education campaigns. Representatives of the Bureau were members 
ofthe NSC in the 1920s; 4) Individual private insurance companies ' figures , especially 
those with membership in the NSC30; 5) State and local engineering departments; 6) The 
U.S . Census Bureau; and 7) The National Automobile Chamber of Commerce (NACC). 
The NTSC 's Committee of Statistics continuously streamed these figures into a 
variety of tabulations. The myriad of databases and sources resulted in inevitable 
inconsistencies and contested numbers. Nationwide death rates had to be computed based 
on wide-margin estimates, not comprehensive and accurate enumeration.31 As such, the 
NSC was well aware of the fact that the errors involved in these assessments were large.32 
In light ofthis lack of uniformity, the Council ' s Committee on Statistics set out 
early on to standardize the compilation of accident statistics.33 By the mid 1920s the 
Council pushed for this nationwide by circulating a standard accident-reporting form to 
all police departments and municipal officials. Standardization was construed as 
accuracy, which in tum meant the potential to arrive at a complete portrayal of the 
problem. According to this view, the increasing ability of record keepers to produce finer, 
specific, and compartmentalized figures based on universal measures is the prerequisite 
steppingstone for prevention. 34 
No less important than the collection of statistics, their dissemination to the public 
became a central objective for the NSC. Frederick Crum, the Council ' s first chief 
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statistician claimed that other than for engineering and legislative purposes, data "will 
have great publicity value."3536 As a result, the Council established close working-
relations with national and local media, sending out routine communicates with periodic 
batches of statistics. 
Early Uses of Numbers in the Discourse on Traffic Accidents 
The employment of statistics in the discourse on motor vehicle accidents is evident from 
the earliest days of automobility. In the absence of a single safety establishment or 
statistics bureaus that made regular public claims based upon collected data, it was 
largely the proponents of the automobile who took the helm in this respect. Automobile 
clubs, car manufacturers, and various chambers of commerce and associations used any 
accident figures they came across to establish a set of legitimations in favor of the new 
mode oftranspo11ation and expanding the socio-technical infrastructure that supports it. 
As will soon become apparent, the dominant methods and meanings they established -
namely a relativistic approach that centered on comparative techniques couched in an 
actuarial paradigm of calculated risk - became the backbone of the use of statistics in the 
public discourse on the accident problem for years to come. 
Generally, proponents of the motor vehicle utilized numbers in the early days as a 
political means for arguing in support of the automobile's safeness. Since the motor 
vehicle ' s destructive side received a great deal of bad press during this era,37 advocates of 
the new technology sought to counter this offensive by presenting statistics as an 
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ostensibly objective and rational measure that transcends mere personal opinions. These 
strategies usually consisted of comparing the motorcar's accident record to that of other 
modes of transportation. In 1913 The Club Journal employed data collected by the 
American Museum of Safety to claim that New York City traffic fatality figures from 
1907 to 1911 "exonerate the automobile." The average during this period of91 deaths a 
day from automobiles compared to 230 by wagon was presented as a refutation of "the 
general impression that the automobile is the modem juggernaut. "38 Another editorial 
similarly highlighted comparative statistics to claim that pedestrians in New York City 
must be subjected to the same kind of regulations as the automobile, since the figures for 
the first three months of the year show that 12 out of 62 deaths resulted from "people 
crossing the street at points where they are not supposed to do so. "39 
The refusal to judge the destructiveness of the automobile on its own terms in favor 
of a comparative and proportioned perspective emerged as a dominant logic in the 
incipient discourse on traffic accidents. An increasing specification of units of 
comparison further bolstered the relativist framework by which these technological 
mishaps came to be understood. Exponents of motor travel soon began to draw on highly 
selective timeframes for their evaluations. Consider the following excerpt from the 
Automobile Trade Journal: 
The advent of the automobile as a means of conveyance has caused it to be given 
considerable undesired notoriety. The press pays practically no attention to 
vehicular accidents unless an automobile is involved, in which case great stress is 
laid on the cause of the accident and its disastrous results. Statistics prove, 
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however, that the number of accidents due to automobiles is much smaller in 
proportion than of those due to streetcars or wagons. According to E. P. Chalfant, 
general manager of the Association ofLicensed Automobile Manufacturers, the 
police records show that in New York City from January 1st to April 1Oth, 1909, 
there were 434 accidents in vehicles of different kinds . Of these, one hundred and 
sixty-seven were due to horse-drawn vehicles, one hundred and sixty-two to street 
cars, ninety to autos, and fifteen to trains, giving a percentage of 38.4 accidents 
due to horse-drawn conveyances and 37.3 per cent due to street cars, while of 
accidents due to automobiles there were only 20.4 per cent. But in spite of these 
figures , the automobile, still being somewhat of a novelty, always receives a rather 
harsh criticism whenever it is the cause of an accident, and it will continue to do so 
until the newness wears off and it ceases to be attractive news matter, thereby 
receiving undue publicity.40 
Operating in the terrain of numbers thus allowed advocates to carefully choose statistical 
evidence that can serve as the basis for sweeping arguments in support of the safety of 
automotive travel. In fact, there seemed to be no endpoint to the nuanced uses of 
measurement units. Citing statistics reported in the Chicago Daily Tribune, a reader's 
letter to The Automobile points to the fact that of the 147 people killed violently in the 
city in August, not one died as a result of automobile travel. This detail , the writer 
concludes, constitutes clear evidence that "the Chicago automobile is not the deadly 
devil-wagon some heated imaginations have believed it to be."4 1 A year later the same 
magazine highlights statistics for the month of April supplied by the Indiana Secretary of 
the State Board of Health, wherein no traffic fatalities were attributed to the automobile. 
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That month ' s figures are sufficient to "prove the carefulness and efficiency of automobile 
drivers ... a strong point in favor of the automobile."42 
Were automobilists unique in making such claims? On one level , the answer is no. 
Scholars of social problems have long observed that claimsmaking is an inherently 
situational practice, a political tool that attempts at swaying rival parties into accepting 
the point of view the claimsmaker is interested in advancing.43 But a deeper meaning lies 
in the numerical arguments presented above. Interestingly, they fail to squarely face a 
latent paradox buried within them. Comparisons of this sort seem to constitute especially 
short-lived rhetorical ammunition since they support a state of affairs that its creators are 
not interested in preserving. As advocates for establishing the dominance of the 
automobile by marginalizing out other modes of transportation, motor vehicle enthusiasts 
were themselves hastening the irrelevancy of these very statistical triumphs. By yearning 
for the creation of a full-fledged auto-centered transport system while at the same time 
extolling the statistical insignificance of automobile accidents compared to other means 
of conveyance, these proponents refuse to acknowledge the imminent increase in risk that 
such a system will necessarily entail. 
Apparently unaware of this problematic ramification, and despite the fact that the 
aggregate toll of lives and injuries due to road accidents had grown tremendously during 
the 191 Os, auto interests continued to use evaluations that undermined an absolutist 
perspective in favor of a proportioned one. For one, motorcar enthusiasts were among the 
first to publicly deploy fatality calculations based on miles traveled and number of 
registered cars rather than on population. These alternative rates often served as a 
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stepping-stone for claiming that accidents are actually decreasing or at least not 
worsening. In a 1907 editorial The Automobile lays the groundwork for such a calculus 
by sophisticatedly borrowing railroad statistician ' s concept of ' passenger mi !e. ' 44 At first, 
the editor admits that the automobile increases the total passenger miles with a related 
rise in accidents. Yet he then qualifies this statement by noting that "nevertheless [the 
automobile] most materially decreases the risk per passenger mile."45 Such an innovative 
technique- the incorporation of a standard originally used in a different field - soon 
became the basis for making competing arguments about the dangerousness of auto 
travel. By 1921 the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, a powerful 
organization promoting automotive interests, could confidently assert that when looking 
at the ratio of fatalities per number of registered vehicles the automobile death rate has in 
fact been cut in halfbetween 1914 and 1919.46 Autoists employed these rates to condemn 
the "much unnecessary alarm and near-hysteria" over the accident problem.47 
Further indication of the push toward strict relativism came in the form of an early 
adoption of the language of magnitudes . Contributing substantially to this trend was the 
establishment in 1909 of the National Highways Protective Society, a highly visible 
association of prominent New York City businessmen, industrialists, attorneys, and 
socialites who advocated for punishing ' scorcher' drivers and removing children from 
playing in the streets. In an attempt to harness the power of numbers, the Society 
provided a series of widely publicized comparative statistics during the 191 Os. In 1912, 
for instance, the organization drew parallels between various vehicular accident rates in 
New York City its members had been able to glean from local police precincts. Although 
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half of those mishaps were found to emanate from automobile use, the secretary of the 
Society, Colonel Edward Cornell , dampened down the results: " [A]ccidents will always 
happen so long as man is a finite creature but their number can be reduced by a general , 
decent regard for the other fellow ' s rights. "48 In other words, the Society set its advocacy 
goals within the framework of changes on a shared scale of metrics, creating expectations 
for alleviating the situation somewhat, not eradicating it. 
A second kind of legitimation in suppmi ofthe automobile on the basis of 
statistics was underpinned by actuarial practices. Proponents of automobility frequently 
turned to insurance paradigms of risk analysis as means to justify the supposed safeness 
of auto travel. Ironically, this strategy first arose as a response to the insurance industry ' s 
early suspicion of the automobile. Underwriters were initially hesitant to provide 
automobile drivers with policies due to the novelty of the technology and the ensuing 
unceiiainty in accurately substantiating its dangerousness. Faced with doubt as to how to 
set premium rates for automobile travel , actuaries feared to incur heavy financial losses. 
Yet it was the automobilists themselves who attempted to clarify these computations by 
proving that the motor vehicle was indeed statistically safe. Such is the case, for instance, 
when a writer for The Automobile Magazine employed statistics compiled by New York 
City ' s police commissioner for the year 1903. According to these figures , less than three 
per cent of the city ' s street fatalities resulted from automobile use, a fact that should "put 
a quietus upon some of this insurance bugaboo ... [that regards] the automobile as a thing 
especially devised by the devil to rob poor insurance companies of scanty dollars."49 
Soon, personal driving narratives, a popular genre in early automobile literature, began to 
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incorporate the language of probability. "Every new owner and every prospective owner 
of a motor vehicle ought to realize that there is a strong probability of having an accident 
on the road sooner or later," wrote one motorist. " It can be mathematically demonstrated 
that out of 1,000 cars, each making a mileage of 5,000 in a season, a certain, definite 
number (which is entirely too large) will meet with one or more accidents that will be 
more or less disastrous, depending upon the special circumstances in each case. "50 Before 
long, newspaper editorials echoed this actuarial logic. In 1908, to cite one instance, the 
Washington Post quoted a one Herbert Lyon, an "automobile enthusiast", who claimed 
that the "hysteria" over "reckless automobile driving" is unwarranted since " it can be 
proved by statistics of accidents and life insurance that a person is safer in a railroad 
coach than he is in a church."51 
Faced with mounting pressure from the politically and socially powerful class of 
automobilists, by 1910 more and more insurance companies were insuring motor vehicle 
owners . By the end of the first decade ofthe twentieth century, one automobile magazine 
could boast confidently that " [T]he autoist is a fair risk for the insurance companies, 
according to the statistics that have just been compiled by Medical Director J. W. Fisher, 
of the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of Milwaukee. Of 551 deaths upon 
which claims were paid by the company in the last four years, only seventeen were due to 
automobile accidents, and only sixteen of these were occupants of the cars .. . It is evident 
that there are greater hazards than in automobiling." 52 
Interestingly, the growing actuarial comfort with the motorcar occurred despite 
the fact that in reality the ' automobile hazard ' grew exponentially, as the expansion of 
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roads and car ownership was accompanied by a dramatic rise in accidents. The Horseless 
Age acknowledged that insurers ' newly found interest in automobilists had in actuality 
little to do with the statistical risk of the motor vehicle. Rather, other reasons, such as the 
"extensive agency connections" between major insurance companies and prominent 
motorcar enthusiasts, that accounted for this partnership. Further explanations related to 
improvements in car construction, the news of foreign insurance companies' profiting 
from entering into the motorcar sector, and the establishment of automobile departments 
in several leading insurance companies. In light ofthis increasingly cozy relationship 
between the two industries, The Horseless Age advised its readers to take insurance 
policies, calling it a "necessary, businesslike precaution."53 
Relativism and the Ideology of 'Small Victories and Minor Defeats' 
If early automobilists frequently drew upon statistical relativism to make sense of the 
accident problem, it was by no means the sole dominant modality of claimsmaking in the 
public discourse on this matter. In the daily press, the increasing toll and unprecedented 
scenes of bodily mayhem now witnessed regularly on the urban streets of America 
invoked a mostly panicked tone. Riding on a popular sentiment of outrage at the killing 
of pedestrians, many of them children, coupled with class-based antagonism against 
wealthy automobile owners, editors of major newspapers generally displayed a moralistic 
stance on the issue of automobile mishaps in the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. In both tone and substance, their attitude was often infuriated and judgmental. 
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Numerous op-eds likened auto accidents to murder. "Highway Slaughters" screamed the 
title of a New York Times piece in 1913,54 while recurring adjectives, such as "reckless 
slaughter," and "an intolerable evil,"55 painted a largely grisly picture. The Chicago Daily 
Tribune seemed to outdo its counterparts in this sense, often employing such sordid 
descriptors as "grim," "ghastly," "gruesome," "damnable," "carnage," "horror," "driving 
atrocities," and "sickening." Editorials frequently dubbed prominent automobilists, like 
William K. Vanderbilt Jr. , as "scorchers" or "joy riders," portraying them as egotistical 
playboys who leave chaos and anguish in their quest for thrill and speed. 56 Streets were 
represented in these years not as conduits for safe and enjoyable passage but as spaces 
that breed death and destruction. "Victims of auto speeding or speedsters are taken to the 
cemeteries everyday," a Los Angeles Times editorial lamented in 1920, "feeding the 
graveyards with bodies of men, women, and children. "57 
In the early 1920s, however, this moralistic crusade begins to give way to 
different kinds of evaluations. The establishment of the NSC's Committee on Statistics in 
1919, improvements in record keeping, and the push toward a nationwide standardization 
for compiling accident data signaled the steady spread of the relativistic language of 
magnitudes to other arenas of claimsmaking. A proportioned perspective, one that is 
based on assessments of more or less, gradually begins to overshadow the early years' 
absolutist abhorrence of large-scale automotive carnage. The appearance of a new 
discourse and sentiment soon becomes undeniable. Language used to illustrate the 
accident problem shifts piecemeal from appalled diatribes against mass killings to the 
idiom of rate changes. Frequently analyzing incoming data from around the country, the 
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National Safety News (NSN) now talks, for instance, about " reductions" in the number of 
automobile accidents, 58 " increases" in the state of Massachusetts, 59 "downward trends,"60 
"the percentage increase is decreasing,"61 or "an improvement over November of last 
year."62 
The mounting deluge of figures coupled with newfound technical abilities for 
comparative and fine-grained statistical analysis fueled a similar paradigmatic change in 
newspaper editorial discussions of accidents. The adjectives denoting outrage, 
characteristic of the early years, were steadily being replaced by a vocabulary of number 
fluctuations . The Chicago Daily Tribune , for example, calls the 1920 ' s annual total of 
15,000 nationwide deaths "a bad record."63 Soon afterwards, the newspaper goes on to 
describe "cold-blooded statistical repo1is" that "deal in facts,"64 and rates that have 
"resumed the upward tendency."65 In 1924, the first year that the Washington Post cites 
statistics, its editors speak of fatality " levels below the average rate," accident mortality 
rated being "held down," and measures that can "reduce the accident rate. "66 The national 
toll , the newspaper later contends, can be "reduced by half. "67 As early as 1923 the New 
York Times even prints an editorial that only presents comparative figures between states 
and cities ' death rates, devoid of any moralistic approbation or discussion of possible 
causes and solutions. 68 
The transition to a focus on the vacillations of numbers as the primary means to 
assess the severity of the accident problem leads to the emergence of what I call , 
following Roland Barthes, an ideology of ' small victories and minor defeats. ' In his 
Mythologies, Barthes incisively dissects the various intricacies by which everyday life 
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myths aid in perpetuating the dominance of a bourgeois social order. One such site is the 
astrology column in popular magazines. Specifically, Barthes notices that horoscopes 
never offer their readers any advice that will offend either conformist social-status 
expectations or the hegemony of the market economy. All they can hope for are small-
scale improvements, within the immediate realm of "the little things in life," (e .g. "next 
week will be a good time to talk to your boss about a raise") thereby eliminating any 
horizon for radical transformations of self and society. As a nanow framework that 
cannot envision changes in individual lives- and deaths - occuning beyond the 
parameters of the given social order, this ideology thus constitutes a fom1 of mythmaking 
because it refuses to challenge the status quo. 69 
Tuming largely from an absolutist moral damnation into a nit-picking calculus 
within the ' numbers game', 70 the discourse on traffic accidents seems to immerse itself in 
such an ideological framework- a dominant motif that carries well into the 1950s. 
Examples are abundant. After first lamenting that a sharp increase in one month ' s deaths 
have "not brought home to the American public the necessity of careful , courteous 
driving to prevent accidents," the NSN qualifies immediately: " It should be said, 
however, that the increase is not quite as great as occurred in 1929 over a similar period 
of 1928 . . . Neither was the March experience quite as bad as that in February. While 
March had more deaths it had three more days, so that the number of deaths daily 
declined from 72 in February to 66 in March". 71 In another instance, the NSN proudly 
states that " [M]otor vehicle deaths showed a very encouraging decline in February. The 
average figure is only 54 deaths daily in February, compared to 60 in January." 72 At 
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times, such numerical triumphs took absurd fom1 . For example, in 1926 the Washington 
Post proudly boasted that, "Automobiles killed only 34 persons a day during February, 
the lowest record in 14 months. "73 Indeed, newspaper editors quickly got caught up in the 
spirit of finding solace or disappointment in minute computations. An annual reduction of 
6 percent in the death rate in New York City was described by the New York Times as 
"gratifying,"74 while the Chicago Daily Tribune noted in a different year that "[T]here is 
some compensation in the fact that 1937 fatalities are somewhat lower."75 
Ironically, such statistical reasoning opened the door for unintentionally 
downplaying a reality of mass carnage. Figures that only a year or two earlier were 
described in appalling terms such as "gruesome" or "horrid," were transformed, in light 
of new statistical evidence, into "progress" or "improvement." Consider the following 
segment from a New York Times editorial: 
In the first six months ofthis year 363 persons were killed and 14,483 injured in 
New York City by automobile accidents. Appalling as this record is, it is an 
improvement over that of the corresponding period of 1935, when 467 persons 
were killed and 16,266 injured. 76 
When evaluations are conveyed primarily through the prism of numbers, constructions of 
the scale of the problem become increasingly malleable and short-lived. A hitherto "bad" 
situation can suddenly be intertwined with "good" attributes . When in a single year 
pedestrian deaths decreased by 13.4 percent to a total of I 0,820, The Travelers Insurance 
company even sounded celebratory: "There is reason for vast encouragement, and even 
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jubilation, over the substantially lowered pedestrian accident records."77 Another telling 
illustration ofthis effect can be found in a sequence of 1920s editorials in the Washington 
Post. In 1925, the newspaper describes a yearly decrease of nine deaths on the streets of 
Washington as "gratifying" as well as a "new dawn of a better day." 78 A year later, while 
another editorial proclaims that " it appears that one ' s chances of being fatally injured are 
only 1 in over 5,000," it still labels the death toll appallingly as "startling."79 In the next 
year, the decrease from 511 total accidents to 455 in the month of February, accompanied 
by a drop from 10 to 8 deaths, meant to the Post a "gratifying record from every 
standpoint."80 And in 1929, the same newspaper argued that statistics actually prove that 
the automobile is safe, since "the approximate risk per mile traveled on the highways" is 
not increasing. 81 Still, two months later the paper reverts back to calling accidents "a 
plague. "82 
It is important to note that relativism was not the only strand in the discourse on 
traffic accident, only the most dominant and recurring one. Absolutism was rare but 
existent. Some cities, for example, charged that counting deaths per number of 
automobiles is unfair since some had disproportionately large number of cars operating 
within their territory. At one time Louis Dublin defended the practice, using a universalist 
moral argument: "I believe that it is an entirely wrong principle to excuse appalling 
conditions in certain cities simply because they have relatively more machines in 
operation. The very existence of this condition calls necessarily for a greater effort to 
cope with the situation."83 Similarly, when NSC statistician Reuben Forney announced a 
reduction in the general accident rate between 193 7 and 193 8, he warned against "self 
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congratulation," since if considered on its own merits, "the 1938 accident record 
constitutes a major social problem." A critical view on the use of statistics also appeared 
in other fields. A labor union representative, berating the industry for being "lulled" and 
"hypnotized" by the power of the numbers: "We become aroused and somewhat more 
active when this magic number goes up a couple of points; we congratulate ourselves and 
derive some sense of achievement when it goes down a couple of points ... Everything we 
do is really keyed to it somehow ... But it is our own state of mind that invests this 
number with whatever magic it may be." Coming up with a general 'norm' for an 
accident rate is "meaningless," since"[ A ]11 the higher industry-wide figures prove is that 
there aren't enough of us who care and try enough."84 In 1950 the Travelers Insurance 
drew attention to the over-reliance on fatality figures: "If deaths increase there is a flurry 
of activity; if they decline there is a feeling of smug complacency."85 Similarly, in 1964 
the company sarcastically addressed those who find encouragement in death rate changes, 
noting that "Of course, we can't pass this encouraging information on to the dead victims 
of accidents. "86 Still, instead of entertaining novel ways to assess the severity of the 
accident problem, the insurer only suggested to focus on injury statistics, re-affirming the 
centrality of the rational-technical frameworks of evaluation. 87 
Nonetheless, one logical consequence emanating from the focus on magnitudes is 
the search for a death rate deemed as acceptable or 'normal. ' 88 For instance, looking 
toward a new year's trends, the New York Times asserted in 1936 that, "[I]t ought not to 
be impossible to keep fatalities this year down to 900."89 Eyeing such target numbers 
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requires the ability to set statistical benchmarks, or more generally- to project into the 
future. 
Predicting Deaths 
Forecasting fatality rates constitutes one of the most salient uses of statistics in the 
discourse on traffic accidents in the United States. The most visible practice in this 
respect consists of the yearly and holiday predictions of expected deaths, most notably 
associated with the techniques of the NSC. First inaugurated by the Council in the mid 
1930s, the organization's morbid forebodings are disseminated to numerous media 
outlets in the weeks leading to every New Year's and other major holidays. The lure of 
lucid simplicity laden in numerical representations, especially so gruesome and 
spectacular in nature, often resulted in wide press coverage that dominated great portions 
of the public discussions on the problem. By the 1950s such forecasts took on a macabre 
sports-like character, with several news agencies updating the public throughout the 
weekends as to how the actual tally stands in relation to the prediction.90 "People like 
forecasts," an NSN editorial stated in an attempt to explain this unique practice, "The TV 
weather men with their weather maps and folksy chatter have large audiences every 
night."91 For newspapers, predictions served as uncomplicated standards by which to 
gauge the precise gravity of a particular period ' s deadliness. The continuous supply of 
numbers by the Council , united with the clear and straightforward nature of quantified 
data, provided for both economic reportage on the accident problem and an much-
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anticipated opportunity for editors to express solid opinions on the issue. "When 415 
persons are killed in traffic accidents on a three-day weekend there is small reason for 
jubilation," the New York Times stated in one emblematic instance among many, "But 
deadly as it was, the Labor Day weekend cost fewer lives than it did a year ago, and fell 
considerably short of the National Safety Council ' s forecast of 460 dead."92 
Yet it is pertinent to point out that the act of publicly predicting traffic deaths did not 
start with the NSC' s gloomy forecasts. As early as the closing of the second decade of 
automobility, various producers of discourse on auto mishaps turned to forecasting 
fatality rates as a central vehicle for meaning-making on the issue. Future-oriented risk 
calculations have always been a mainstay practice among insurance companies, a 
complicated mathematical technique that serves as the premier standard by which to set 
premium rates. And indeed, major insurers began to project automobile accident trends 
based on statistical tabulations, though in the early years most remained within the 
confines of corporate documents or professional journals such as the National 
Underwriter and the Insurance Press. But by the mid 1920s these predictions gradually 
figured in public discussions on the accident problem. Basing its opinion on actuarial 
numbers, one Washington Post editorial was by 1925 able to sound such confident claims 
as, " [O]fthe 20,000 who are expected to die in the course ofthis year in automobile 
accidents fully 18,500 will do so because of sheer heedlessness on their part or that of 
others."93 So more than a decade before the NSC took statistical envisaging to a whole 
new level with its holiday necromantics, it was routine insurance practices that held an 
139 
especially pivotal role in embedding predictions within dominant public definitions of the 
accident problem. 
The NSC itself established the habit of forecasting even before it discovered the 
special power of holiday projections. Bolstered by the its newly formed Statistics Bureau, 
the NSN introduces in January 1932 a new section, 'The Accident Barometer,' in which 
various statistics on traffic accidents were presented and briefly interpreted. The section 
ends with a column titled ' Looking Ahead . . . ' wherein the Bureau offers predictions as to 
what to expect from the upcoming monthly death rates (e.g. "deaths from automobile 
accidents will continue to increase in July, and will head the list in number. .. "). 94 One 
visible offshoot related to the routinization and institutionalization of forecasting is the 
appearance of a matter-of-fact tone in the Council's talk of accidents. As the 'Accident 
Barometer' put it drearily once, "Motor vehicle fatalities may be somewhat more 
numerous than in earlier months, but there will not be as many as will occur in the fall. "95 
Similarly, after rep011ing on a 20 per cent drop in fatalities between January and February 
1932, the NSN adds that "[P]art of this decrease is seasonal , but ordinarily a drop of 10 
per cent is all that could be expected."96 Or in a different instance, the Council's flagship 
journal dryly remarks: "As these fatalities usually increase 10 per cent in May the present 
decrease is decided! y encouraging. "97 
Having delineated several notable phases in the evolution of this particular practice, I 
now ask: What purposes did the prediction of future traffic fatalities serve? Considering 
that such forecasts were aimed first and foremost at the general public, one obvious 
motivation is behavioral. Predicting future carnage meant to function as a scare tactic, a 
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ghoulish forewaming of possible things to come for those drivers and pedestrians who 
deviate from the nonn. "We always hope that these wamings will induce some driver to 
keep a lighter foot on the gas and refrain from passing other cars on hills and curves," the 
NSN proclaimed explicitly. 98 In another opportunity the joumal , basing its assumptions 
on potential future death rates, wamed ominously: "The comparatively low February 
should not obscure the fact that auto death increases are just around the comer and that 
every effort should be made to keep 1930 from being a repetition of the tragic 1929 
increase. Children, especially, will need more education and supervision as spring months 
offer new, but hazardous, play possibilities."99 
A second motivation is linked to a different kind of audience, namely authoritative 
bodies that have the capacity to act within institutional frameworks on the accident 
problem. Here predictions served as tools for marshaling organizational efforts towards 
averting the expected deaths. "Unless something is done to curb the month to month 
rises", the NSC cautioned in 1931 , "we shall find ourselves at the end of 1931 with a 
proportionately higher death toll. " 100 Two decades later, the Council's President, Ned 
Dearbom, called for a comprehensive "plan of attack" to combat traffic accidents. 
Dearbom rested his case on a strong realistic outlook: "as a man who believes only what 
he sees, I peer into the future and I am afraid of what I see." He wamed that without such 
a drastic effort, the "death toll this year will reach an all-time high in the history of our 
nation- a dreadful figure of more than 41 ,000 deaths, and possibly even 42,000! ... I see 
the shocking forecast that by 1966 the death toll on America' s highways may well be 
54,000. And by 1975 - dare we guess?" 101 
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The importance of these overt motivations notwithstanding, the practice of prediction 
deserves further consideration, especially when it emanates from the safety 
establishment. Herein lies an intriguing paradox: Forecasting accidental deaths seems to 
constitute a peculiar institutional technique to be undertaken by an organization whose 
raison d'etre is to prevent them. If your explicit goal is to eradicate accidental harm -
why predict with such a high level of confidence and precision that it will in fact occur? 
Some answers to this deeper quandary may be found by delving deeper into the 
circumstances that gave birth to this form of discourse. It is here that I turn briefly to 
Michel Foucault. 
Claiming to engage not so much in history as in archaeology, Foucault was interested 
in identifying the conditions that made discourse possible.102 For him, an archeology of 
discourse, or "the description of an archive," means exposing the set of rules that at a 
given period and for a given society define the limits and forms of the sayable, of 
. f d f . . 103 conservatiOn, o memory, an o appropnatiOn. 
With Foucault in mind, then, my focus turns to identifying the conditions that make 
accident predictions feasible on the level of discourse. In other words: When does it 
become possible to claim to .foresee- and thus know - that a ce11ain number of traffic 
deaths will take place tomorrow, next month, on Christmas Eve, or next year? In 
answering this question I discuss three different, albeit related , possible conditions: 1) the 
technical ability to forecast accidents, 2) the organizational pressures to carry them out, 
and 3) the cultural desire to do so. 
The technical ability to predict 
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Predicting accidents requires complex technical and organizational capabilities, and as 
mentioned above, constitutes a staple practice in the business routines of insurance 
companies. Insurance is a Modernist invention, whose theory is based in principle on the 
notion of risk. In insurance this term designates a specific mode of treatment of certain 
events capable of happening to a group of people. 104 Insurance is thus an application of 
probability calculus to statistics; that is, for an event to be a 'risk ' it must be possible to 
evaluate its probability. To do so, actuaries employ both a statistical table, which 
establishes the regularity of certain events, and a calculus of probabilities of the statistic, 
yielding an estimation of the chances of that class of event actually happening. The 
results of these predictions help to set individualized premium rates . Unlike legal 
damages, which are required to match the full scale of loss, insurance compensation 
payments are defined by a contractually agreed tariff Thus, tables or scales of 
compensation rates are fixed in advance so as to define ' the price of the body ' in all 
possible eventualities. 105 
As part of my historical investigation here I have found that the NSC, the most vocal 
organization in the United States in terms of accident predictions, based much of its data 
and methods on an insurance framework toward risk. For one, private underwriters 
supplied a considerable bulk of statistics for much ofthe NSC's forecasts , and as such 
played a key role in establishing the dominance of an actuarial prism in the treatment of 
automotive death. Since the technical-rational paradigm of risk computation lay at the 
basis of these companies' organizational methods and cultural approaches to 
conceptualizing misfortunes, the Council ' s mainstay strategy of grim forebodings owes 
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much to this particular discourse. Methodically, many of its confident projections leaned 
on life tables generated by corporate insurers. On the personal level, prominent NSC 
experts who as head of the statistics division in the 1920s and 1930s initiated the 
organization's routine of predictions, held at the same time leading positions as 
. . . . . . . 106 
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Organizational pressures 
Ironically, the emergent positivist reliance on numbers led to a growing organizational 
insecurity about their accuracy. Well into the 1930s, state and nationwide automobile 
fatality rates could not be tallied precisely, but merely as estimates based on limited 
sample studies. As one NSC statistician admitted, improvements in data collection often 
lead to an increase in the number of"reported" accidents. 107 To offset this predicament, 
and in an attempt to secure media publicity with the factual veneer implicit in solid 
numbers, the Council rushed to their make end-of-the-year counts public before the year 
actually ended. By making claims about incidents that had yet to take place, this practice 
essentially involved speculative predictions, complemented by retroactive comparisons 
with other sources in order to affirm estimates. 108 The following case, a prediction taking 
place four months before the year's end, is a noteworthy instance: "While it is impossible 
to predict what will happen in the remaining three months of the year, it is doubtful that 
the totals will exceed those of last year to any greater degree than has been exhibited in 
the year so far. That is based on the fact that October and November 1929 were 
exceptionally high months, exceeding by about 400 deaths the record of any previous 
month in the year." 109 
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Predictive power also constituted important symbolic capital in the context of inter-
organizational competition, as different institutions vied for authoritative prestige within 
the field of accident record-keeping and distribution. 110 In 1924, Louis Dublin, chairman 
of the Committee of Public Accident Statistics in the NSC, applauded the statistical 
efforts of the NBCSU - only to immediately counter by reminding his readers that the 
Council is the body that conducts the most comprehensive studies in the field .111 In 
another instance, the Managing Director of the Council displayed great pride in his 
organization ' s annual tallies for 1927, saying that they diverged in only three deaths from 
the ones of the Census Bureau.112 The NSN even conceded apologetically in 1932 that it 
overestimated 1930' s total by 250 deaths, after figures were compared to the final tally of 
the Census Bureau. 11 3 
Part of the lure of predictions lies in their ability to retain a semblance of scientism 
and objectivity for the forecasting agency, thereby painting it as a supposedly 
disinterested external viewer who merely provides hard and unbiased numbers. In one 
telling editorial addressing such statistical prophesying, the NSN was quick to clarify that 
it does not constitute an irrational technique. "Our statistical and public information staffs 
do not pretend, of course, to be crystal gazers or astrologers. Their estimates are based on 
such practical factors as current traffic trends, records of previous holidays, weather 
outlook, etc." 11 4 In another opportunity the journal proclaimed to carry out predictions 
"without the aid of tea leaves or a crystal ball ," but rather based upon established 
practices of insurance actuaries, who "can predict with amazing accuracy how many 
people will die during a year." 11 5 
The cultural desire toforecast 
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Predicting future aggregate death totals becomes especially alluring in the context of the 
dominant conceptualization of the 'accident' as an uncontrollable and unforeseen 
event. 116 In the absence of any real ability to forecast specific auto wrecks (e.g. "will Joe 
Johnson, from 32 Main St. in Evansville, Indiana, have a fatal traffic accident while 
driving on Interstate Highway 90 tomorrow?"), the prospect of statistically managing a 
general rate by announcing its eminent unfolding fulfils a deep-seated Modernist fantasy 
of tightly designing the social order by taming the whims of chance and forces of nature. 
In 1954, after it became apparent that the NSC ran a higher FoUiih of July weekend 
prediction than the actual figure, a subsequent NSN editorial sought to provide an 
explanation for the incongruence in numbers. Announcing that it was "happy" to 
overestimate the holiday fatalities, the writer adds somewhat apologetically: "a reputation 
for pin-point prediction is of no importance. The saving of 82 lives is. Everyone is 
cordially invited to make our estimators look silly." Feeling the need to explain its 
actions to the public, the Council inadvertently reveals some of the difficult 
organizational dilemmas emanating from the practice of mortality forecasts. It will be 
absolute cynicism to doubt the NSC's sincerity regarding its valuation of saving human 
life above all else. But at the same time the claim wherein predictions are not significant 
seems somewhat disingenuous since it runs in sharp contrast to the organization's guiding 
epistemology and dominant praxes. As shown above, predictions constituted a major 
vehicle for establishing institutional visibility, credibility, and prestige in public 
constructions of the accident problem. 
'Saving Lives' 
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Another recurring brand of claims, which is closely linked to the teclmique of prediction, 
involves an assertion of 'saving lives. ' To better understand the nature of this contention 
it may be beneficial to first consider some different ways in which lives can be saved. 
Suppose, for example, that you are standing on an urban subway platform, awaiting the 
imminent approach of the next train. Suddenly, a nearby passenger, who hurriedly 
advances closer toward the rails in order to position himself for embarking, stumbles 
right in front of your eyes. Instinctively, you reach out and grab the man' s coat, pulling 
him back forcefully and preventing his fall only seconds before the train arrives at the 
platform. Most probably, you have just saved this man' s life. You have identified a 
particular person in specific danger and have taken pinpointed action that averted the 
impending harm. 
The act of 'saving lives ' in the context of the institutional discourse on traffic 
accidents is, however, deployed in a different manner. Here the lives purported to being 
saved are not those that are lived by particular people. The saved have no name or 
address to speak of. Neither were they found in specific danger (as in someone teetering 
over subway train tracks). Rather, these lives ' have been saved ' or 'will be saved' only in 
the statistical sense, on the abstracted level ofthe population. The 'saving lives ' element 
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first appears in the 1920s and gradually continues to imbue a growing portion of the 
statistical talk on traffic accidents by the NSC, automobile interests, insurance 
companies, and printed newspapers. It usually rests on some longitudinal comparison 
between various temporal units - years, months, weeks, days, holiday weekends -
followed by an inference that reductions in the rates mean a "saving of lives." A 1932 
report by the NSC's Statistics Bureau provides a typical illustration of this kind of 
assertion: "This decline in motor fatalities of approximately 13 per cent means a saving 
of over 4,000 lives, compared with 1931 , and brings the annual total to the lowest point 
since 1928, when there were 27,996 deaths." 117 
What does 'saving ' mean in this sense? If no one in particular led someone away 
from specific danger to safety - was anyone really saved? To better understand this 
seemingly ambiguous notion it may be beneficial to continue with a Foucauldian 
interrogation of the conditions that make a discourse possible. Thus, instead of asking: 
"How is the idea of saving lives constructed throughout the years?" I pose the question, 
"Under which circumstances does it become possible to save lives in traffic on the level 
of population?" 
The ability and motivation to predict future fatality rates was deeply involved in 
such fonns of saving lives. In the mid 1930s the NSC began to eye ' reduction goals, ' 
yardsticks of how many people should be saved in accidents in a given future. When the 
Governor ofNew Jersey, Harold Hoffman, spoke in front the NSC' s 1935 annual 
congress, he called on the Council to devise a plan that will lead to a "reduction of at 
least by 3 5 per cent in motor vehicle deaths by the end of the year 1940 ... Put this 
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program across and in 1940 you will have 12,600 friends and neighbors alive who now 
have the finger of sudden death upon them." 118 The safety establishment responded 
favorably to the Governor's challenge. Soon after his speech, the NSC commenced its 
Five Year Campaign, a new drive that culminated in a target-figure of fatalities to be 
reached at the close of the decade. 
It also becomes possible to save lives in such a way within the context of the 
triumph of relativism and the honing of technical abilities to splice up numbers vis-a-vis 
sophisticated mathematical models . More often than not, lives could be declared as 
' saved' only when comparisons involved fine-spun and carefully selected data. In 1930, 
for example, the senior statistician of the NSC claims that, "22,000 lives have been 
saved" in states that have established drivers licensing from 1916 to 1929. 11 9 Yet 
interestingly enough, shortly after this declaration the same statistician acknowledges that 
during these same years automobile deaths had risen sharply, both in absolute numbers 
and in relation to the total number of automobiles registered. 120 Ironically, then, the 
quantified techniques that make the saving of lives visible on the charts operate 
comfortably in the same space that observes mass carnage. 
Another paradoxical implication of the 'saving lives ' discourse is that it reifies the 
socio-technical system that produces such harmful realities, since it requires a regularity 
of accidental occurrences. Deploying the word ' saving' in this context essentially means 
that some existing high rate is lowered. Put differently, rather than ' saved,' lives are, 
more precisely, being spared. Once a regularity of high death rates has been identified, 
the policy spotlight finds it easier to shift away from structural causes of car crashes (say, 
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the contribution of the socio-technical organization of society that gives birth to these 
alarming death rates) to questions of how best to manage interventionist forces (safety 
campaigns, police departments, auto clubs, drivers, pedestrians, etc.) that act within the 
existing system to primarily reduce frequency rates. The words of William Cameron, 
Managing Director of the National Safety Council in the late 1920s, speak to this 
approach: 
We know that there were over 92,000 accidental deaths in the United States in 
1926, and that there were approximately 95,000 such deaths last year. We know 
that this is an increase of 15,000 deaths per year since 1913, but that the 
population has increased more rapidly than these deaths; so that the accidental 
death rate per 100,000 population was really 6 per cent lower in 1927 than in 
1913. It is also true, however, that since 1921 accidental deaths have been on the 
upgrade, both in actual number and in deaths per 100,000 population. This 
increase for all accidents on the basis of death rates amounts to 17 per cent since 
1921. Jfthe accidental death rate in 1927 had been the same as it was in 1921, 
14,000 of the 95,000 killed last year would be alive today. 121 
Clearly, it is the control of the rates- for example, the fatality level in correlation to the 
population growth or number of registered automobiles -that becomes the main focus of 
the campaign efforts. Consequently, holistic views or radical challenges of the reality that 
leads to mass carnage become obscured from vision. 
A further consequence of this discourse relates to the etiology of ' saving lives ' on 
the group level. What leads to a particular decrease in the death rate? And when rates do 
dip - who or what can be credited with saving those lives? Judging by the answers 
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provided over time in the printed media, it would be difficult to find unequivocal 
answers. When it came to newspaper editorials, a certain organizational amnesia seemed 
to set in. For instance, The Washington Post argued that the decrease in the number of 
Washington DC fatalities in a four-week period in 1925 compared to the same period in 
the previous year was attributed to the installment of new traffic regulations in the city. 122 
Yet exactly a year later, when the city saw an increase in deaths, the newspaper claimed 
that the measures placed in force to safeguard against violations are not adequate. 123 In a 
different case, two years after the city of Chicago implemented a new traffic enforcement 
program, the Chicago Daily Tribune claimed that the project had "saved lives." 124 But 
when a little more than a year later the city saw a rise in deaths, the newspaper did not 
reverse its conclusions, but called instead for an even stronger enforcement campaign. 125 
If not for providing consistency in imputing reasons for rate changes, the 
quantification that instantiated saving lives seemed to serve other purposes. Before long, 
this stream of discourse opened the floodgates for an untenable casuistry that aimed 
mainly at increasing either the public prestige of preventive organizations or doling out 
credit to parties involved in safety efforts. Consider the following sequence. When the 
Los Angeles Times noticed that traffic deaths began decreasing shortly after the United 
States ' entry into World War II due to strict driving limitations, the newspaper ' s editors 
explained the tradeoff in body counts in a piece titled "How Total War Saves Lives at 
Home" : "If we can save even a fourth of 40,000 lives by more careful driving on the 
home front , it will be a worth-while offset to the toll ofbattle."126 Yet within two years 
the connection between driving frequency and accidents had already been forgotten . A 
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guest editorial in the Times , written by an official from the LAPD, chose to credit 
enforcement efforts: 
From May 1 to May 11 , 1944, a total of seven persons have been killed in traffic 
accidents. During the same 11 days of last year 18 persons died in Los Angeles 
traffic! What further proof is needed that Los Angeles ' well-rounded traffic 
program is working - and that curbing the speeder is the first step in producing 
results? 127 
This line of reasoning was reinforced in a later editorial , wherein the newspaper attributes 
the saving of lives to the control of speed: 
Exceeding the speed limit killed 13,430 people last year and injured 595 ,980. 
That is a ghastly fact but at the same time a hopeful one. Put in positive form, it 
means that if all motorists everywhere would observe the speed limit a potential 
13 ,000 or more lives could be saved every year, and a further 600,000 or so would 
be safe from maiming, disfigurement and other injury. 128 
In short, the facile correlation between numerical reductions and the claim of sparing 
lives comes at the expense of any systematic examination of the veracity of such 
inferences. The relation between the real world of traffic and the accident rate employed 
to represent it is understood in the cases above not within a wider vision that uncovers the 
implicit structural causes of accidents but through a narrow evaluation of the institutional 
labor to affect the problem. Any saving of lives necessarily occurs thanks to relevant 
parties who are working explicitly to mitigate the carnage- and so it is to them that the 
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praise must go. In 1950 the Los Angeles Times goes to great lengths to make sure that the 
police, newspapers, radio, and civic organizations, "who did all they can do to warn 
people that thoughtlessness would bring disaster," did not engage in futile efforts. 129 In 
another opportunity, the Times congratulated its police inspector for the city's "restricted 
list of personal tragedies" during the Labor Day weekend, a record that is considered 
"hopeful by comparison." 130 
Conclusion 
Statistics constitute a valuable device for grasping, assessing, and tracing solutions for 
troubling social conditions. The production of sum totals of complex phenomena spread 
over time and space is done by identifying, collating, and enumerating similar types. 
Statistical accounting can be especially beneficial when applied to traffic accidents 
because it has the capacity to reveal the staggering aggregate toll of a multitude of 
individual incidents. It provides the greater public and policy makers a useful instrument 
by which to grasp the scope and seriousness of a problem from a broad point of view. 
Even though counting is a sociocultural activity that reflects political and organizational 
choices, 131 few can doubt that the advent of statistics in the last two hundred years has 
constituted an important scientific stepping stone for discerning and overcoming many 
harmful social and medical conditions. As Ian Hacking put it starkly in an address to his 
readers: "Without it [statistics] most of you would not exist, for your great -great. . . -
grandparents would never have lived to puberty. " 132 Moreover, statistics can aid in 
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illuminating particular injustices and misconceptions that adversely affect marginalized 
groups. Kinsey ' s studies on homosexuality in America in the 1940 are an excellent case 
in point. In this light, the turn to statistics to make sense of traffic accidents is highly 
understandable. As one form of quantification, enumeration has provided important 
insights to the magnitude of the problem on various levels of analysis, aided in tracing its 
vacillations over time, pinpointed the immediate causes of individual mishaps, isolated 
crucial variables such as nighttime and weather vulnerabilities, and identified at-risk and 
risky groups alike. Indeed, one would find it difficult to categorically deny that statistics 
have helped improve at least some aspects of the accident problem in the past one 
hundred years. 
As the above analysis has shown, however, quantification produces other effects 
on the construction process of accidents as a social problem. The use of statistics is 
reactive: it causes people to think and act differently. By activating some process in the 
object that it treats, the application of numbers to the world can create or reinforce the 
categories used to conceive of human beings. We tend to overlook this effect because, in 
a way, statistics deny their own reifying effects. "Statistics," Ian Hacking argues, "may 
think of itself as providing only information, but it is part of the technology of power in a 
I, , 
modern state." ~ ~ As I have shown, the frequent employment of numbers as a socio-
political vehicle for making claims and molding people ' s perceptions of automotive 
carnage speaks volumes about these observations. 
Thus, aside from mere counting, another form of quantification -
commensuration - operates in this discourse. Expressing difference as magnitude 
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according to some shared metric, commensuration is a social process that involves the 
transfonnation of qualities into quantities. 134 In the case discussed here, commensuration 
is active on the level of the system of automobility. The automotive sphere is a qualitative 
phenomenon. It can be conceived as a socially organized, networked space that allows 
human/mechanical devices to be transited and transported thanks to conversions of raw 
materials into high-energy power. 135 Alternating between mobility and motility, 
acceleration and deceleration, the resulting matrix of traffic is constituted by infinite 
instances of engagements, disengagements, varying proximities, collisions, and near 
misses. More than a mere movement of people and devices, automobility comprises a 
domain of knowledge in which meanings are created, circulated, destroyed, or 
perpetuated. 136 As such, it is a complex socio-technical system that is characterized by 
structural violence. As the analysis in this chapter had shown, filtering this contingent, 
complicated, and disjointed environment through numerical schemas- the primary of 
which is the near exclusive focus on the accident fatality rate- is an act of 
commensuration that engenders several interesting consequences for the collective 
definition processes of traffic mishaps as a social problem. 
First, superimposing a quantitative model on this social system is essentially a 
movement in search of order and clarity that produces a new human-made artifice. I 
argue that the cultural desire to establish a semblance of control over social problems is 
especially acute when accidents are involved. Consequently, less than an embodiment of 
any effective effort to make sense of auto accidents on a social , political, and moral level, 
institutional claimsmaking activities involved in the construction of the problem 
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constitute primarily an attempt to control the uncontrollable as a fonn of ' organizational 
legitimacy.' 137 In this sense, a quantified analysis of accidents signals a cold-headed, 
rational approach to problems that are hard to foresee. 138 Recognizing a numerical 'rate' 
presupposes that it is an external entity that exists beyond the computing organization 
"out there in the world," thereby suggesting that harmful realities are observed and 
managed from a disinterested outside perspective. The near obsession with predicting 
accident fatality rates throughout most of the century reflects these effects . As Lee Clarke 
has found, organizations confronted with potentially disastrous accidents generally try to 
transform uncertainties (the inability to estimate the likelihood of an event) into risks (the 
possibility of estimating the likelihood of an event, i.e. the probabilities of an adverse 
occurrence). 139 To do so they concoct contingency plans, blueprints for future action in 
the event of something going wrong. Yet organizations facing potential catastrophes tend 
to create highly symbolic plans, what Clarke calls 'fantasy documents ' - rhetorical 
instruments that have political utility in reducing uncertainty for organizations and 
experts .14° Fantasy documents are not functional in the sense that they provide recipes for 
coordinated and effective action; rather, their utility is rooted in their capacity to signal to 
others that the uncontrollable can be controlled. 141 Fantasy documents thus normalize 
danger by in reality increasing the hazard from the systems they represent. Buttressed by 
such plans, organizations and experts can incorrectly claim that the problems are under 
control. I contend that traffic accident predictions can be viewed as kinds of fantasy 
documents . Mirroring more of a claim to a hold on a volatile and unexpected future than 
a practical means to avert traffic accidents, forecasting serves to uphold political and 
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organizational goals while representing automotive mayhem as a manageable, if 
foreseeable, risk. Statistics thus function as rhetorical devices to first and foremost meet 
institutional goals - acquiring organizational prestige, scaring people into particular 
vested forms of behavior, managing rate fluctuations, etc.- in disjunction with the actual 
social conditions that systematically produce these technological problems. 
Second, such commensuration opens up a discursive realm that makes the concept 
of ' acceptable deaths ' possible. The multitude of texts published throughout the century 
about the accident problem reveals a recurrent general narrative structure that produces 
this effect: 
1. Some 'bad ' statistic (e.g. increase of death rate per a hundred thousand 
population). 
2. A sense of control over the negative events by placing the number in a certain 
wider numerical perspective (e.g. comparison with the figures published by 
Metropolitan Insurance Co. affirms the numbers) 
3. A different, positive light is shed on the number, leaving the impression that 
the situation is not as bad as initially thought (e.g. presenting the figures for 
deaths per number of registered automobiles, fewer child deaths, etc). 
These observations provide a deeper, nuanced understanding of commensuration as an 
inherently relativist undertaking by instantiating some ways whereby the meanings of 
commensurate objects become dependent on their comparison with each other. 142 
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Third, I have uncovered several interesting ways in which commensuration of 
accidents as a social problem induces a fascinating double play of revelation and 
obfuscation. In seeking to make a complicated world seem simpler and easier to control , 
the frequent translation of a quality (the structural violence of the auto-centered 
transportation system) into a quantity (traffic accident death rate) systematically discards 
information while representing its original object of treatment in a newfound abstraction. 
Particular, local, and situational forms knowledge tum largely irrelevant in the act of 
commensuration. As an epistemological technique for making sense of the world it 
highlights some aspects of reality while obscuring others.143 Specifically, as Wendy 
Espeland recently pointed out, empathy becomes less of a legitimate basis for judgment 
once the value of things is turned into a number. 144 These observations can begin to 
explain the interesting conversion of accident victims vis-a-vis numerical discourses from 
' someone' into ' something. ' Formulators of public policy in the United States primarily 
consider a person ' s death in an automobile accident as a statistic or economic value. This 
form of instrumental rationality establishes victims' relevancy first and foremost as signs 
("producers," "consumers," etc.)- not as active signifiers and interpreters who can 
choose whether or not to be reduced in such a fashion. 145 Not surprisingly, this approach 
may lead to either callousness toward the problem or a loss of interest in it altogether. 
And indeed, in the American case we witness both. An undeniably general trend in the 
use of statistics throughout the century consists of increasingly presenting a dreary deluge 
of numbers, lacking interpretive depth, moralistic tone, or any broad-based social 
explanation. 146 In conjunction with this trend, the writings on the accident problem by 
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two of the major producers of discourse on accidents examined here, the NSN and 
newspaper editorials, wane considerably starting in the late 1960s. Traffic accidents 
almost completely disappear as a broad topic of discussion. Substantially, the major focus 
shifts exclusively to the narrow questions of seatbelt use, airbag technologies, and 
drinking and driving. 
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Chapter 4. 
The Controlling Accident 
Power, Discipline, and (Auto )Mobility 
While quantification constituted throughout the decades a major vehicle for making sense 
of, and managing, the accident phenomena, it shared its prominence with other distinct 
discursive strategies. This chapter turns its attention to one of these strategies by focusing 
on the element of social control present in the definitional processes of this social 
problem. First, I provide a brief look at some important historical moments signaling the 
rise of this particular current in public discussions of the accident issue. I then tum to 
examining several outstanding modalities of power operating in this discourse. In 
showing how salient representations of technological mishaps are intimately linked to 
authoritative techniques of mapping, directing, and surveying both individual and group 
behavior, I continue to supplement the constructivist research with a structural 
Foucauldian analysis of discourse, power, and knowledge. Ultimately, I argue that such 
techniques of power and control operate to affect dominant public representations of the 
automobile problem in ways that are not radically different than the supposed objective 
rational-scientific discourse of quantification, but serving rather as the other side of the 
same com. 
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The Tum to Effectual Discourse 
If one salient stream of discourse in the first two decades of the accident problem can be 
characterized generally as a reactionary and moralist condemnation of the unprecedented 
carnage inflicted by a novel and largely unregulated technology, 1 the third decade of this 
era witnesses the arrival of a new kind of response, distinct in both tone and aim. Now 
the appearance of what I call an effectual discourse , one that consciously seeks to mold 
people' s behavior in the hope of reversing the bloody trends, becomes unmistakable. 
As it employs to a great extent the irrational channels of rhetoric and 
sensationalism, one may conjecture that this new trend is essentially different from its 
rationalist counterpart, the technical and impersonal idiom of statistics discussed in the 
previous chapter. Yet as will become apparent in the following pages, the emergence of 
this distinct stream is not unrelated to the dominance of quantification in the discourse on 
traffic accidents, but closely linked to it. In fact, one catalyst for this tum lies precisely in 
the fear beginning to strike those speaking authoritatively on accidents that mere numbers 
leave the public unaffected and indifferent. As one major propagator of such figures, the 
Travelers Insurance Company, addressed its subscribers, "Statistics might have left you 
cold ... Perhaps it ' s because you 've overlooked the fact that statistics are people ... [a 
statistic] is, or was, a care-free boy on a bike; a young mother dashing to a store for a loaf 
of bread - and not coming back. "2 
Toward the end of the 1920s, then, several dominant actors involved in producing 
public discourses on traffic safety become preoccupied with new kinds of questions 
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relating to statistics. Various debates now center on how to employ numbers so as to 
elicit certain public reactions to the accident problem. A nice illustration of this shift is 
found in an article titled "Telling the Whole Story in Public Accident Statistics," in which 
Professor Richard Kirby from the Department of Civil Engineering at Yale University 
advises the NSC on how to "compile statistics that attract attention and give all necessary 
information." Kirby asserts that the work of statisticians must focus not merely on 
gathering data but on devising "more effective and striking methods of placing the facts 
before the particular portion of the varied and widely scattered audience who should be 
familiar with them." In laying down his claim, he likens statistical departments to 
"ammunition store-houses" that supply each relevant agency with the "particular type of 
ammunition it can use effectively." Yet 'effectively ' for Kirby does not mean inducing a 
radical change in the socio-technical system that begets mass carnage, as he himself 
doubts "that anything can greatly reduce" the total number of accidents: 
There will always be inexperienced or thoughtless or absent-minded drivers 
backing into telegraph poles or smashing other persons' fenders. The important 
thing is to reduce the severity of the accident, so that the daily list of dead and 
injured will not keep mounting. 
If the compilation of comprehensive and detailed data cannot in-itself lead to a dramatic 
alleviation of the automotive malady, advocacy through quantification should rather 
center on the manipulation and presentation of numbers so as to trigger modest gains in 
safety work by arriving at more ' acceptable' records. Consequently, Kirby provides 
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statisticians with a series of practical suggestions on how to convey figures in an 
aesthetically persuasive fashion: " use a variety of geometrical forms ," "have a title that is 
comprehensive, explicit, self-explanatory," and "where feasible, put two to five years on 
a chart. "3 
The gist of this discursive transition, then, involves a swing in focus from 
questions of how to collect statistics and what they mean intrinsically toward debates of 
how to present them in ways that affect desired responses. In marking this movement, a 
flurry of new kinds of expert advice begins to imbue the safety literature. " [T]he 
information obtained has not been used to the limit of its potentiality," bemoans one 
researcher, "they [statistics] should be used in some way that will benefit the public in 
proportion to the cost of their collection and analysis." One way to use statistics, he 
continues, is to advance pedagogical goals. "The mass information obtained on accident 
records is very valuable in educating the public in safe driving and walking habits."4 And 
while another statistician urges the NSC to "keep statistics simple,"5 a public relations 
executive in the oil industry advises the safety establishment to "irritate them [the public] 
if you want their attention." Citing the lack of shock effect in merely publishing numbers 
of mass carnage, the PR expert asserts that the individual presented with nationwide 
mortality statistics "fails to see himself." Advocates need therefore to "arouse guilt" in 
the driver by employing such individuating slogans as, "One motorist in every 43 is 
going to kill a man, woman or child in a preventable accident. Will YOU be the one?"6 
The NSC soon took up such suggestions, as evident in its leading catchphrase of the 
1940s and 1950s: "Be Careful , the Life You May Save May Be Your Own." During these 
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years, the Council established tight working relations with commercial propaganda 
specialists, organizing campaigns and safety drives in cooperation with such bodies as the 
National Advertising Council. 7 
Interestingly, one of the dominant figures aiding the novel push in the direction of 
an effectual discourse was not affiliated with safety institutions per se. George Newton, 
head of the Travelers Insurance Company ' s News Bureau, established in 1931 The 
Travelers Book ofHighway and Street Accident Data, an annual compilation of statistics 
and commentary that played a highly visible role in the shift toward the new approach. In 
its 43 years of publication the Travelers Book, as it was known for short, had been 
distributed in well over 65 million copies,8 circulating widely amongst police 
departments, newspapers, schools, safety groups, and private residences. It represents a 
fascinating marriage between technical actuarial practices of probability calculations on 
the level of population, and interpellating techniques that seek to modify individual 
behavior by having subjects recognize their private lives in the numbers. 
For Newton, who as a former journalist obviously appreciated the effectiveness of 
words and images in public communication,9 the central problem of traffic safety 
advocacy lay in the challenge of operationalizing numbers to educe behavioral changes. 
In a series of lectures and articles geared at safety workers in the mid and early 1930s he 
spelled out the reasons impeding an end to the automobile accident crisis. 10 The public, 
Newton argued, "doesn' t want to know anything about automobile accidents" because 
experts had failed to "market" the "product of safety." The solution therefore is to 
contrive a "business-like, salesmanship" approach. "Only when we become efficient 
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salesmen," he maintained, "will the public show any inclination to want to know 
anything about automobile accidents." Specifically, a major predicament pertains to the 
presentation of statistics : 
We have reams of figures, charts, and illustrations that even cause untold mental 
anguish to those that gave them birth. Is it surprising, therefore, that the public 
fails to get any meaning out of the figures and other material? Does the public 
regard in any personal light a mass of figures on the number of people killed and 
injured when the figures remain nothing but masses of numbers? 
Overcoming both the dryness and complexity inherent in technical rationality will be 
achieved not by re-evaluating the dominance of quantification in the safety discourse but 
through contriving images rather than words, since a "good illustration is worth a 
thousand words." 1 1 What is needed is a dramatization of the accident problem. Since 
people are "moved less by reason than by sentiment.. . we cannot expect to get very far. .. 
if we merely present statistics, charts based on actuarial studies, or astute factual 
conclusions." Traffic accident discourse must therefore strive to capture the public ' s 
elusive attention span. "To well chosen words we must add the attention compelling 
power of dramatic illustrations to carry our message to those who have many demands on 
their attention." 12 Only then can the individual motorist and pedestrian have a chance to 
identify their own lives amongst the anonymous bulk of general numbers. As Newton ' s 
brainchild, the Travelers Book unmistakably bore these principles in its nearly four 
decades of circulation. "Effective appeals for safe driving and walking are voiced in 
terms of self-protection and the Golden Rule, not casualty totals," the book ' s 1950 
edition made clear. 13 
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Having introduced some historical catalysts and key players involved in the shift 
to constructing an effectual discourse, I turn now to examining several particular 
modalities of power operating in public discussions of the accident problems whereby 
subjects were meant to be managed and controlled in line with the plans and fantasies of 
safety advocates. 14 
Dividing Practices 
According to Michel Foucault, one central mode in modern societies by which human 
beings are made into subjects is embodied in what he calls ' dividing practices. ' This form 
of "objectivising the subject" essentially means that the individual is either divided inside 
him/herself or divided from others.15 For Foucault, such practices of discovering and 
imposing difference are an elemental form of power in the modern world . In fact , the 
"system of differentiation" that "permits one to act upon the actions of others" is at once 
a requisite and outcome ofpower. 16 On the one hand, distribution and differentiation 
according to rank or grade mark the gaps between the subjects and hierarchizes qualities, 
skills, and aptitude; on the other hand, it serves to punish and reward. Specifically, a 
' dividing practice' operates as a sequence of strategies or technologies of power: It 
compares individuals to a whole, d~fferentiates them from one another, hierarchizes them 
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in tenns of value and abilities, homogenizes them according to a measure of confom1ity, 
and excludes by marking the external frontier of the abnormal. "In short, it normalizes." 17 
In schools, hospitals, am1y barracks, and prisons- the chief sites onto which 
Foucault shines his empirical light- subjects are continuously disciplined by such an "art 
of distributions ."18 The modem state identifies 'unproductive' people as political 
problems, then classifies them as 'the mad,' 'the poor,' ' the delinquent,' etc. in order to 
justify their isolation and control within appropriate apparatuses of surveillance, 
rehabilitation, and correction. 19 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such practices 
are inextricably implicated with the appearance of new professional domains that concern 
themselves with individual welfare, population administration, public health, and social 
hygiene. In The History of Sexuality, for instance, Foucault exposes the discourse through 
which nineteenth century experts created a hierarchy of sexualized bodies and divided the 
population into groups of'normal' , 'deviant', and ' perverted. ' 20 
Drawing on Foucault's theory of differentiation, I construe the dramatic 
employment of dividing practices within the discourse on traffic accidents as a particular 
mode of modem power. Indeed, such practices constitute an undeniably salient element 
in public representations of this social issue throughout the twentieth century. 
Distinctions that slice the motoring public into increasingly fine-grained groups and sub-
groups are engendered from the earliest days of automobility. In fact, one will be hard-
pressed to find any zero point in which public discussions of accidents occurred free of 
dividing the population into distinct categories. Any idea of an entire social body having 
to come to terms with new forms of technological violence as part of a general nexus of 
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people, artifacts, and cultural values seems never to have been entertained without the 
accompanying inner classifications that instantly break down this whole. As such, these 
practices can be interpreted as constituting not only a tool for attempting to socially 
control drivers and pedestrians, but also the very basis for classificatory power itself. 
They are made possible largely due to a socio-structural arrangement in which 
authoritative gazes(' Automobile Association of America ', 'The New York Times', 'The 
National Safety Council ', etc.) understand themselves as occupying a position that is a-
priori ' external ' and essentially antonymous to their objects of scrutiny ('careless 
drivers ', 'mindless pedestrians ', 'women at the wheel ', ' drunkards ', 'speed maniacs ', 
etc.). 
Gender, social class, and ethnic affiliations constituted the initial lenses for 
drawing such social boundaries within the incipient realm of automobility. In the earlier 
years, women, professional drivers, and foreign chauffeurs served as the main targets for 
branding particular motoring behaviors as ' dangerous .' Newspaper editorials at times 
held up auto owners as law-abiding citizens while reviling chauffeurs as reckless rogues 
who should be arrested and given "the full limit of the law."21 Women too were brought 
under this castigating gaze. Though researchers have correctly identified the liberating 
effect the automobile had on many early twentieth century women,22 a no less powerful 
discourse activated controlling gender mechanisms vis-a-vis the newly established 
technological imperatives of motoring. "Some women are bound to be in the thick of the 
trouble," a Los Angeles Times editorial scornfully stereotyped when discussing a woman, 
whose repeated accidents finally claimed the life of an II year old, "The experience of 
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traffic officers is that the average woman driver does not learn from her accidents. She is 
likely to repeat. Trusting some of them with the steering wheel of a car in the midst of 
city traffic is like trusting a 3-year-old child with dynamite."23 Meanwhile, the 
Washington Post called attention to another problematic sector, "the expert drivers," who 
include such wage laborers as postal workers, army car operators, taxicab drivers, and 
deliverymen. 24 The safety establishment soon picked up on this group ' s ostensible 
dangerousness. In 1923 the NSC slammed professional drivers as constituting the leading 
cause of accidents, pointing out the irony wherein "the more flashy , speedy, yet expert 
driver escapes while the unfortunate average driver suffers an accident into which he was 
actually forced. "25 
Transgressors were singled out in an essentializing manner by locating their 
behavior in inherent personality structures. One automobile magazine warned its readers 
against what it called the "naturally reckless chauffeur." Since he "will not become 
careful the moment he arrives at a dangerous place of the road," the "only way to avoid 
disaster is to be careful at all times ."26 In other words, membership in the groups of 
problematic motorists is determined by in-built and hence ineluctable behavioral traits. 
The presence of the congenitally rash driver poses a special kind of peril: "He usually 
possesses sufficient skill to be dangerous, and his habit of driving rapidly, of taking 
chances and of being totally regardless of the rights of others is the cause of a large 
proportion ofthe accidents that are recorded. It is an axiom among good drivers that one 
should never take chances. By this is meant that the car should always be kept under 
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control. . . The drivers who pay heed to these rules are the ones who seldom, if ever, 
figure in the accident column."27 
Yet dividing practices took place not only on an axis established between 
authoritative voices and traditionally weakened social groups, but also within the very 
cadres of the dominant di scourse producers. Auto clubs, for one, began to cast subtle 
distinctions within motordom. As one motoring magazine argued, automobiles are 
"intelligently and carefully driven on the whole." The problem rests entirely with a "few 
reckless drivers ." The police, the writer concludes, "would gain in popularity by 
suppressing [these drivers] instead of trapping, on account of a strict technicality, the 
law-abiding citizens using the motor car with consideration to everybody. "28 The 
National Highway Protective Society, an important automobile advocacy group in the 
191 Os, similarly places the accident menace at the foot of a "certain class of automobile 
owners." Colonel Cornell, the president of the organization, stated in the Automobile 
magazine that 
the difficulty lies in the single fact that certain owners and certain chauffeurs feel 
that they must exceed the limits of the law, good taste, and good sense in order to 
attract attention to themselves and their cars . It is perfectly sure that the man who 
has owned a high-grade automobile since the beginning of the industry will not 
take undue chances and it is equally sure that the man who saves $1 ,000 and buys 
a car for the use of himself and family will be cautious and law-abiding in its 
operation. But the man who suddenly achieves wealth and who loses his 
perspective of life and the rights of others is the fellow who is a menace to the 
automobile as well as to the general run of citizens? 9 
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By constructing status distinctions based on levels of cultural capital , Cornell argues that 
driving is about good taste and style as much as it is a technical skill. Regrettably, it is the 
parvenus and Nuevo-riche who are tarnishing the image of the responsible ' classy ' 
motorists. In light of another serious accident, The Horseless Age likewise claims that it 
"ought to prove a lesson to those, often of the wealthy class, who habitually violate the 
rules of safety in automobile driving, or who defy public sentiment and the laws ofthe 
road."30 
New ariificial borders were delineated continuously within a markedly narrowing 
trend from targeting broad social groupings to focusing on internal personality features. 
Before long, powerful actors produced distinctions based not on social status or class 
position but character type. A Cleveland judge, who exercised an iron fist approach 
toward erring drivers, received open support from the NSC in 1922. " It has been these 
' tyrants,' ' fools ,' and ' incompetents ' who have been responsible for the hundreds of 
thousands of our citizens who have been killed or injured by reckless driving and 
speeding," Judge Alva Corlett told the NSN . "Public sentiment. . . seems to indicate that 
at least ninety per cent of the people including drivers of automobiles believe in law and 
order and the strict enforcement of all laws. "31 Voicing an essentialist stance that traces 
the source of the transgression to the individual at the same time that it presumes the 
neutrality of the technology, Judge Corlett claims that some drivers ' behavior is simply 
"prompted by selfishness and an utter disregard for the convenience, safety, and existence 
f I ,.32 o anyone e se. · 
How does one identify such corrupted personalities? A problematic character, one 
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safety advocate asserted, can be defined negatively in relation to the established standards 
of normalcy. It thus encompasses "all those individualities and idiosyncrasies ... which 
make their possessor enough different from other men in reaction to take him out of the 
average and place him in the class of the unsuccessful or unsafe. "33 The task of spotting 
the ' enough different ' character of the dangerous driver was understood largely as a 
scientific endeavor, thereby placing it squarely in the field of psychiatry. "Psychiatrists 
throughout the country have become interested in the mental processes of reckless drivers 
and speed demons," the NSN reported in 1923, "and are attempting to lay bare the kinks 
and quirks that are responsible for their idiosyncrasies."34 In scrutinizing these mental 
processes, psychiatry evaluates, by way of elimination, the competency of several human 
faculties. Intelligence, for one, is found to be an important yet unnecessary condition for 
safely operating a motor vehicle, since people of low intellect have proven to be able to 
handle automobiles skillfully. 35 What is required of the nonnal driver, then? "The nonnal 
man ... will possess greater facility in judgment," which itself rests on "past experience," 
and "calculation" or "sense of proportion." Additionally, nom1al driving requires 
"responsibility," which is a moral quality that "comes with maturity."36 
Still , even finer distinctions were soon needed in order to come up with a point of 
normality that will preclude the criminalization of wide swaths of ordinarily normative 
citizens. A. L. Jacoby, a psychiatrist from Detroit, Michigan, conveyed these difficulties 
to the safety establislm1ent in 1927. Jacoby cited a borderline example of a traffic 
accident involving a seemingly ordinary high school student, who by all means worked 
after school and during summers for money to go to engineering college, appeared in 
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excellent physical health, and exhibited superior intelligence- in short, "a nonnal boy of 
whom any father might well be proud." In the said accident, the teenager mistakenly 
drove into a safety zone and struck a pedestrian. Only after a thorough study of his case 
were the experts able to finally isolate the young man ' s problems: " impulsiveness, 
immaturity of judgment, and a certain amount of recklessness ... were in direct casual 
relationship to the accident."37 
And so the system of classification multiplies exponentially by retroactively 
searching for faulty elements in one' s character. Even if a-priori no delinquency is 
apparent, the occurrence of the accident alone is evidence that some human weakness 
must lay at its origin. An influential series of studies by Dr. Alvhh R. Lauer from the 
Department of Psychology at Iowa State College consolidated the adoption in America of 
this method and aided in creating a new general psychiatric category, the ' accident-prone 
driver. ' 38 As Dr. Lauer explained: "When an accident-prone driver cannot be classified in 
any other way he is said to be reckless. The road-hog, the drunk, the speed demon, the 
paranoic, the man with defective vision, the 'ne'er do well ,' the nervous person, the 
unintelligent, and all the other cases that are not definitely analyzable go into this 
group."39 
But dividing practices were far from confined solely to the indexing fingers of 
psychiatry and admonishing newspaper editors. Safety workers, ostensibly guided by 
pragmatic-technical approaches to traffic problems, engaged in such practices as well. 
The Jacksonville, Florida chapter of the NSC, to cite one example, labeled traffic 
violators in real-time by releasing unto to the streets a character called the ' Jacksonville 
180 
Jaybird. ' Wearing a feathered costume topped by a large bird ' s head and a beak and 
carting a sign reading "I am a Jay Walker", this figure followed behind the city's 
jaywalkers for the purpose of attracting "lots of attention and causing embarrassment to 
pedestrian violators."40 In a different case, a Detroit safety group initiated a campaign 
titled 'Look Out For That Crazy Driver,' wherein local cartoonists partook in depicting 
the most "stupid and dangerous driving habits."41 
On the level of intentionality, it is evident that by embodying a modality of power 
that aims at shaping behavior through a regime of guided persuasion, dividing practices 
operate explicitly to control and manage social groups. Yet both the ubiquity and primacy 
of such practices in the world of motoring seem to suggest that they also emanate from a 
deeper place in the schemas of dominant American symbolic structures, thereby requiring 
further explanation. Numerous scholarly interpretations of auto-symbolism have in recent 
years exposed many interesting semiotic aspects of the motor vehicle. Much more than 
simply a practical transportation technology, the car is an artifact invested in modem 
societies with near mythical qualities. A sleek, shiny, and aerodynamic machine that is 
culturally charged with a penetrative sexuality, dreams of unlimited movement, and 
fantasies of human transcendence over the constraints of the physical body, the 
automobile has been transformed into the bonafide literal and figurative articulator of 
our drives and desires. 42 Yet not enough attention has been given to the automobile ' s 
5ymbolic meanings within the systemic matrixes it is inextricably a part of- the socio-
technical apparatus that brings together machines, infrastructure, people, and time/space. 
Placed within these broader supporting grids, the motor vehicle is often aligned in 
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dominant cultural associations with such qualities as predictable rhythm, flow, regularity, 
and hannony. It will suffice to think ofthe ordinary radio traffic report, whereby listeners 
are advised on which congested or ' slow moving' areas to avoid, while the accident is 
designated as the cause of the disruption in the network of roads and the cars they carry. 
In other words, the auto is dominantly aligned here with order and repetition. Within 
such a representation of movement, stasis is assigned the category of the abnormal: 
Immobility in the fom1 ofthe mishap is signified as an interruption in the system of 
(auto )mobility. Note that, interestingly, it is the accident that simultaneously enhances the 
very meanings that emphasize the monotony of unabated traffic flow. Such an 
interpretation draws upon Mary Douglas' seminal works on danger and pollution. 
Situating ideas of order and disorder in broader epistemic socio-cultural structures, 
Douglas claims that basic "ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing 
transgressions have as their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy 
experience."43 Fundamentally, she argues, "dirt offends against order; eliminating it is not 
a negative movement, but a positive effort to organize the environment. .. to relate form 
to function, to make unity of experience."44 The discovering of ' dirt ' and its 
accompanying cleansing rituals are thus not aberrations, but positive contributions to 
atonement: "By their means, symbolic patterns are worked out and publicly displayed."45 
I submit that dominant representations of the system of the automobile entail a 
certain fantasy of purity and order. According to the ideal version of this vision, cars and 
people move hannoniously on strips of asphalt in a perfectly choreographed stream of 
human and mechanical bodies. A timeless form of movement, it is self-justifying and 
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sublime - in shm1, it is fantastical. As such it can only be ' dirtied ' or polluted by the 
crash - that is, the uncoordinated contact between various elements circulating in the 
network (between pedestrian and car, car and car, and car and other objects such as a tree, 
telephone pole, or the road itself in an improper manner, as in a rollover accident). And if 
the accident is the pollution, the accident-prone and the dangerous drivers are the 
polluters . By purging the driving population of them, order will be restored. A 1925 New 
York Times editorial spoke to the existence of such a fantasy by first listing at length the 
mental profiles of reckless drivers as provided by a leading psychologist. Having thereby 
set the perimeters of acceptable motoring, the newspaper concludes that authorities 
should take action to "eliminate from the automobiling brotherhood and sisterhood those 
who are not fitted for membership."46 In another case, the Times editor quoted the 
director of the NSC who argued that traffic accidents are caused by " relatively few 
people who are reckless, heedless, irresponsible, incompetent, selfish, or all of these." 
The "only solution," the paper contends, is to "get them off the road." "Someday," the 
safety official continued, "the people will rise up and demand laws and enforcement to 
I. h h" , -47 accomp 1s t 1s. · 
Yet while Douglas' thesis provides a useful explanation for understanding the 
dialectical relationship between social order and disorder, her deep structuralism risks 
positing a universalist picture that may overlook important cultural and historical 
contingencies. Zygmunt Bauman, while acknowledging the pervasive existence of 
Douglas ' basic dialectic between purity and pollution in our dominant epistemologies, 
notes that in modernity such a relationship actually acquires a particular meaning. 
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Affecting an age in which 'being' means a perpetual new beginning, modernist social 
ordering continuously seeks to establish new arrangements, neither maintain nor revive 
older ones. For Bauman, the significance for the relationship between order and disorder 
cannot be overstated: 
All in all , [in modernity] the state of 'perpetual beginning ' generates ever new, 
' improved ' targets of purity, and with each new target cuts out new categories of 
' dirt'- an unheard-of dirt and an unprecedented dit1. A new condition appears, in 
which even ordinary, boringly familiar things may turn into dirt at short notice or 
without notice. With models of purity changing too fast for the purifying skills to 
catch on, nothing seems secure anymore; uncertainty and suspicion rule the day. 
We may go even a step further and say that the ' order-making ' now becomes 
indistinguishable from announcing ever new ' abnormalities,' drawing ever new 
dividing lines, identifying and setting apart ever new 'strangers. ' 48 
Modernity will thus never cease to find phenomena that seem to threaten its orders, not so 
much because such views are inherently impressed in people's mental structures but 
because this era' s most dramatic cultural impetus resides in constant regeneration 
towards novel orders of social organization and progress. Drawing on Bauman's 
argument, it may now be easier to understand why ' abnonnalities' in automotive 
behavior are continuously discovered anew- often precisely at the moments in which 
previous ones are seemingly addressed or even ' cured. ' The fantasy of purity and order in 
the particular space of motoring must remain exactly that- a fantasy never completely to 
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be realized- since such a reali zation will be contradictory to the modemist logic of 
forward movement through the constant improvement of people, science, and technology. 
Disciplining Traffic 
Once groups have been divided, the focus then turns to how best to manage their actions 
within the system of classifications. It is, in essence, a question of government. The 
preoccupation with an "art of governing" or "governmentality," as Foucault named it, 
increasingly appears as one of the primary problems concerning the architects of modern 
societies. Herein lies the sine qua non dilemma of the burgeoning liberal democracies: 
how can the state assure its sovereignty, legitimacy, and ability to rule effectively at the 
same time that it guarantees its subjects basic rights and freedoms? Under this 
framework, the task of governing turns into a challenge of how to manage not so much a 
territory as things: 
The things are ... men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those 
things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its 
specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, and so on; men in their relation to 
those other things that are customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, and so on; 
and finally men in their relation to those still other things that might be accidents 
and misfortunes such as famines , epidemics, death, and so on.49 
The measure of successful political power, then, rests not so much in the absolute power 
of the sovereign and his capacity to ensure the rule of law, but in the ability to secure, 
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manage, and maintain, amongst other objectives, the health and physical wellbeing of 
the govemed population in general. For Foucault, this does not mean the dissolution of 
domineering power, but rather a monumental shift in its nature: The contradictions 
between the needs of the govemor and govemed in modemity are bridged in a grand 
movement from punishing to disciplinary power. Discipline, says Foucault, "was never 
so important or more valorized than at the moment when it became important to manage 
a population." Again, punitivism does not disappear altogether. Instead, punishing in 
regimes of disciplinary power employs subtle coercion aimed "not at expiation, nor even 
precisely at repression" ; goveming in modem societies means disciplining subjects 
through correction, monitoring, and training for self-reflection. The management of the 
population takes place not only on the level of its aggregate effects, the collective mass 
of phenomena, but also " in its depth and details. "50 
A similar gradual shift from punishing to disciplinary power can be observed in 
the discourse on traffic accidents. Initially, the dominant approach to the accident 
problem called for strict enforcement and heavy uncompromising punishment, a policy 
that owed much to the reactionary nature of the early response to the unprecedented 
havoc wreaked in everyday life by a new and largely unregulated technology. 
Representing this perspective, a prominent industrialist told the NSC in the early 1920s: 
"the public will not be educated into law observance unless there is an awakening 
through strict law enforcement." 51 As the emerging institutional player in the field of 
accident prevention, the Council initially echoed this stance. "Fines are inadequate in 
extirpating the reckless driver," the NSN stated unequivocally, "Jail sentences without 
alternative and without discrimination are undoubtedly creating a more wholesome 
respect for law and order. "52 
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But before long, fundamental problems with such iron-fisted measures arose. One 
was how to bear the consequences of an en masse criminalization of generally law-
abiding citizens due to violations committed in quotidian circumstances and that lacked 
clear illicit intentions. How do we deal , as one commentator put it, with a situation in 
which there is "a criminal in every family?"53 In an address to safety experts in 1930, a 
Massachusetts judge acknowledged that strict juridical solutions for the accident problem 
"increase the probability of any man becoming a criminal." According to him, "there is 
something wrong when an entire community is obliged to admit that its individual 
members are all actual criminals, and that the only difference between the gentlemen who 
have criminal records and those who have not is, that they got caught and we did not." In 
fact, " law enforcement is the last step in giving adequate protection upon the highway." 54 
Coming from a juridical figure such a statement carries special significance, as it is 
emblematic of the deep shift now underway in dominant approaches to safety education. 
A related predicament inflicting punitive enforcement concerned the danger of 
inadvertently perpetuating criminal cultures by exposing young offenders to the prison 
environment. Starkly aware of this risk, a judge in Minneapolis who became 
apprehensive of teenage drivers ' negative "associations" in jail , alternatively instituted a 
'reckless drivers school ' -a remedial course aimed primarily not at penalizing but 
reforming. "Instead of being treated as criminals, the boys were informed at the 
beginning of the course that it was not punishment which was being dealt to them, but 
187 
instruction which would help them to be better drivers," he explained. So careful were the 
'course ' s' supervisors in masking the criminality of these offenders' actions that the true 
framework in which they were being treated had been kept secret: "No mention was 
made at any time of the fact that they were under workhouse sentences. Their violation 
was referred to as some mistake made in driving and that efforts were being made to 
equip them so that they would not make the same mistake again."55 That the attempt to 
"equip" them with the tools of self-examination was successful is evident in the 
transformation undergone by these young men. "Many of the boys were naturally 'hard 
boiled,' but those in charge of the school felt the students could be made to understand 
the traffic problems and responsibilities resting upon the driver. " In fact, the program 
sought to convert the boys into ambassadors of good faith, who will ultimately spread the 
word of safety to others in the community. The NSN reported that on the last night of the 
course, the judge addressed the boys in this manner: "You perhaps know more now of 
traffic problems than any other body of men of your number in Minneapolis. Go out and 
tell those who do not know what you have learned and try to instill in the minds of others 
the reason for careful driving. "56 
By the early 1930s it thus becomes apparent that the disciplinary mode of power 
takes precedence over the punishing one. As the Vice-President of Public Safety for the 
National Safety Council put it quite bluntly: 
The problem of highway accident is chiefly a problem of controlling human 
conduct. .. A few drivers are ' accident-prone ' because of physical or mental 
defects- poor eyesight or hearing, epilepsy and the like. A much greater number 
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of accidents occur either through lack of skill or through a faulty attitude which 
we call carelessness. The remedy for faulty skill is training. The remedy for faulty 
attitude is training and discipline ... The driver must be trained in skill and self-
control- and the reckless minority must be controlled by the state. We need 
public education and propaganda to obtain more widespread adoption of the 
remedies of proven value- and we need further experimentation and research to 
perfect these remedies . .. Training and discipline are intimately related; neither 
can be completely successful without the other. 57 
Why did this transition in power modalities occur? One reason may lay in the growing 
frustration at the poor results strict enforcement and punishment had in reducing the 
dramatically rising death rates. "The frequency with which automobile accidents occur", 
a Travelers insurance report stated, " indicates that neither regulation nor enforcement 
can supplant personal responsibility." Rather, "carelessness . .. on so wide a scale will 
cease when people begin to exercise the restraint that comes with an appreciation and 
exercise of personal responsibility. "58 
Another explanation relates to the psychiatric gaze's aforementioned increasing 
interest in the problem of motoring as a new form of socially threatening activity. 
Continuing professional practices that date back to psychiatry 's nineteenth century 
discovery ofthe ' dangerous individual ' (as criminal, madman, etc.),59 experts concerned 
with managing the health of the social body identify in the 1930s a new area of scrutiny-
the dangerous driver. Hand in hand with announcing ownership of this fledgling 
domain 's forms of knowledge, behavioral specialists also spell out its methods of 
intervention. It is the rigorous objectivity of the human sciences that will evaluate each 
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case individually- not the dry rule of written law that is problematically open to 
subjective judicial interpretation - and detennine the appropriate remedy. As an article in 
the NSN put it, " Punitive measures, somewhat dependent for their severity or leniency 
upon the mood of the judge at the time of their assessment, may curb a tendency to 
transgress the laws, but scientific research alone will enable corrective measures to be 
applied."60 Another psychiatrist relayed to the National Safety Council that adjusting 
people' s behavior in the realm of automobility "will be made satisfactorily .. . not by 
childish tirades against traffic enforcement agencies nor by impulsively conceived acts of 
legislation, but by a calm, mature, study of the situation as it presents itself. "61 
Although notable categories of problematic drivers included those suffering from 
congenital diseases and illiteracy, there seemed to be a growing consensus amongst 
experts that the focus of intervention must be the individual ' s emotional state. The 
concern with adjusting motorists ' emotive faculties further explains why disciplinary 
methods of refonn were gradually seen as more adequate than law-based punitive 
measures. As one specialist suggested, "Regulation of speed limits, regulations as to the 
right or left turning and regulations as to parking will have little effect on the emotionally 
unfit driver because his attitude toward others is distorted and the laws and regulations, 
he feels , are not made for him."62 
As acts aimed at re-directing human dispositions, to what points should the 
correction of standards aim for? For psychiatry, the answer was clear. "The safety and 
transportation problem is to make more people attain the average," one specialist told the 
NSC, "The means to that end are education, discipline, and general character building."63 
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Specifically, "train as an operator develops concentration, gradually brings self-reliance 
and decision, and finally, in the average driver, a sureness and self-confidence in his 
powers which makes him invariably coJTect in judgment and positive inaction."64 
Moreover, control over the machine is miiTored in the control over oneself, a homology 
that ultimately benefi ts both individual and society: "Once he has learned to master it [the 
automobile], by that very mastery he becomes a better all around person than he was 
before. Any man who can take care of himself and hi s load in modern traffic gains in 
mentality by doing so. "65 Many other similar parallel lines between one ' s mastery of 
technology and selt' were frequently drawn during this era. "The man who has not learned 
to obey the rules is to be considered as ignorant, just as the man who has not learned to 
shift gears," another safety researcher stated. The challenge for safety educators is thus to 
discipline drivers through a habitual internalization of the rules of the road, one that is not 
unlike the gradual automation of operations brought about in driving. "Obeying the rules, 
or not obeying them, is a habit, like gear shifting, and should be as automatic on the part 
of the driver. " In the end, "we don' t want drivers to think."66 In accomplishing such 
inculcation, however, " law enforcement is not the only end"; rather, the prefeJTed 
methods include "certain types of training of the driver which do conduce safe driving."67 
The aiTival of technologies for personalized mobility thus called for greater self-control 
on the level of the individual. As an NSN editorial made it clear, the hazard of the 
highways "cannot be solved by police work alone. Safety in an age of power and speed 
calls for extreme self-discipline and re-appraisal of individual rights and privileges. "68 
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Evidently, then, assuring the protection ofthe social body from its internal threats 
requires marshaling the commitment of each and every one of its individual members. 
Governmentality, Foucault observes, involves in essence the "conducting of conduct," a 
method wherein men and women learn to develop healthy dispositions that will ensure 
the longevity of society. Specifically, these technologies of self "permit individuals to 
effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on 
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transforn1 
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
i1mnortality."69 Such a modernist imperative to "know oneself'70 noticeably rings 
through the discourse of traffic safety. "Diagnose your own driving", urged the president 
of the NSC in 1930, "be your own doctor for a moment and see how many of these poor 
driving symptoms you have." Identifying any such symptoms means to "be determined 
that you will drive your car, conduct yourself on the highway, in a manner which will not 
only not cause accidents, but which will prevent them. Believe that highway regulations 
are promulgated for your safety and follow them." 71 Drivers ' labor to develop caution 
and care must first and foremost be directed inward. The Travelers Insurance encouraged 
its patrons to "pledge to develop within yourself habits of care, caution and courtesy 
behind the whee1."72 At one point the company ' s president maintained, "Not until the 
great majority of sensible Americans decide that we must police ourselves and put a halt 
to the annual Dishonor Roll , will the grim record cease to exist."73 
Indeed, insurance companies positioned themselves in the forefront ofthe crusade 
for acceptable motoring based neither on the calculated pursuit of profits, nor a need for 
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exerting power and influence, but a genuine concern for the wellbeing of the public. 
"Insurance companies have a natural interest in the care, safety and responsibility 
exercised by people in their daily lives," a major insurance company made clear, "That is 
one reason why they are pioneers in the fields of accident and fire prevention, health 
education, and highway safety."74 
Creating, implementing, and sustaining successful technologies of self became an 
especially tough mission when it came to questions of how best to manage the interplay 
between individuals and material objects . As the twentieth century saw the incorporation 
of more and more mechanical devices for personal use, it was human ' s natural 
imperfection and fallibility that turned all the more apparent. In stark contrast to the 
ideology of linear progress informing developments in science and teclmology, the safety 
movement was openly troubled by the persistence ofthe 'human problem ' - humans ' 
inadequacy in the face of an incessant drive toward technical perfection. While the 
automobile is "a triumph of engineering technique ... a sleek, powerful machine, quick to 
respond to the will of its driver," wrote the president of Travelers Insurance, 
"Unfortunately, the design of the driver has not kept pace. And in a variety of traffic 
situations, he fails the crucial test of judgment and skill."75 Another safety specialist 
lamented that, "it is not within the power of machinery and organization to improve the 
quality of man, to give him knowledge, to teach him discipline .. . [in other words] the old 
problem of improving the quality of human nature." If improving human nature cannot be 
accomplished by the strict power of the machine, the answer must be found in micro-
managing conduct. It is, moreover, the task of the rational ist mind set in general: "So we 
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come to see this whole work of our modem life as a great crusade for improved manhood 
and womanhood, for better living."76 
How will drivers be designed then? In line with a disciplinary form of power that 
operates on the individual's body and mindset, training will develop self-supervision not 
negatively through fom1al punishment but positively via means of productive coaxing. 
The latter techniques include, for instance, "developing the driver ' s pride," as one 
industrialist advised the safety establishment. "The driver must be convinced that a 
sincere effort is being made to make his job safer and more comfortable, in other words, 
with advantages for himself. It would be most unfortunate if he should get the idea that a 
program is only organized to tie him up with rules. " When " leadership is more 
considerate and reasonable and the driver has confidence in it," another business 
executive reported, "your drivers are helping willingly ."77 These approaches soon became 
the central modus operandi of the National Safety Council. The Council ' s president made 
it clear in 1930 that the mission of traffic safety is to create obedience not by punishment 
but correction; not to induce through coercion but affect vis-a-vis the arousal of passion. 
"It is corrective education which must be accomplished by publicity, by spreading the 
gospel of accident prevention in the form of rules, suggestions, regulations, and that other 
less tangible something called enthusiasm which will awaken the slumbering spirit of 
safety consciousness."78 A marked manifestation ofthis paradigm is found in the 1954 
initiation of ' S-D Day ' - Safe Driving Day- a novel idea that emanated from that year' s 
White House Conference on Highway Safety, an initiative by President Eisenhower' s 
administration in response to the mounting accident problem. One of the ensuing Action 
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Committee' s suggestions consisted a nationwide call for unity in observing traffic laws 
and exercising safety. 79 In the eyes of the safety establishment, the purpose of S-D Day is 
to galvanize the cooperation of motorists not so much by means of external authoritative 
pressures as by "showing that motorists and pedestrians can eliminate traffic accidents by 
their own actions .. . [By demonstrating that] the place to attack the traffic safety problem 
is in the community, and that the responsibility rests upon each individual. It will implant 
in the minds of motorists and pedestrians the realization that if they can greatly reduce 
accidents on S-D Day, they can do so throughout the year. "80 
Another illustration ofthe movement toward ' softer ' forms of persuasion is found 
in the overall changes exhibited by the Travelers Book throughout the decades. If the first 
volumes edited in the 1930s by George Newton embodied a horrified and sensationalist 
take on the accident problem, by the late 1940s the journal attempted to affect driving by 
good-natured humor, as ironic cartoons and lighthearted catchphrases dot the myriad of 
statistical tables and pie charts. " It is with a real hope that a bit of satire may succeed in 
personalizing the lessons of safety where sterner warnings have failed", the company's 
president explained the shift in the book' s approach. "If a laugh and some gentle ribbing 
puts a safety point across among enough people who need it, that purpose will have been 
served."81 
Imminent Justice 
A general consensus imbues the socio-historicalliterature on accidents and misfortunes 
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around the idea that the arrival of the modem era ushered in new interpretations of the 
untoward . If in pre-modem times disasters were attributed to forces beyond human 
control , to the inexplicable ' act-of-God,' in modernity dangers and hazards are 
transfom1ed into manageable ' risks. ' Contrasting the capricious and transcendental nature 
of omniscient punishment, risk instated humankind at the forefront of the battle against 
failures by employing scientific and technical means of prevention and chance 
calculations. 82 As a perspective deeply lodged in the center dominant Western discourses 
that champion rational problem solving processes, it relegated the notion of divine or 
mystical punishment as a thing of the past. Judith Green , for example, demonstrates that 
imminent justice - the idea that misfortune strikes as a direct result of wrongdoing- is 
essentially a pre-modem, anti-rationalist notion, which in the modem world is attributed 
to childish or undeveloped mentalities. 83 
While there exists little doubt that risk has become the dominant paradigm by 
which accidents are understood, this literature does not appreciate enough the lingering 
persistence of supposed pre-modem frameworks and the way they complement the 
modernist ones. The discourse on traffic accidents in the United States for the greater part 
of the twentieth century provides in this sense a telling case. Although, as shown above, 
the disciplinary mode of power overshadows the punishing one within dominant public 
representations of this social problem, the latter by no means disappears. Rather than 
simply being sidelined, the punitive force of social control takes on a surprisingly 
different twist in the discourse on traffic accidents. In its most frequent manifestation, it 
is not so much humans who punish other humans, but rather mysterious forces that 
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inhabit the world and exact appropriate measures against unheeding deviants. This may 
come, for example, in the form of a Darwinian principle of survival and elimination. In a 
1905 New York Times editorial titled "Learning in a Hard School ," the newspaper argues 
that acclamation to the automobile as a new mode of transportation is akin to a process of 
natural selection whereby the fittest survive and the weakest perish. "A majority ofthe 
victims now is composed of the automobilists themselves, and they are undoubtedly 
undergoing the inevitable process of selection. Those of them who will not or can not 
acquire the requisite skill and caution must go; those who can and will are to survive."84 
In other cases, the automobile itself is portrayed as an autonomous and arcane force that 
unleashes some intrinsic destructive impulse on those who misuse it. Under the ominous 
title "Automobiles Punish and Reform", the New York Times constructs the motorcar as 
such an enigmatic machine, which "does not lend itself readily ... to departures from the 
path of rectitude and sobriety". Those who stray from this path will be "punished" by the 
automobile "with a stem severity, and not infrequently the penalty it exacts is death ."85 
By way of such imagery, the automotive domain is thus increasingly being 
construed as a decontextualized and closed space governed by its own internal rules of 
reward and punishment. Within the confines of this order there is little room for 
transcendence: mistakes and accidents immediately draw 'objective ' sanctions from 
reality in the fonn of death, injury, and destruction. 86 As the title of a Los Angeles Times 
editorial put it formulaically: "Want to Stay Alive? Walk and Drive Safely! " .87 Missteps 
and miscalculations in traffic carry unrepentant penalties. "Beware of the Rapture of the 
Road," warns the title of another Times editorial, since "the immediate penalty may be 
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death or maiming."88 Or as the New York Times writes following a weekend of mayhem 
on the highways: "Some drivers simply became careless or reckless and paid for this with 
their lives."89 And since many child-related accidental deaths "have been caused by the 
children themselves", parents are bound "under the most dire penalty" to safeguard their 
children. In this harsh reality, telling a child to "run out and play" is "equivalent to a 
death-sentence."90 Evidently, such talk assumes a one to one correlation between 
misguided action and fatal result, between failed learning and tragic outcome. As another 
Los Angeles Times editorial stated bluntly: "More than 90 per cent of all these fatal 
accidents obviously were caused by breaking rules. If the drivers had gone by the book, 
most of the 27,000 dead of 1941 would still be alive."91 The New York Times , reporting 
on a particularly bloody Fourth of July weekend where 400 people lost their lives in 
accidents, even suggests that the dead received the response they were provoking: 
These were the drivers- or their hapless passengers- who didn ' t have time to be 
careful enough or were the victims of another driver' s haste. These were the 
drivers or riders who thought they could get by one more weekend without having 
their brakes checked, or their smooth tires replaced. These were the chance-takers 
who thought they could pass another car on a hill , or who didn't look in the rear-
view mirror before they turned out. Now they have their answer, and time for 
f . k . 91 t wm zs past rec onzng. -
Within the cosmology of imminent justice, learning necessarily comes at an 
enorn1ous price. "Is the sum of the casualties of 1923 to exceed that of last year?", the 
New York Times wondered in 1923, "There will be no reduction but a marked increase if 
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the lesson of experience is not learned and the code of regulations ... is not studied and 
scrupulously observed."93 "With all these figures , we should have learned something", 
berated the Los Angeles Times in a different occasion, "But the California Highway 
Patrol believes we haven ' t learned enough and the figures bear the~ out."94 Reflecting on 
the upcoming year by employing metaphors from the world of gambling, the president of 
the Traveler 's Insurance warned in 194 7: "Some will lose because they are willing to 
take a chance, no matter how great the odds. Others will lose because they have not 
learned the game well enough to play it safely ... Remember, when you gamble in traffic, 
you bet your l(fe."95 
Given that a prominent stream in the discourse of automobility calls upon drivers 
to fulfill their unbound freedom through the thrilling experience of driving speedily and 
umestrictedly, the potentially controlling power of imminent justice becomes all the more 
apparent. As Ilan Gur-Ze'ev argues, the taken-for-granted world created by automotive 
discourse consists of two seemingly conflicting values, which in fact operate as two sides 
ofthe same coin. On the one hand, people are highly disciplined by immersion in the 
existing order (submitting themselves to endless safety rules, traffic regulations, rational 
choices of preserving life, and so on); on the other hand, this same order constantly 
encourages a rebellion against these very rules and regulations (through the 
romanticization of the joyride, the ecstatic abandonment promoted in car commercials, 
the eroticism of the automobile, and so on). The resulting bind constitutes a dogmatic 
rebellion: The normalized driver never really questions the deep socio-technical 
imperatives imposed on him or her by the system.96 Discussions on accidents in the 
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automobile press are often imbued with similar paradoxes. Reporting on a fatal accident 
that occmTed to a one Frank Mathews in New Jersey, The Horseless Age claimed that, 
"this accident again is a result of the speed craze. It is reported that less than three hours 
before Matthews was arrested at Seabright for reckless speeding, and the judge when 
levying the fine had warned him that some day he might fall a victim to his 
recklessness."97 The mishap, then, represents the flipside of the elated feeling laden in 
successful driving. As the Washington Post put it: "The first feeling when an accident 
occurs to a motorist should be that of shame or humiliation."98 
'Being-Unto-Death' 
Another salient theme that operates to control motorists seeks to establish a relationship 
between them and death. Obviously, traffic accidents often do result in fatalities. 
However, I argue that the particular dominant representations of automotive mmiality 
embody certain modes of social power because they seek to affect people 's behavior by 
reifying 'death' as a force that not only represents the ultimate outcome of mistakes made 
in traffic but also the cause of these accidents as well. Again, this particular current 
constructs the space of the road as an extra-social, tautological universe that is governed 
by rules that are independent of people 's political design. 
In textual discussion of traffic accidents ' death ' is often written with a capital ' D', 
suggesting an autonomous and shadowy force that sweeps motorists into its abyss of no-
200 
return. Constituting a theme that is evident from the earliest days and carried well into the 
late 1960s, representative examples are abundant. Consider a sample of them below. 
"Death still loves a shining mark", writes the Los Angeles Times in a 1908 eulogistic 
editorial for a young pedestrian victim, "The lights of home were just ahead - then came 
the flash of doom and the sudden dark;"99 "Death's triumphs have increased 21 percent", 
exclaims the Chicago Daily Tribune during its ' Massacre Clock ' project, "The fifteenth 
ihousand [fatality] will arrive on schedule" 100; "Death lurks at every intersection" 101 ; 
" [D]eath rides on the front seat of every automobile" 102 ; "Death Makes a Million", the 
New York Times said ominously, "death very shortly will claim the millionth American to 
be killed by an automobile accident in this country." 103 
At times, such constructs adopt a deity-like language, implying that fatalities are 
sacrificed to a higher god. When traffic deaths in Los Angeles mounted following a rare 
holiday weekend without casualties, the Times claimed that 
Death is, in horrible fashion, making up for that strange holiday that he took. Six 
traffic killings Monday brought the county ' s toll since his unwonted layoff to 27 
and it is 30 now. On the sixth day alone after the respite began seven lives were 
sacrificed. 104 
Such an omnipotent force is as sweeping as it is disinterested, targeting both the 
biaiHeworthy and the guiltless. "Tragedy stalks the highways for the innocent as well as 
for those who are guilty of carelessness in driving," one Chicago Daily Tribune editorial 
bemoaned.105 
201 
One may conjecture that such language contravenes the rationalization of the 
accident since it evokes a casuistry that is more in line with pre-modem notions of 
mishaps as acts-of -God than with scientific investigations which offer practical remedies 
for society ' s illnesses. At the end of the day, however, they seem to operate in the same 
terrain that seeks to reduce fault to pure individual agency. Erring drivers and pedestrians 
may indeed suffer from the obtuse forces of misfortune and bad luck- yet they can avoid 
such maladies through rational choice and calculated behavior that corresponds to the 
informed answers discovered by those who are carry out safety research. 
Nowhere is such "rationality of the irrational" 106 more prominent than in reports 
on holiday accidents, both past and future. The ' Death Never Takes a Holiday ' motif, 
strikingly dominant from the early 1930s onwards, wallows in a gruesome play of words 
and imagery that captures the irony laden in bloody holidays. Drawing on the paradoxical 
coupling of pleasure and pain, joy and suffering, this theme simplistically intermixes 
moments intended for celebration and leisure with danger and destruction. "Death May 
Strike Tonight" 107 and "The Grim Reaper often comes camouflaged as Santa Claus," 108 
are just two exemplary editorial headlines that capture this duality. On Christmas Eve in 
1950 the Los Angeles Times editor reminded its readers that, "tragedy always is the 
companion of a holiday, with a long, horrid casualty list," 109 while another editorial, titled 
ominously "Vacation Danger" wamed its holiday-bound readers that, "there can be no 
relaxation for anyone who is at the wheel of an automobile." 110 The Chicago Daily 
Tribune even tried to persuade its readers, who "may be potential victims", to stay home 
and not take "unessential trips ." Indeed, when it comes to the world of motoring, there 
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can never be rest for the weary. A lone critical editorial against this grain is a 1928 
Washington Post piece that refutes the "popular fallacy that Death stalks about with a 
two-edged sword on holidays." According to this text, which is overwhelmingly eclipsed 
by the aforementioned scare tactics of shock and aversion, spotlighting holiday accident 
deaths is problematic because its spectacular nature tends to downplay other, everyday 
death tolls. 111 
Taken as a whole, such dominant representations put a controlling spin on the 
Heideggerian notion that all humans are ' beings-unto-death.' It is indeed true that on 
some basic existential level our lives are directed toward our deaths. But within the 
context of effectual discourse, ' being-unto-death ' as it is constructed in traffic discourse 
functions as a power mechanism since it makes a debilitating association between 
mishaps, free will, and mortality. Within this salient current drivers and pedestrians are 
depicted as dead-men/women-walking (and driving), who are always and already 
potential victims of theirs and others' mistakes. "There are seven hundred individuals, 
young and old, now enjoying life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness within the limits of 
Chicago who will meet an untimely death before Christmas in a motor vehicle 
accident," 112 the Chicago Daily Tribune announced in 1937. The concrete cause and 
effect link is severed here, as euphemistically, these people simply "meet" death. 
Similarly, a Los Angeles Times editorial titled "Pedestrians Must Learn Their Lesson!" 
states that, "two hundred and twenty four human beings walked to their death in Los 
Angeles during 1942. In four of five fatal pedestrian accidents, the victim has been found 
to be walking illegally at the time of the mishap." 11 3 
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For those who have not been victims (yet), accidents are also construed as 
opportunities for watching and learning. The car crash is treated in this regard as a fertile 
event that canies invaluable behavioral lessons. "The people can, if they will, profit by 
the Christmas tragedies", the editor of the Los Angeles Times commented, "Another long 
holiday is coming up this week end. Let us all unite to prevent a recunence of the wasted 
life of Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and Monday." 114 Likewise, the New York Times 
addressed its readers directly before a particular Fourth of July weekend: "If you want to 
live to enjoy and remember your Fourth of July holiday, drive carefully and, above all , 
don ' t speed." 115, or in another instance, " It can't be a Happy New Year if it begins in the 
morgue or the emergency ward of a hospital. Remember this when you press down of the 
accelerator." 116 One Chicago Daily Tribune editorial explicitly engages its reader-
motorists on this matter: "Perhaps your name has not appeared yet in the details of an 
accident, but you are on the waiting list and impatient to become a headliner." 117 
Another method to impress a sense of impending death involves the employment 
of realist methods that allow the disciplined subject to vicariously experience automotive 
mortality. A 1925 editorial by the Chicago Daily Tribune, later echoed in the NSN, 
advocated sending traffic violators to visit the hospital for a few weeks so that he or she 
"hears the sobbing of a child, crushed by a heedlessly driven truck; sees the weeping wife 
who nods her head when the policeman asks if this was her husband." Such exposure to 
honor is not offered as a means for developing empathy or stretching out to the suffering 
of the Other; rather, it functions primarily as a way for the violator to imagine his or her 
state of potential victirnhood. "In a week the visitor is impressed ... In three weeks he 
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hears moans in his sleep and sees policemen standing waiting just outside his bedroom 
door. In a month the hospital visitor has become the most cautious human being on 
em1h." Interestingly, such effectual measures do not contradict this era' s increasing 
medicalization and scientization of the driving problem, but instead complement them. 
As the above editorial put it, "The method is slow, but is certain to cure the reckless 
h I. . , 118 person w o app 1es It. 
The last point deserves further mention since national printed media, which can 
obviously slip occasionally into sensationalism, did not constitute the only body to 
employ the language and imagery of ' being-unto-death. ' Such discourse increasingly 
pervaded the supposedly more calculated safety establishment and insurance sector as 
well. For example, in the late 1940s, the Kingston Tennessee chapter ofthe National 
Safety Council addressed the issue of traffic safety by building a mock ' cemetery ' in the 
hem1 of the city ' s business district. Three ' tombstones ' were erected alongside a real 
coffin that was brought especially for the occasion. Ghostly figures wearing signs such as 
'I was a Jay walker ' and ' I crossed in a red light' then patrolled the streets to discourage 
traffic violations.119 Not long afterwards, the Cleveland Safety Council hauled a wrecked 
car to one of the city ' s main squares. A loud speaker, concealed in the mangled remains, 
emitted throughout the day ghastly voices, which served as a "warning for passersby to 
drive safely." 120 In the early 1940s a The Travelers Book entertained the idea of the dead 
coming back to admonish the living into greater caution. "How different would be the 
story if they [the 35,000 people killed in 1940] could come to life just long enough to 
convince us that what happened last year to others might happen this year to us! " 121 
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Ilan Gur Ze'ev argues that when the essence oflife is translated into the 
imperative of slaying alive, men and women can more easily be converted from people to 
things. In advanced capitalist societies such reification eases the shift in the 
reconstruction of individuals from meaningful and interpretive subjects to objective 
entities that are considered primarily as statistics of fatality rates, lost production and 
consumption values, wastefulness of public funds, etc. And if existence cannot be 
transcended because it is consumed by the imperative to fend off death, if people so 
anxious cannot imagine being something other than what they were programmed to be-
then again, this fonn of rhetoric encourages the emersion in the taken-for-granted order. 
While the car is often synonymous with individual liberty and free choice, the constant 
threat of annihilation reiterates the futility of total, radical change. 
Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has illuminated several dominant avenues by which the elements 
of power and persuasion have been deployed in the construction of the accident problem. 
The evidence points to the existence of a striking discursive stream of social control that 
operates to divide the population into identifiable categories, discipline individuals into 
appropriate behavior in traffic, and monitor the extent by which their conduct has 
internalized the rules of the road. Several conclusions arise from the analysis. The first 
touches upon the relationship between the rhetorical and irrational nature of the effectual 
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discourse discussed above and the rational-technical discourse examined in the previous 
chapter. Generally speaking, the historical and sociological literature on accidents and 
misfortunes identifies a substantial rift between pre-modem and modem explanatory 
regimes. According to these works, modernist scientific-rational approaches to 
understanding harmful events often replace earlier moralistic paradigms that located the 
cause ofthe malady in the sinfulness ofthe victim. 122 
Yet in my analysis of power in the public conversations on traffic accident I found 
the story to be more complex. The dichotomy between pre-modem irrational perspectives 
misfortunes and modern rational-technical approaches is much fuzzier than these works 
might suggest. The two epistemologies can evidently work in tandem, or may 
complement each other. As witnessed in this chapter, the effectual discourse functions as 
the other side of the coin of the rational-technical discourse of statistics: Pre-modem 
strategies of imminent justice and interpellating would-be victims jlowed.fi-om statistical 
calculus of risk (i.e., 'will YOU be the next one killed? ' ). To restate the argument, it may 
beneficial to consider the following two pie charts published in the 1933 Travelers Book 
fi 123 ( 1gure 1 ). 
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HUMAN ACTIONS PRODUCING DEATHSl 
Image 1. "Human Actions Producing Deaths ." The Travelers Insurance Co. , 1933 . 
The diagram, titled "Human Actions Producing Deaths," breaks down the causes of 
traffic accidents occurring to drivers and pedestrians. It demonstrates one way in which 
quantification may constitute a technology that sets the stage for particular fonns of 
social control. The cosmology created by commensuration allows here for considering 
only causal data capable of being converted into a number. Other potential "human 
actions producing death"- the reliance on automotive transportation at the expense of 
other modes of conveyance, the culture of speed, the marketing messages that encourage 
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reckless driving and risk-taking, the mythologization of the automobile as a sublime 
technology, the constructed symbiosis between personal identity and one ' s car - are 
nonexistent here because they cmmot be translated cleanly into figures. The enclosing of 
this world in neat borders marks the domain of the say-able and thinkable. Put differently, 
that which can be counted - counts. 124 And since atomized forms of behavior ail ow by 
definition for such a fine-grained itemization, the blaming index finger facilely spots its 
targets. As the Travelers Insurance itself put it: " [the numbers] stand out crystal clear: 
drivers usuaiiy have no one but themselves to blame for accidents," 125 and in another 
instance, "the finger of statistics is not pointed at the engineers and designers; it's pointed 
at you, the driver. " 126 
A second consequence has to do with the particular type and degree of control 
imposed on citizens in the socio-technical system in automobility. Norbert Elias, one of 
the few critical scholars to place transportation in the center of their sociological studies, 
argues that since driving necessitates a high level of self-control and discipline, a 
society ' s accident rate can serve as an indicator of its level of development. According to 
him, as societies modernize, their accident rates decrease. 127 While Elias' thesis is 
important in highlighting the centrality of self-control for the particular epistemology 
generated in the field of motoring, he overlooks the darker implications of such 
dramaticaiiy uncompromising demands on people's subjectivity. As was witnessed in this 
chapter, in an auto-centered transportation system drivers and pedestrians' subjective 
state must be geared to meet the demands of the system: they have little choice but to 
maintain a wide-awake consciousness that is always fuily vigilant of the potential hazards 
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of road travel. Any altemate states of mind, such as playfulness or daydreaming, may 
result in grave consequences. These findings echo the general argument put forth by 
Fruend and Martin, in which "our increasing reliance on the auto makes sobriety, wide 
awakeness, and the optimal functioning of our biomechanical bodies unquestioned nom1s 
demanded of anyone who wishes to have full freedom of movement." 128 In this regard, 
"the imposition of a particular kind of subjectivity while driving or walking in traffic 
represents one of the more subtle forms of social control that accompanies auto-centered 
transport. It is in this sense that we can speak of a politics ofsubjectivity." 129 
Third, I have uncovered some specific rhetorical devices that allow authoritative 
claimsmakers to clutch their audience in potentially constraining and controlling 
behavioral dilemmas. By reducing drivers and pedestrians to things whose life cannot 
transcend the demand to stay alive while celebrating their supposed freedom to live their 
automotive fantasies to the fullest, the double-messages of the car eases the direction and 
management of people to suit the demands of the existing social order. In this sense, my 
finding adds to those made by Wolfgang Sachs on the contradicting meanings of 
automobility. From its inception, the motorcar's ideology offered only a dogmatic 
rebellion against the existing social order. Celebrated early on as a means for escaping 
the humdrum of a routinized and alienating industrial world, auto enthusiasts paid little 
attention to the irony of positing an emblem of technological progress as the prime 
vehicle for achieving naturalist transcendentalism. 130 This paradox was bridged in two 
ways. The first entailed the development of a unique auto-centered tourist gaze that could 
romanticize nature only by consuming it through the windshield, i.e. fleetingly and from 
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a distance. The second was expressed in the creation of the suburb- a specialized living 
space of the Auto Age that sought to bring together the advantages of the automobile 
with a sense of appreciation for the natural environment. The green suburb offered a 
secure and elegant solution for those who wanted to remain urbanites without having to 
face the political consequences of industrial city illnesses. 
211 
1 Flink. America Adopts, The Car Culture , and The Automobile Age. For more recent works see 
Blanke. Hell on Wheels; Packer, Jeremy. 2008 . Mobility Without Mayhem: SC{fety, Cars, and 
Citizenship. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.; and Nmton, Peter. 2008. Fighting Traffic: The 
Dawn (if/he Motor Age in the American City. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
2 The Wreckord, pg. 19. 
3 Richard Kirby. 1928. "Public Accident Statistics." National Safety News 18(2): 13-14. 
4 Hayley Simpson. 1931. "Make Statistics Pay Their Way." National Safety News 23(5): 25. 
5 J. M. Buswell. 1931. " Keep Statistics Simple." National Safety News 23(4): 89. 
6 Cyril Daldy. " Irritate Them if You Want Their Attention." National Safety News, 26(3): 66. 
7 See in this regard John Sterling. 1947. "Advertising Saves Lives." National SC{[ety News 56(5): 
20-1 , 82-6; Sidney Ingham. 195 I . "You and the Newspapers ." National Safety News 64( 4): 102-
3, I 83. 
8 That is the figure quoted in the book's I 964 edition, five years before the cessation of its 
publication. 
9 A brief biographical sketch of Newton appears in the following newspaper article printed after 
his death: "G. D. Newton Dies; Held Travelers Post," The Hartford Courant , July 29, 1969, pg. 
6A. 
10 Other than speaking at safety conferences and publishing several articles in the NSN, Newton ' s 
pieces appeared in such professional journals as The National Underwriter (see volume 35 , 
August 20, I 931) and Safety Engineers (see volume 64, October 1932) 
11 George Newton . 1933 . "Is the Public Interested?" National Safety News 27(1 ): 27-8, 68. 
12 George Newton. I 935. "Dramatizing Accidents." National Safety News 35(2): I 6, 55. 
13 Maim Street, pg. I I. 
14 The effectual discourse was visible in other areas. For example, J.C. Furnas ' shock article 
" ... And Sudden Death ," first published in 1936 Reader 's Digest quickly became a defining text 
in its realism and scare quality. Furnas ' gory piece sought to thrust the reader into experiencing 
the horror the accident by means of images and words that would erase the distance between 
bystander and victim. The article operated on the assumption that readers can be frightened into 
safe driving by feeling what it means to crash a car. Though Furnas ' piece is a landmark moment, 
it has already been the subject of scholarly discussions and thus will not be elaborated in here. For 
a nice interpretation of the article see Beckman. Crash. 
15 Michel Foucault. I 994. "The Subject and Power." In Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, eds. The 
Essential Foucault. New York, NY: The New Press, pg. I26. 
16 Ibid, pg. I 40. 
17 Michel Foucault. 1977. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York, NY: Knopf 
Doubleday Publishing Group, pg. 183 . 
18 Ibid. pg. 141. 
19 Michel Foucault. 1965. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. 
New York: Pantheon Books; and Foucault. Discipline and Punish. 
20 Michel Foucault. 1976. The History of Sexuality. London, UK: Penguin Books. 
21 Quoted in Kevin Borg. 1999. "The ' Chauffer Problem ' in the Early Auto Era: Structuration 
Theory and the Users of Technology." Technology and Culture 40(4): 797-832. See Borg' s 
article for a detailed account on the class aspects pervading the relationship between chauffeurs 
and wealthy automobile owners. 
22 See for example Virginia Scharff. 1999. Taking the Wheel: Women and the Coming of the 
Motor Age. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press; Georgine Clarsen. 2008. Eat My 
Dust: Early Women Motorists. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University; Deborah Clarke. 2007. 
212 
Driving Women: Fiction and Automobile Culture in Twentieth-Centwy America. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
23 
" Woman at the Wheel. " Los Angeles Times, January 25 , I 922, pg. 114. 
24 
"Traffic Accidents." Washington Post , January 19, 1919, pg. S4. 
25 National Safety News. 1923. "Speed and Safety." February, pg. 24. 
26 The Horseless Age. 1905. "Accidents." 15(25): 671-672. 
27 Automobile Topics. 1909. 18(19): 1257-1258. 
28 Automobile Topics . 1908. "Needless Exaggeration." 16(22): 1525 . 
29 The Automobile. 1912. "Accidents ofthe Year On New York Streets." 27(23): 1156. 
'0 
o The Horseless Age. 1902. 'The Yonkers Sentence." 19(19): 492-493. 
31 Alva Corlett. 1922. " Why Speeders Should Be Sent to Jail." National Safety News 6(3): 27-28. 
32 National Safety News. "Speed." 
33 Robbins Stoeckel. I 927. "Man and Automobile." National Safety News September, pg. 32. 
34 John Bums. 1924. "Science Scrutinizes the Reckless Driver. " National Safety News, 9( 4): 15-
16. 
35 A. L. Jacoby. 1927. "Intellectual and Emotional Fitness for Automobile Operation ." National 
Safety News 15( 4 ): 43-4; and Burns. "Science Scrutinizes." 
36 Burns. "Science Scrutinizes." 
37 Ibid. ; and Jacoby . " Intellectual and Emotional." 
38 On the origins and evolvement of this concept in the United States see John Cynoweth 
Burnham. 2009. Accident Prone: A History of Technology, P!>ychology, and Misfits of the 
Machine Age. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
39 Alvhh Lauer. 1932. " What Type of Persons Have Accidents?" National Safety News 26(2): 17; 
See also Alvhh Lauer. 1932 "Recklessness in Driving." National Safety News 26(6): 17-19, 61. 
Such discourse was part of a larger movement to medicalize traffic accidents. See Beth Gangloff. 
2006. Medicalizing the Automobile: Public Health, SC{fety, and American Culture, 1920-1967. 
Ph.D. Disse1tation, State University of New York at Stony Brook. 
40 National Safety News. 194 7. The ' Jacksonville Jaybird ' ." 56(2): 54. 
41 National Safety News. 1949. "'Crazy Drivers '." 60(5): 56. 
42 Several important works in this regard are: Cynthia Dettelbach. 1976. In the Driver's Seat: The 
Automobile in American Literature and Popular Culture. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 
Anedith Nash . 1983. Death on the Highway: The Automobile Wreck in American Culture 1920-
40. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota; Blanke. Hell on Wheels; Sachs. For Love; Rae. 
The American Automobile; Flink . The Car Culture, The Automobile Age; Roland Barthes. 1957. 
"The New Citroen." In Mythologies; Peter Marsh and Peter Collett. 1986. Driving Passions: The 
Psychology of the Car. The University of Michigan Press. 
43 Mary Douglas. 1966. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. 
London, UK: Routledge, pg. 4 . 
44 Ibid, pg. 2 
45 Ibid, pg. 2-3 . 
46 
"A Scientist Gives Good Advice." The New York Times , September 14, 1925 , pg. 18. 
47 
"Slaughter on the Road." The New York Times, January 8, 1955, pg. 12. 
48 Zygmunt Bauman. 1997. Postmodernity and its Discontents, UK. London : Polity Press. 
49 Michel Foucault. 1994. "Governmentality." In Rabinow and Rose. The Essential Foucault, pg. 
235. 
50 Ibid, pg. 243. 
213 
51 Arthur Morey. 1922. "The Increasing Menace of the Automobile." National Sqfety News 6(3): 
31. 
52 W. H. Koehler. 1923 "Speed and Safety." National Sqfety News 7(2): 23. 
53 Edward Weeks. 1927. "A Criminal in Every Family." Atlantic Monthly 140: 445-51. See also 
Frederick House and Francis Hugo. 1920. "Is the Motorist a Criminal?" Colliers 65: 48, 87, 90, 
January 3. 
54 Arthur Stone. 1930. "What Constitutes 'Dangerous' Driving?" National Safety News 22( I) : 13. 
My emphasis. 
55 National Safety News. 1924. "Minneapolis Judge Organizes' Reckless Drivers ' School '." 9(2): 
21. My emphasis. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Edward Dana. 1932. "Experience Points the Way to Traffic Safety." National Safety News 
25(6): 14-15. 
58 Tremendous Trifles: The Traveler 's 1932 Street and Highway Accident Data Book. 1932. 
Hartford, CT: The Travelers Insurance Co., pg. 18. 
59 Michel Foucault. 1994. "About the Concept ofthe 'Dangerous Individual ' in Nineteenth 
Century Psychiatry." In Rabinow and Rose. The Essential Foucaull , pp. 208-228. 
60 Burns. "Science Scrutinizes." My emphasis. 
6 1 Jacoby. " Intellectual." 
62 Ibid. 
63 Stoeckel. "Man and Automobile." 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Knight Dunlap. 1928. "Why Some People Have Bad Luck." National Safety News 18( I): 34-6, 
84. 
67 Ibid. 
68 National Safety News. 1954. "For Those in Peril." 69(5) : 17. 
69 Michel Foucault. 1994. "Technologies of Self." in Rabinow and Rose. The Essential Foucault, 
pg. 146. 
70 Ibid. 
71 C. E. Pettibone. 1930. "Diagnose Your Driving." National Safety News 21 (4): 21, 96. 
72 Deadly Reckoning: The Travelers 1961 Book of Street and Highway Accident Data. 1961 . 
Hartford, CT: The Travelers Insurance Co. , pg. 15 . 
73 The Dishonor Roll: The Travelers 1960 Book of Street and Highway Accident Data. 1960. 
Hartford, CT: The Travelers Insurance Co., pg. 1. 
74 Heedless Horsepower: The Travelers 1957 Book of Street and Highway Accident Data. 1957. 
Hartford, CT: The Travelers Insurance Co. , pg. 1. 
75 Misguided Missiles: The Travelers 1955 Book of Street and Highway Accident Data. 1955 . 
Hmtford, CT: The Travelers Insurance Co. , pg. I . 
76 Alfred Wishart. 1926. "Dramatic Aspects of our National Accident Toll." National Safety News 
14(6): 7. 
77 William Smith. 1932. "Developing the Driver's Pride." National Safety News 25(4): 12. 
78 Pettibone. 1930. 
79 For a thorough historical account of Eisenhower's interest in traffic safety, his strong ties to the 
National Safety Council , and S-D Day see Richard Weingroff. 2003. President Dwight 
Eisenhower and the Federal Role in Highway Safety. Washington DC: Federal Highway 
Administration. 
80 National Safety News. 1954. "An Appeal to the Nation." 70(6): 30. 
81 The Human Race: The Travelers 1947 Book of Street and Highway Accident Data. 1947. 
Hmtford, CT: Travelers Insurance Co., pp. 4, 31. 
82 Beck. Risk Society; Anthony Giddens . 1999. Runaway World. London, UK: Profile Books; 
Green. Risk and Misfortune; Hacking. The Taming of Chance. 
214 
83 Green. Risk and Misfortune. 
84 
"Learning in a Hard School." The New York Times, August 22, 1905, pg. 6. 
85 
"Automobiles Punish and Reform." The New York Times , May 19, 1911 , pg. 10. 
86 Gur-Ze'ev. "The Metaphysics." 
87 
"Want to Stay Alive?- Walk and Drive Safely!" Los Angeles Times , December 5, 1945, pg. 
A4. 
88 
"Beware of the Rapture of the Road." Los Angeles Times , September 5, 1953, pg. A4. 
89 
"Holiday Aftennath." The New York Times, September 4, 1952, pg. 26. 
90 
"Children in the Streets." Washington Post, June 17, 1926, pg. 4. 
91 
"If They're Caught, Punish Them." Los Angeles Times, December 28, 1946, pg. A4. 
92 
"The Weekend Dead." The New York Times, July 6, 1955, 26. My emphasis. 
93 
"Motorists Must Heed." The New York Times, May 21 , 1923 , pg. 14. 
94 
"Auto Accident Facts for '54." Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1955, pg. B4. 
95 Jesse Randall. 194 7. "You Bet Your Life." In You Bet Your Life: The Travelers 1947 Book of 
Street and Highway Accident Data. Hartford, CT: Travelers Insurance Co., pg. 3. 
96 Gur-Ze'ev. "The Metaphysics." 
97 The Horseless Age. 1902. 10(1 0): 260. 
98 
"The Cause of Traffic Accidents." Washington Post, June 12, 1926, pg. 6. 
99 
"Death's Shining Mark." Los Angeles Times, March 3, 1908, pg. 14. 
100 
"The Fourteenth Thousand." Chicago Daily Tribune , September 22, 1936, pg. 16. 
101 
"The Twentieth Thousand." Chicago Daily Tribune, December 27, 1936, pg. 12. 
102 
"The Home Front Slaughter." Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1943 , pg. A4. 
103 
"Death Makes a Million ." The New York Times , April 2, 1950, pg. 148. 
104 
"Death Takes a Holiday - But Not for Long." Los Angeles Times, January I 0, 1946, pg. A4 . 
My emphasis. 
105 
"It Could Be You." Chicago Daily Tribune, May 29, 1965, pg. 14. 
106 Gur-Ze ' ev. "The Metaphysics." See also Ritzer's discussion of the dialectical relationship 
between rationalities and irrationalities in the instrumental ' McDonaldized' social institutions of 
modern societies. George Ritzer. 1993. The McDonaldization of Society. Newbury Park, CA: 
Pine Forge Press. 
107 
"Death May Strike Tonight." Los Angeles Times, December 22, 1950, pg. A4. 
108 
"Enough?" Los Angeles Times, December 13, 1945, A4. 
109 
"Death May Strike." 
110 
"Vacation Danger." Los Angeles Times , August 14, 1955, pg. 84. 
111 
"Holiday Accidents." Washington Post, December 27, 1928, pg. 6. 
112 
"The Third Thousand." Chicago Daily Tribune, February 25 , 1937, pg. 12. My emphasis. 
11 3 
"Pedestrians Must Learn Their Lesson! " Los Angeles Times , April 16, 1943 , pg. A4. 
114 
"The Morning After." Los Angeles Times, December 27, 1950, pg. A4. 
115 
"The Weekend Dead ." The New York Times , July 6, 1955, pg. 26. 
116 
"Christmas Tragedy." The New York Times , December 29, 1954, pg. 22 . 
11 7 
"The Tenth Thousand." Chicago Daily Tribune, July 23 , 1936, pg. 12. 
118 National Safety News . 1924. "A Cure for Recklessness." August, pg. 15 
11 9 National Safety News. 194 7. '"Cemetery' on Main Street." 56(2): I 04. 
120 National Safety News . 1947. '"The Talking Car ' ." 56(5): 52. 
121 Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: The Travelers 1941 Book ofStreet and Highway Accident 
Data. 1941. Hartford, CT: Travelers Insurance Co., pg. 3. 
122 For example, Joel Tarr demonstrates how the 1866 cholera outbreak in the US was 
successfully fought through the application of medical solutions and proactive public health 
initiatives. See Joel Tarr 1990, "Risks and Society: Some Historical Cases and Contemporary 
Comparisons." In Kirby. Nothing to Fear, pp. 77-99 . 
215 
123 They Call Us Civilized: The Travelers 1933 Book ofStreet and Highway Accident Data. 1933. 
Hartford, CT: The Travelers Insurance Co. , pg. 13. 
124 Or as Martin and Lynch, in an analysis of the cultural of counting, put it: "To count something 
is to make it accountable as a member in a class of relevant objects." In this sense, 'counting ' and 
' discounting ' are often reciprocally involved. Martin and Lynch. "Counting Things," pg. 246. 
p · 
_) The Wreckord, pg. 6. 
126 Rushin ' Roulelle: The Travelers 1963 Book of Street and Highway Accident Data. 1963 . 
Hartford, CT: Travelers Insurance Co. , pg. 15. 
127 Norbert Elias. 1982. Power and Civility. Berkeley, CA: University of Califomia Press. 
128 Freund and Ma1tin. The Ecology, pg. 100. 
129 Thid . pp. 98-99. 
I '0 
' Sachs. For Love. 
216 
Chapter 5. 
The Planned Accident 
Auto Thrill Shows, Destruction Derbies, and the Cultural Logic 
of the Deliberate Car Crash in America 
This chapter sets out to investigate the possible role of commodification and the 
consumer market in shaping the public di scourse on traffic accidents as a socia l 
problem. fn particular l focus on the ' selling ' of auto-destruction through the ' auto 
thrill show' and ' destruction/demolition derby,' a popular entertainment genre of 
wrecking cars in front of live audiences. 
Surprisingly, the vast historiography on the automobile in America, 1 including 
a fairly recent interdi sc iplinary interest in cars that draws upon varying fields such as 
gender, cultural studies, anthropology, and critical cultural history, 2 has paid hardly 
any attention to the ubiquitous cultural phenomena of the staged car crash . To date, 
Jess than a handful of works have touched upon this subject. In their study on 
contemporary ' rites of reversal ', Robert Jewett and John Lawrence claim that 
demolition derbies constitute one such rite, as they allow lower and middle-class 
Americans to temporarily invert a number of socially sanctioned norms. Specifically, 
destroying cars in such a planned fashion creates an opportunity for violating the 
strong sanctity of property and the voluntary acquiescence to traffic regulations. 3 
Stephen Zehr, who conducted ethnographic observations at several demolition 
derbies, similarly argues that since primarily blue-collar audiences attend these 
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contests, they provide an opportunity for marginalized groups to reconfigure 
dominant cultural meanings associated with the automobile in the United States. 4 
Aurian Haller, through a reading of artist Mike Featherstone's series of works entitled 
Demolition Derby, agrees that these competitions serve as " performative arenas" that 
allow disadvantaged actors to subvert hegemonic representations of capitalist cycles 
of production and consumption. Yet he also sees them as sites that simultaneously 
reiterate dominant constructs of violent and aggressive masculinity. In the end, 
though, in what seems like an effort to avoid an interpretive aporia, Haller suggests 
that we view derbies as no more than mere experimental theatrical ·'play", a form of 
unforeseen creativity that refuses any discursive pigeon-holing altogether. 5 
While these works supply a pioneering empirical and analytical window to the 
subculture ofthe deliberate car crash, they suffer in large part from a lack of proper 
historical depth . Specifically, what is missing is an excavation of the past that will 
flesh out the origins of this genre, trace its evolvement through time within important 
developments in both the wider systems of automobility and broader contexts of 
cultural production in America, and flush out the major cultural representations of 
deliberate auto-destruction and their relation to the accident. 
The chapter thus seeks to overcome the drawbacks in the sparse literature on 
the deliberate car crash show by providing a socio-historical exploration into this 
unique genre.6 The analysis of how the commidification ofthe crash may relate to the 
evolving definition of the traffic accident as a social problem proceeds by confronting 
two central cultural quandaries that lie at the heart of the inquiry. The first is how to 
explain the rationale for purposely destroying such a prized iconic technology- the 
automobile- highly revered and celebrated in the United States precisely for its 
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wholeness and utility as an operational device that purports to provide unfettered 
accessibility, individual-based expression, and speedy mobility. For, ostensibly, it 
doesn ' t make much sense: Why would Americans want to repeatedly demolish this 
beloved machine, considered by many observers and scholars as the bonafide 
defining technology of the past century?7 Where did this need to destroy the 
mythologized object emanate from? What motivated this act and which purposes did 
it serve? 
The second main puzzlement to be tackled here deals with decoding the 
representational element in the ontology of the staged automobile wreck. If the 
deliberate crash is essentially a mock practice, i.e. a destructive yet largely controlled 
and simulated event- could it therefore be a copy or a reproduction of some original? 
What is the reference world ofthe staged crash? 
The ensuing investigation will thus seek to uncover a cultural logic in which 
staging car crashes ' makes sense ' at a specific historical moment.8 In the first section 
ofthe chapter, I link the planned wreck to a fairly rich yet largely unrecognized 
tradition of reenacting technological destruction for public amusement. I then tum to 
examining the car crash genre by discussing the key players and institutions that 
invented, sanctioned, and performed these particular spectacles. Finally, I reconstruct 
two different contexts in the history of American automobility and demonstrate how 
they functioned as concentric arenas in which the deliberate destruction ofthe car 
could be developed and sustained over time: 1) The deep capitalist logic of chronic 
product obsolescence and regeneration, specifically embodied in the automobile 
industry by the implementation of the ' annual model renewal ' policy in the early 
1 920s; 2) the era ' s increasing privatization of the traffic accident problem through its 
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etiological discourse, in which dominant players assigned blame and responsibility 
predominantly to human agency, intent, and control over the technology. 
The Staging of Wrecks and Destruction in America's Amusement Culture 
The very idea of deliberately wrecking material objects to entertain live crowds was 
not a new one in early twentieth century America. Jn fact, simulating destruction as a 
form of public amusement began some four decades before Ward Beam ' s daredevils 
started smashing cars. Reenacting notable historical disasters in front of a live 
audience constituted a novel method to captivate audiences in the late nineteenth 
century, feeding on and further amplifying a popular fascination with large-scale 
catastrophes and accidents.9 The first of such dramatizations probably dates back to 
the early 1880 ' s, when several Coney Island, New York beach resorts introduced the 
' Eruption of Mount Vesuvius ', a fireworks spectacle that covered a miniaturized city 
of Pompeii in " torrents of blazing magnesium powder. ' ' 10 By the early 1900s, the 
proprietors of the Island ' s three emerging amusement parks- Steeplechase, Luna 
Park, and Dreamland - each incorporated six different disaster shows. Visitors to 
these venues could now witness, for instance, a staging of the Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania Flood of 1889, the Galveston Texas Flood of 1890, or the Boer War of 
1899-1902, in which a thousand actors played war games. But the most successful 
attractions proved to be the two fire spectacles, 'Fire and Flames ' at Luna Park and 
' Fighting the Flames ' at Dreamland. In these massive installations, organizers 
repeatedly set ablaze several-story buildings, only to have them extinguished by a cast 
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of hundreds of "fire fighters" in full-gear, who saved leaping ·'residents" with ladders 
and safety nets. 11 
Meanwhile, other entrepreneurs began producing destruction spectacles 
outside the confines of the amusement park. In early 1896, marketers of the Hocking 
Valley-Toledo, Ohio railroad line came up with a new publicity stunt to bolster sales: 
a staged collision between two trains in front of a live audience. Following a 
widespread advertising campaign, the organizers scheduled the crash for May 30th of 
that year, at a point on the line just south of Columbus. Several dilapidated couches, 
their windows displaying dummy passengers and ticket-masters, were coupled to two 
old locomotives. Despite the rainy weather, some 25 ,000 people gathered to watch the 
unprecedented show. 12 News ofthe arranged crash soon circulated around the nation. 
The Idaho Daily Statesman, for instance, provided the following description of the 
event: 
A special track had been laid for the trains to collide. After a signal the engineers 
pulled open the throttles of the locomotives till a speed often miles an hour was 
attained, then the throttles were pulled wide open and the engineers jumped, while 
the trains rushed on to destruction. Going at a rate of 45 miles an hour they came 
together directly in front of the park with a crash that could have been heard for 
miles and the air was filled with debris. Both engines sprang into the air and held 
each other by the nose, while the cars piled up behind them. The wreck was 
perfect. The locomotives remained forming a perfect Y and all the cars were 
telescoped. The air was filled with steam and hot water and 25 ,000 people were 
panic stricken. When the air cleared and the wreck could be seen, a cheer went up 
I' from 25 ,000 throats. J 
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Though a flying bolt injured one railroad official, breaking hi s leg in t\vo places, the 
fun was not ruined for the others in attendance. The excited crowd, reported another 
newspaper, rushed to the remains of the wreck and frantically collected souvenirs. 14 
This planned collision between t\Vo trains was probably the first of its kind, 
yet certainly not the last. Incidentally, a man by the name of William Crush, a 
traveling agent for the Kansas-Missouri-Texas (Katy) railroad, witnessed the 
pioneering event in Ohio and was deeply impressed by what he saw. At the time, the 
Katy Line was also mired in financial problems and desperately sought ways to 
bolster its patronage. Crush , envisioning that the revenue and publicity from such a 
spectacle might be just the right cure for the line ' s ills, set out to organize a similar 
event. Following an extensive publicity campaign, Crush's crash took place three 
months later in front of an estimated crowd of 30,000 spectators who gathered in a 
haphazard town built especially for the occasion several miles north of Waco, Texas. 
' Crush, Texas ', duly named after its founder's oddly befitting name, became the new 
locus of the smashing extravaganza. Although several newspaper accounts proclaimed 
that most viewers "got their money ' s worth", the event that came to be known as The 
Great Crash at Crush also turned into tragedy, as two people lost their lives and scores 
were wounded by flying debris. In response, the railway company fired William 
Crush- only to reinstate him several years later- and the victims ' families proceeded 
to sue the Katy line for damages.15 Surprisingly, however, the fiasco did not put an 
end to the staging of train wrecks. Another quick entrepreneur, Joseph Connolly, who 
attended the Texas crash, went on to arrange some 73 train wrecks over a span of 35 
years, mainly in state and county fairs. Connolly, soon to be known as 'Head-on Joe ', 
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was a farmer from Iowa who boasted after his retirement that no one was ever killed 
or injured in any ofhis crashes. 16 
Even more esoteric than planned train collisions, the staged wreck of airplanes 
served as another rather odd form of public entertainment in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. The premiere aviator-crasher was a stunt pilot by the name of 
Captain Frank Frakes, a native of Tennessee who performed scores of such spectacles 
at fairgrounds nationwide. Frakes ' repertoire consisted of flying planes into trees, 
lakes, prefabricated houses, and occasionally even straight into the ground. 17 
Evidently, then, the deliberate wreck of a technology as a means of 
entertaining live crowds constituted an interesting, if unusual fad during this era. The 
staged car crash, first popularized by Ward Beam and his team of smashers in the 
early 1 920s, could gain initial acceptance and subsequent popularity as a legitimate 
public practice precisely within such a cultural climate that strove to realize 
destructive fantasies and continuously increase the stimulatory threshold for shocks 
and thrills. At the same time, however, when it came to auto destruction, this 
particular genre acquired several important differences, not the least of which are its 
shear lasting presence in the United States. After reaching their heyday roughly 
between 1900 to 1930, the fire spectacles and train and plane crashes faded almost 
completely into the oblivion of quirky Americana. The same cannot be said, however, 
of the automotive mayhem circuit. The latter strand, although relatively marginalized 
in recent decades, is still very much alive. To understand the particularly strong hold 
and cultural significance the staged car crash has on the collective American pulse let 
us now examine the socio-historical context in which it was first created and 
popularized 
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The Deliberate Car Crash Show: A Wrecking Milieu 
The year was 1922. Ward Beam, a small-time event promoter from the town of 
Celina, Ohio, concocted a new business venture. Beam, whose family al so operated a 
nearby flight school that provided lessons in dangerous aerobatic flying , noted the 
enthralling power ofthrilling displays and decided to establish a roaming troupe of 
daredevil automobilists. After convening the first crew in early 1923 , Ward Beam's 
International Congress of Daredevils performed its inaugural show in August of that 
year at a local Toledo fair, giving birth to a new genre in America ' s mass amusement 
culture- the ' auto thrill show ' .18 Beam ' s men initially devised a set routine of car 
tricks, consisting mainly of precision driving and automotive endurance 
demonstrations. Yet the shows soon turned largely into spectacles of high risk and 
destruction. The greatest attraction, Beam di scovered, were the wrecks and smashes: 
autos colliding in head-on crashes, slamming into brick and flaming walls , leaping 
from ramps straight into other vehicles (known as the ' T-Bone Crash ' ), and running 
over human ' iron men ' . Gradually, then, a completely new chapter in the joint history 
of American popular entertainment and the automobile was being written. Such real-
life1 9 deliberate20 car crashes became a burgeoning avenue for public amusement, 
gaining rapid popularity nationwide and culminating a decade later in the invention of 
the destruction/demolition derby, an all-out smash-up spectacle in which wrecking 
cars became an end in itself. 
Initially, Ward Beam's auto thrill show performed in local and county venues 
in the Toledo and Cleveland area. As their act gained gradual recognition outside of 
Ohio, the group took their act to neighboring Midwest states such as Indiana, 
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Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. By the late twenties, they appeared in fairs 
and other public gatherings throughout the East Coast, a clear sign of accelerated 
success that motivated other stuntmen to follow suit and establish their own troupes. 
AI ' Flash' Williams ' Thrill Drivers from Chicago and Jimmie Lynch ' s Death 
Dodgers from Arkansas soon figured as the more prominent ones. The growing 
competition led Beam to up the thrill ante and add new features to his repertoire. In 
1928, he introduced the ' ash can derby ' . Dubbing it "the world's worst race", Beam 
called on lay drivers to enter in this event worn-down "junk-piles, purchased under 
50$."21 These already-beat jalopy races set the stage for his next invention- the 
' wreck ' em race ', probably the earliest version ofthe demolition derby, 22 in which 
numerous dilapidated cars competed by trying to knock each other off the track using 
fender nudges and bumping strategies. This gradual conversion of the thrill show into 
a largely car wrecking spectacle was completed by the end of the 1920s when Beam 
added to his group's routine a risky head-on collision between two speeding cars. 23 
Undeniably, crashing now was all the rage. 
The era ' s stock market crash and its subsequent Depression years impacted the 
structure of the thrill show business in surprising ways. As people so ld to the job 
market any skill they could possibly muster, an increasing number of them attempted 
stunt driving?4 These circumstances, coupled with a desire for a collective boost in 
morale and cheap opportunities for mass amusement, actually ignited a resurgence in 
auto daredevilry.25 As new thrill groups formed throughout the country, by the late 
1930s they numbered around several dozen. Three ofthem soon became eminent 
outfits, joining the exclusive elite club of the pioneering crews: Joie Chitwood ' s 
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Original Auto Daredevils, and Earl ' Lucky' Teter's and Lee 'Lucky' Lott's Hell 
Drivers . 
Meanwhile, Beam also began operating speedways in Pittsburg ('Bridgeville ' ) 
and Chicago ('Roby' ), promoting stock car races under the auspices ofthe American 
Automobile Association (AAA). In these venues he continued throughout the early 
1930s to institute head-on collisions as sensational attractions between the racing 
events. Gradually, such stunts spread both to other speedways and fairgrounds 
throughout the country.26 With deliberate wrecks as sideshows now dotting racing 
world, it was therefore probably only a matter of time until the crash itself- not 
merely the speedy endurance run- will share motor sports ' center stage . Soon, 
dramatic wrecks became an integral ingredient in the dominant construction of 
NASCAR as a prime arena for exhibiting a hypermasculine competitiveness that can 
successfully navigate violence with technical mastery. 27 Stating that such races drew 
the same number of people as did major league baseball in the late 1930s, a Life 
magazine article on the era ' s midget car racing craze claimed that the "millions went, 
above all , to see the crashes."28 After all , a seldom articulated axiom in the racing 
world held that the crash was a necessary component of the contests since it relieved 
the monotony of the endless laps and the threat that such repetitiousness posed to 
render as dull and unexciting accelerated motion itself.29 
And indeed, it did not take long for the auto wreck to assume the limelight. By 
the end of the 1930s, a new era in the evolution of the deliberate car crash show hit 
the scene. In the summer of 1939, the management of the Fresno Speedway in 
California announced a novelty attraction, coining what was to become a new trope in 
the lexicon of American popular culture. A ' destruction derby ', an entire contest 
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solely predicated on car wrecking, was billed as the venue ' s feature event. This latest 
act conjured a Darwinist world: automobiles will be pitted against each other in a 
fight for survival, wherein the last motor to run will be the winner. Other nearby 
California stock and midget car racetracks, such as Stockton, Carrell , and Neptune, 
soon followed suit and slated such derbies. "Thrills, laughs, and chills will be 
combined tomorrow night during the intermission of the midget car races", promised 
the Oakland Tribune in its write-up for the first Neptune Speedway show in 
September I 939.30 Now dubbed alternately as the ' demolition derby ', this latest crash 
display gained rapid popularity, and after WWII31 spread to other regions throughout 
the country.32 As Larry Mendelsohn, owner of Islip racetrack in Long Island and early 
demolition derby promoter, succinctly summed up the rationale for promoting such 
events : "Why do people come to auto races? Crashes. They come here to see cars 
crash, so I figured why not have a race where all the cars do is crash."33 
Although today the auto thrill show and demolition derby are considered a 
marginal subculture in the United States and are associated in the public imagination 
primarily with rural working-class vulgarity, a closer examination of the genre ' s 
evolvement through time suggests that in its early decades they had been far from 
peripheral. The pages of The Billboard magazine, the premier trade journal for the 
entertainment industry, point to these exhibitions ' ability to generate a mass appeal. 
At least through the early 1960s, auto thrill shows constituted large-drawing 
happenings. In local , county, and state fairs , such shows were grandstand mainstays, 
often favored by organizers as the chief profit-grossing attractions.34 But far from 
being confined to rural areas and local fairs , the shows also took place in such major 
urban settings as Washington DC's West Lanham Speedway,35 Atlanta ' s Lakewood 
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race track,36 Los Angeles ' major auto sport venues, 37 and Chicago's Soldiers Field,38 
attracting Americans from all walks of life. Furthermore, auto thrill acts were slated 
during prestigious international exhibitions such as Chicago ' s Century of Progress 
Exposition in 1933, and the 1939-1940 and 1964-1965 World ' s Fair in New York.39 
The latter show was the last one to appear in a major exhibition, marking the drifting 
of the auto devilry away from the central terrains of popular culture toward the 
margins of sub-cultural peculiarities.40 
Yet by then, the deliberate car crash created a lasting impression in the 
cosmology of the American motor vehicle. Buttressed by these shows' incessant 
production ofwrecks and smashes, a new dominant meaning came to be attached to 
automotive aesthetics and utility. The private car no longer signed in merely as a 
working technology that provided for speed, forward movement, and accessibility; its 
very representations now spoke to and celebrated the attributes of destructibility, 
expandability, and disposability. What cultural environment enabled the cohabitation 
of such a seemingly paradoxical set of values? More specifically, why did these novel 
links originate and gain subsequent popularity in the 1920s? 
Cars, Production, and Destruction in the 1920s and Onward: The 
Introduction of the 'Annual Model Renewal ' Policy 
A fairly recent important theoretical contribution to the social studies oftechnology 
consists of embracing a systemic view of the dynamic between people and objects. 
The premises of this framework hold that we live in a world of socio-technical 
.systems, wherein devices , human actions, and meanings are produced within a 
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complex ensemble of human-artifact interdependence and mutual etfects. 41 Taking up 
this perspective as a working assumption, in the case discussed here we are not so 
much interested in automobiles per seas we are in the system of automobility. This 
system comprises of interweaved components of actors (drivers, pedestrians, 
producers, gas station attendants, etc.), technologies (cars, fuel , garages), connecting 
networks (high/byways, gas hauling fleets, roadside industries), and values (speed, 
efficiency, privacy, freedom). Accordingly, flushing out the meanings of the 
deliberate car crash cannot be carried out internally only, i.e. from within the genre 
itself, but must also pay attention to developments in the wider world of automobility 
and related socio-economic activities. 
While the first decade of automobility was characterized by uncertainty over 
the roles set out for the novel machine, the auto industry grew significantly 
throughout the 1910s, as manufacturing shifted from exclusive luxury items for the 
wealthy to mass producing Fordist assembly lines .42 But by the early 1920s, as such 
efficient production outpaced consumption, the market experienced general 
saturation. Unlike the early years, in which the latest automotive developments 
captivated consumers' imagination, by the 1920s people became less and less 
fascinated with the novelty of the machine and turned to the used car market. As crisis 
loomed over the industry, its leaders frantically sought out solutions to increase 
consumption rates. Eventually, the answer was found in a paradigmatic shift from 
function to form. The plan was to reignite the consumers' interest in automobiles by a 
new styling policy that will dramatize constant changes in auto symbolism. 
General Motors, under the leadership of company president Alfred P. Sloan, 
set the pace for the new trend. In 1921 Sloan devised a policy known as the 'annual 
229 
model renewal ' (or ' planned obsolescence ' as it later became known), a method for 
outdating GM' s previous models every year in order to speed up the replacement 
cycle of new cars, augment the company's market share, and increase the price and 
profit on each unit sold.43 Cleverly exploiting the dramaturgy of marketing, GM now 
unveiled its upgraded sedans ceremoniously in major seasonal car exhibitions and 
local showrooms. These yearly changes, however, did not revolve as much around 
engineering or technological innovation as they did on aesthetic retooling. Minor 
cosmetic embellishments of the auto body and interior soon became the principal 
means used to outmode the attractiveness of previous models . Most changes- the 
addition of gadgets, accessories, novel colors, and body streamlining- merely aimed 
at making the fonner models seem out of fashion , while distinguishing GM from 
other brands. 
Fueled by intense industry competition, automobile regeneration soon became 
an end in itself. Bound by such structural pressures, GM' s new policy translated into 
an imperative for other major car manufacturers . ln order to remain viable and appear 
in-touch with the capriciousness of consumer tastes, nearly all auto companies 
stepped up restyling techniques.44 As annual model changes propelled short-! ived 
design trends, styling and sales departments grew significantly, at times even atthe 
expense of engineering and safety. Cars soon became longer, lower, wider, heavier-
and less economical. As one 1938 ad for Plymouth boasted in bold letters, its new 
model was "nearly seven inches longer than one low-priced car, ten inches longer 
than another!. "45 
Paradoxically, though, companies advertised new components as "significant 
improvements" - only to discard them in the next yearly model.46 The policy of 
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frequent model changes thus must be understood as an index of destruction , not only 
of production . By the logic ofthis strategy, innovation does not rest so much on 
cumulative alterations that reconfigure past novelties, as it does on overshadowing 
these very developments by relegating them to the oblivion of automotive fashion and 
desirability. Hence, in order for planned obsolescence to work, manufacturers had to 
not only physically outmode older cars, but to remake consumers ' previous desires 
and tastes by severing their emotional attachments to the dated models as well- a task 
Vance Packard caustically dubbed in 1960 as "obsolescence of desirability."47 
Industry executives knew that to do so required an assault on the consumers' psyche 
and symbolic world. As GM president Sloan put it in 1928, the key to the industry ' s 
growth lay in keeping customers "dissatisfied" through the use of constant stylistic 
modifications. 48 To reach this goal , automobile advertising took special care to 
understand, dissect, and manage the emotional bond between drivers and their present 
and future cars. "You ' re stupid to go out every year and buy a brand new car", 
admitted one Chrysler designer, "But the emotion says, ' Wow, isn ' t that nice ' ."49 
Long-time GM head stylist, Harley Earl , claimed: "after three years, even with lots of 
fresh accessories, you don't get a lift out of a car anymore."50 As Ralph Nader, one of 
the industry ' s fiercest critics, argued , "the entire policy of incessant car renewal 
hinged on manufacturers ' ability to continuously recreate an emotional demand for 
the automobile, since there has never been established a quota for status, power, fun , 
glamour, and freedom." Planned obsolescence, claimed Nader, thus operated by 
"catering to buyers ' wants instead of simply to their needs."5 1 
Annual model renewals had a lot in stake. The strategy of constantly 
generating, assailing, then regenerating consumers ' tastes in cars figured as a crucial 
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pillar for the industry's continuing prosperity. 52 " If the public ever catches on to the 
fact that a new car every two years is not a necessity", one au tom obi le executive 
confessed, "we are sunk."53 A 1939 report by GM titled 'The Dynamics of 
Automobile Demand' stressed that if the consumer could not be made dissatisfied 
with his/her old model, "the life of the product will be prolonged and the current 
demand will fall. "54 Therefore, claimed chief stylist Earl over a decade later, "our job 
is to hasten obsolescence. In 1934 the average car ownership span was 5 years; now 
[1955] it is 2 years. When it is I year, we will have a perfect score." 55 And indeed, 
Earl ' s vision materialized to a great extent: repeated model changes proved to be a 
highly profitable policy for the major auto companies, as replacement cycles 
gradually accelerated and profits per unit sold increased . 56 
Yet despite planned obsolescence ' s tremendous success for major car 
companies, not everyone was buying the gimmick. Consumer organizations and 
several social commentators lashed out at the manufacturers' production strategies. 
"The public is just a whipping boy for the industry's style experts,' ' wrote an incisive 
observer in the New Yorker in 1940, "who are trying to out-streamline each other and 
who are so snarled up in their little chromium do-funnies and nutty refinements to 
take the eye of half-anesthetized people in the sluggish air of a sales-room that they 
are not doing their job as engineers ."57 Another critic lamented that the average 
citizen was compelled to "buy a car designed to convert itself within one decade or so 
into rust and oily rubble, as the ample auto cemeteries testit-)'."58 The industry 
countered the mounting antagonism by introducing newer psychological marketing 
tactics that were underpinned by an ideology of progress. In order to naturalize 
planned obsolescence and convince the public of its necessity, corporate leaders tied 
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model renewal to dominant American notions of modernization and development. 
Sloan claimed that GM's yearly changes became "a natural and accepted part of 
American life. ' '59 A Ford vice president described them as the " rhythm'' developed by 
the industry over the years.60 GM's top designer Earl even admitted that the purpose 
of annual changes was to "dramatize progress" .61 As historian David Gartman argues, 
equating continual auto restyling with advancement and improvement generally 
echoed with the public because it acted as a symbolic palliative that allowed 
consumers to vicariously escape their increasingly dead-end Fordist and 
bureaucratized workplaces . As one Ford designer put it: "Maybe it [style change] also 
says that things are getting better. lfthey aren ' t changing you know they aren ' t 
getting better."62 Whatever the broader interpretation of planned obsolescence may 
be, for our discussion it is important to stress that at least on some level of sense-
making this strategy served as a linchpin between practices of symbolic and real 
destruction (of tastes, trends, styles, emotional attachments to cars, as well as the 
models themselves) , and notions of continuous forward movement. Sloan himself 
labeled suppliers and manufacturers who went out of business due to annual model 
changes as " the price of progress."63 
The idea of purposefully crashing automobiles in a repetitive manner for mass 
entertainment was conceived and popularized at this particular moment in the history 
of American automobility.64 The motor vehicle- a technology that only two decades 
earlier was introduced to society and heralded as the ultimate promise for human 
progress- could now be turned against in an iconoclastic fashion thanks to new 
contextual meanings in which its deliberate destruction made sense. Auto thrill shows 
and the ensuing destruction derbies, launched in the early 1920s, found fertile ground 
for public acceptance in this emerging cultural environment of automotive 
regeneration and rapid overturns since they chimed well with the logic underlining 
annual model changes. By dramatically articulating the car ' s expendability in a 
tangible manner, these shows provided a complimentary expression for the now 
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volatile and fickle process of auto production, whereby instability became the name of 
the game. While planned obsolescence intended to wreak continuous destruction on 
consumers' .~ymbo/ic and emotional ties to the vehicle, the deliberate car crashes 
seemed to constitute its natural parallel since they realistically accentuated the 
material disposability of the automobile. 
This is not to claim by any means that the auto manufacturers had now set out 
to make breakable cars or that they were not interested in putting durable products on 
the market. Indeed, throughout these years engineering departments continued to 
improve specific vehicular abilities and correct some known problems. A partial 
inventory of safety innovations includes rear view mirrors, mechanical fuel pumps, 
electric windshield wipers, radial tires, tubeless tires, stamped steel wheels, hi/low 
headlights, turn signals, power brakes, and electric engine starters. Likewise, it is not 
my intention to argue that during this era irrational style tendencies entirely eclipsed 
technical improvements and safety concerns within broader organizational schemes. 
Sally Clarke, in her close look into GM' s Color and Paint Department during these 
years, has shown that the story is much more complex than any such simplistic 
approaches may suggest. Despite his boisterous and domineering personality, chief 
stylist Earl still had to negotiate the strong institutional demands of bureaucratic 
regulations and lowering production costs.65 
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The point is, rather, to bring to the forefront an overlooked episode in the 
history of automobility, one whereby an element of destructibility and disposability 
became an inherent part of the production process and representations of cars in the 
public sphere. Wolfgang Sachs is one of the few scholars to appreciate this 
undercurrent, noting that continual model changes creates a symbolic world in which 
"the destruction of the meaning in which the car is wrapped occurs far in advance of 
the destruction of its tin body."66 The physical demolition of the automobile in the 
crash shows thus oddly fit into this world by symbolically closing this crucial gap. 
But was there anything to suggest that the men and women who devised and 
performed deliberate crashes had any involvement with the dominant meanings 
emanating fTom the auto industry at large? A look at the biographies of several of the 
key crashers provides some clues to this question. Prior to and throughout their 
careers as promoters and stuntmen, these individuals maintained tight direct links to 
major automobile manufacturers, institutions, and advocates. As noted above, from 
the mid 1920s onward Ward Beam served as a prominent member of the AAA, 
establishing himself as a premier racecar promoter. Jimmie Lynch worked as an auto 
mechanic and later salesman of Chrysler Plymouth cars for a Texarkana, Arkansas 
dealership before entering the thrill show business.67 Joie Chitwood became a well-
known racecar driver in the 1930s and early 1940s. After Lucky Teter died while 
performing a crash stunt in 1942, Chitwood purchased Teter ' s group name and 
equipment and went into the thrill show business.68 Teter, of Ashland, Ohio, started 
his career in an oil corporation, first as salesman, then auto driver for the company' s 
advertisements. In one of those exhibition drives Teter reportedly "got bored and 
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decided to roll the car over to see what would happen."69 After emerging from the car 
unscathed and "smelling like a rose", a new auto daredevil was born .70 
However, notwithstanding the importance of such personal networks and 
financial stakes in tying the prominent stuntmen to the heart of motordom, the most 
significant links to the auto industry came in the form of direct sponsorship. Within a 
decade following the inception of the car crash genre, the major shows received full 
endorsement from the industry. At first, local car dealerships financed individual 
crashing events. In the early and mid 1930s, such businesses often supplied the 
professional crashers with automobiles to wreck as pub! icity stunts. At times, some 
dealerships even exhibited smashed-up cars in their display rooms as voyeuristic 
curiosities for their clientele.7 1 In other cases, upcoming thrill shows were advertised 
in the local media, paid by the dealerships themselves . An article explaining the 
lasting success of the shows during this period acknowledged the importance of such 
ties between car sellers and crashers: "They [the dealers] know that the 
demonstrations of what their make can do and the punishment it can sustain, as shown 
so forcefully in a thrill show perfonnance, builds up their sales potential."72 
Yet even more significantly, the leading troupes later received long-term 
backings from major national automakers. By the mid 1940s, all the major outfits 
operated under the full commercial and financial sponsorship of the industry. Joie 
Chitwood first received support from Ford , then Chevrolet, Lucky Lott cooperated 
with Nash Motors, Jimmie Lynch worked with Plymouth, and Flash Williams struck a 
deal with Studebaker. The industry provided the thrill show crews a steady supply of 
automobiles to smash, together with financial support to offset production costs .73 In 
turn, the stunt groups were obligated to participate in the corporations ' printed 
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advertisements and (later) TV commercials, vouching for their automobiles ' sturdy 
performance abilities. 74 As part of this ongoing relationship, manufacturers often 
employed the daredevils as official test-drivers for auto crashworthiness. For example, 
Flash Williams tried Studebaker cars, Jimmie Lynch first wrecked Plymouths for 
Chrysler and later Dodges, and Chitwood proved Chevrolet's tenacity. [n the 1930s, 
these grueling demonstrations became public spectacles in their own right, attracting 
large crowds. 75 Simultaneously, the full-fledged destruction derbies and wreck ' em 
races, the first variations of the demolition derby, were at times performed under auto 
thrill show's AAA and regional auto club auspices. 
It is evident, then, that the major car manufacturers were closely related during 
these decades to the entertainment institution that aimed at wrecking their own 
products, in the form of both monetary support and continuous supply of cars to 
crash.76 Such complex networks of social and economic entanglements suggest that 
central developments shaping the auto industry were far from foreign to the promoters 
of the these shows. This is an important point since, as Freund and Martin have 
shown, actors ' institutional and structural position within the American transportation 
system greatly influences their attitudes towards social, political, and cultural issues 
pertaining to the automobile. 77 Those that have a higher affinity to the vested interests 
of automobility generally tend to support the dominance of the motor vehicle over 
other modes of transportation, valorize the tenets of ' car culture ', and maintain a 
strictly behaviorist approach to highway safety that attributes traffic accidents to 
personal actions while ignoring systemic and structural causes of crashes. 
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The Deliberate Crash and the Traffic Accident 
If the deliberate crash is principally a mock practice - i.e. a destructive yet largely 
hannless and controlled wreck- may we conjecture that is it therefore essentially a 
copy or reproduction of some original? The sparse literature on the pioneering 
destruction spectacles around the turn of the twentieth century suggests that other than 
embodying an obvious sensational attraction as loud and shocking pyrotechnical 
displays, these happenings were not divorced from real accidents and catastrophes . 
John Kasson, in his study ofthe Coney Island amusement parks, argues that such 
extravaganzas fed on a paradoxical sense of "horrible delight" that fin-de-siecle 
Americans took in large-scale technological wrecks. This fascination intertwined fear 
and human vulnerability with notions of renewed control and relief, as audiences 
could now safely re-experience actual calamities as secure voyeurs. 78 Similarly, in 
their analysis ofthe fire spectacles, Dennett and Warnke contend that these 
reproductions signaled the desire to reassert human mastery over technologies 
increasingly being perceived as slipping out-of-control.79 Since the limitations of the 
theatrical reenactment (setting the same building ablaze several times a day) relegated 
the actual fire to a secondary attraction, it was the supposed " rescue operation" - the 
relentless activity of the " firemen", the gushing water, and the "victims" leaping to 
safety- that served as the main spectacle. The repetitive successful containment of 
the burning building suggested that such urban blazes were a thrilling yet increasingly 
commonplace event in the everyday experiences of citizens living in the rapidly 
industrializing society. In this sense, the staged spectacle turned the routine but 
unpredictable incident into a foreseeable event: while in the real-life fire the spectator 
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witnessed an undetermined battle between the firemen and the flames, the reproduced 
affair obviated this speculation. The result, by the very nature of the fictional event, 
was established in advance since the hazard was now tamed, governed, responded-to. 
Yet Sally Lynn, whose closer historical analysis of the Coney Island fire displays 
provides a richer analysis ofthese events, points out to the fact that the structures set 
ablaze were in fact replicas of tenement buildings, closely associated in this historical 
period with newly arrived immigrants. Viewed in this light, the spectacles not only 
relieved spectators as they experienced controlled and benign danger, but also tapped 
into anxieties about the state ofthe growing metropolis, the influx of new 
technologies, and the changing social fabric .80 
Drawing on these theoretical ties between the simulated and the real we may 
now ask ourselves: What are the actual world events that can serve as the primary 
points of reference for the deliberate car crash? To answer this puzzle it may be 
fruitful to first wonder: Why, of all existing technologies for personal use, repeatedly 
break-up cars- and not, say, radio-sets, telephones, computers, or sofas?81 The simple 
and obvious answer is that cars make for especially sensational and loud crashes. Yet 
the sheer fact that no other object ' s deliberate demolition has been carried out over the 
years in America with such frequency as the destruction ofthe automobile begs for 
more cultural explanations other than mere phenomenological ones. The planned 
demolition of the automobile, I suggest, has every bit to do with the fact that cars 
continuously undergo destruction - or, at least, are damaged - within the reality of 
eve1yday life , a phenomenon that is manifested mainly in the public health problem 
commonly known as ' traffic accidents '. Since the occurrence ofthe accident preceded 
the staged wreck chronologicall l 2, I argue that the latter cannot be understood 
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completely without grappling with its relation to the fanner. The ' accidental ' crash is 
one of the main reference points of the ' deliberate ' one.83 
And what was the deliberate crash saying about the accidental one? Well , 
quite a lot. The historical evidence collected in this hapter suggests that ' real ' wrecks, 
i.e. accidents , figured as a prominent topic in the discourse surrounding the auto thrill 
show and demolition derby. Specifically, two salient themes emerge from an analysis 
of this discourse: 1) A catering to the dominant individualist approach to accident 
causality, and 2) a mixed safety message, in which crashes were to be both averted 
and invited. 
Reinforcing the Behavioral Paradigm 
Traffic accidents have accompanied the automobile since its earliest days. As 
fatalities amounted to a serious public problem at the close of automobility ' s first 
decade, both public and private sectors established safety agencies in an attempt to 
curb accident rates by scientifically determining their causes and providing 
appropriate remedies. The emerging safety institution ' s initial dominant paradigm 
concerning the etiology of accidents was behavioral: auto mishaps occur because 
humans are reckless or careless. In line with this approach, traffic researchers and 
auto industry officials viewed the automobile as a neutral technology. 84 Cars don't 
kill , they claimed repeatedly, people do. "The more I study this problem [of 
automobile accidents] ," Walter Chrysler said in 1927, " the more I am convinced that 
a major part of the problem is an educational one."85 By placing the burden of 
preventing car wrecks on the driver, such a causality framework accordingly sought 
instructional and punitive solutions.86 
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The privitization of accidents carried with it crucial political consequences. 
Such a paradigm benefited the auto industry since it shifted scrutiny from the 
technology to its human operators. By avoiding a discussion of the systemic, 
structural, technological , and wider cultural causes of traffic accidents, parties 
interested in sustaining the hegemony of the automobile could reap the fruits of 
assigning blame predominantly to human agency. What is more, developments in tort 
law during these years began placing an increasing level of responsibility for 
accidents on manufacturers. ln the groundbreaking 1916 case of MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co. , a New York Court of Appeals held the company liable for an injury 
sustained in a wreck. 87 The decision, which asserted the manufacturer' s accountability 
for tacit defects that should have been discovered by thorough inspections, opened the 
potential floodgates for similar suits against the auto industry. 88 With the opening of 
this new legal front , the carmakers ' need to deflect the heat from their products 
became even more acute. 
Yet by the close ofthe second decade ofautomobility it was becoming 
increasingly clear that the current efforts to address the accident problem were not 
working. As fatalities continued to grow and public hysteria surrounding the "accident 
crisis" reached new heights, politicians were demanding answers. Scrambling to show 
results, the safety establishment, auto industry, and mainstream media intensified the 
push to affix the moralist behavioral perspective in the center of public attention, 
scapegoating drivers and pedestrians as the criminally irresponsible, usual suspects.89 
The deliberate car crash shows were born at one of the heights of this 
explanatory thrust and further consolidated its stance. For one, several of the 
prominent professional crashers stated openly that it was solely drivers ' responsibility 
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to avert accidents. Jimmie Lynch argued that in ninety-nine out of a hundred 
accidents, the human element was at fault: "The driver who, by practicing the Golden 
Rule and being careful , can eliminate all accidents, is the one who's driving the car 
that is directly behind the one in front ofYOU! Get the point?"90 After Ralph Nader 
exposed the inbuilt dangers of the Chevy Corvair in his groundbreaking 1965 book 
Unsafe at any Speed, Joie Chitwood helped GM's defense of the car by filming a 
series of stunts using the Corvair. Chitwood was even intent on writing a book that 
would prove Nader wrong. " [Y]ou can put two guys in two tanks and [still] get people 
killed," said Chitwood, " it was people, not the vehicles causing all the carnage on the 
highways. "9 1 
Furthermore, the dominant rhetoric surrounding the shows reinforced the 
narrow individualist prism by promoting a notion of complete human control over the 
automobile. Ostensibly, the deliberate car crash shows exhibited chaotic road scenes 
in which ordinary automotive driving goes astray. Paradoxically, however, the salient 
representations of these shows involved frequent claims of control , responsibility, and 
safety. This form of talk implied that driver ' s harbored the potential for complete 
mastery over the operation of technology - as well as its destruction . 
Accounts suggested again and again that those who performed the crashes did 
so with pristine authority and precision . As one local newspaper promised its readers 
in 1936, an upcoming Lucky Teter thrill show will be "a thrilling exhibition ofthis 
master daredevil's ability to make his automobile perform his every bidding and 
accede to his every whim."92 A year later, when asked how he chose his drivers, Teter 
replied: 
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There are a Jot of reckless drivers everywhere: I don ' t want them. A stunt 
driver is the most careful driver to be found . He must have the ability at all 
times to bring an automobile back under control once he loses it. The 
difference between the stunt driver and an ordinary reckless driver is that the 
stunt driver thinks ahead, reacts to stimuli a little bit quicker, and knows what 
he is going to do. A reckless driver merely takes chances . .. All of our stunts 
are mathematically calculated ... We aren ' t reckless drivers- we a merely 
wreck-less drivers unless we are doing it on purpose.93 
Several ingredients ofthe daredevil's supposed exquisite domination ofthe machine 
are evident here. Though seeking danger and destruction , he does so in a cool-headed, 
almost scientific manner. The stuntman, it follows, creates orderly mayhem because 
he is a rational , calculating wrecker. Despite his highly suggestive moniker, Lucky 
does not take chances.94 
Teter' s own death while attempting a trick six years later during a show in 
Chicago did not serve to modify this kind of rhetoric. On the contrary, other 
daredevils now challenged themselves to accomplish the "stunt that killed Lucky" . 
Mishaps and death do not preclude further risk-taking, the rationale built within this 
discourse seemed to imply, but instead invite more wrecks . Even before his death, 
when Teter once suffered a near-fatal injury during one of his crashes, he insisted on 
perfonning the very same stunt as soon as possible. " I didn't want to lose faith in my 
self so my first task upon leaving the hospital was to repeat the stunt," he said.95 In 
another case, one newspaper reported on two Hell Drivers, who, after being injured 
following a slide off the rear-end of a speeding stock sedan in a Pennsylvania show, 
decided to repeat the very same act in order to "prove they have no fear of any jinx at 
the Uniontown Speedway."96 Moreover, the professional car wreckers supposedly 
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controlled not only the technology but the entire consequences of its crash as well. 
The mastery of the machine also meant the careful management of its destructiveness. 
"Jimmie Lynch executed his maneuvers not merely to hear the crowd yell", one 
magazine article proclaimed, "but also to prove by surviving that all auto crashes need 
not be fatal. "97 
The crash performers' supreme technological command also lay in their ability 
to control their own bodies and emotions upon impact. Setting the scene for a head-on 
collision in one of the thrill shows, a local newspaper reported that " [B]oth Arnold 
and Toomey [the drivers] posses powerful physiques, which enable them to withstand 
the terrific shock and the battering they receive when the onrushing cars collide."98 
Another report described Lucky Teter's men as having "steel in their nerves."99 
Although Teter himself once felt somewhat unnerved before a stunt, after climbing 
out ofthe overturned vehicle he proclaimed: " [I] was calm . I hadn ' t lost my nerve." 100 
In a different instance, a feature story portrayed Teter as having a "superb physical 
condition, marvelous coordination of mind and muscle, infinite patience in preparing 
a car for stunts, and consummate skill at handling a car." 101 
Taken as a whole, such pervasive rhetoric of control implied that car crashes 
could always be avoided because they are purely man-made. While in ordinary traffic 
circumstances the accident often signals the loss of command by the operator, the 
deliberate crash reverses this meaning by articulating wrecks not as terminal events 
but as occurrences that can be manipulated through competent human authority over 
the technology. Ultimately, such a discourse served to bracket systemic and cultural 
causes of accidents since it demonstrated that if the professional crashers could 
rationally choose if and how to crack-up a car, anyone can potentially control the 
vehicle and its hazardous consequences. 
The Safety Paradox: Do(n't) T1y this At Home 
244 
Unsurprisingly, then, the daredevil car wreckers quickly assumed a pedagogic 
position on the issue of road safety. An advertisement for Goodyear Tires, endorsed 
by Lucky Lott, vouched for the wheels ' secure asphalt grip by stating "Lucky Lott 
takes no chances where tires are concerned! " 102 Jimmie Lynch ' s souvenir programs 
included a text titled ' My Five Rules of Automobile Driving', in which he offered tips 
in the careful handling of an automobile. "True courage", Lynch stated, " is 
recognizing risk, preparing for it, and being coolly equal to it when you face it." 103 
Lynch was later involved in several safety programs sponsored by the National Safety 
Council, lecturing in schools and appearing in educational films,104 while Flash 
Williams perfonned some 20 crashes for a National Safety Council film titled Perils 
of the Highway. 105 In 1935-36 two ofLynch ' s thrill shows were even sanctioned and 
sponsored by the Charleston, North Carolina Police Department. 106 Lucky Teter 
asserted that other than the production of exciting thrills, his stunts hold great worth 
for automotive engineers and lay motorists. In several opportunities he provided an 
insiders ' safety perspective, highly valuable since it came from a man "who has 
survived hundreds of handmade accidents." 107 
Few if any had pointed out the irony laden in having the men who crashed cars 
for a living teach others how to avoid them; that entertaining destruction was the 
means to avoid further destruction. As a result, the boundaries between inspiring 
reckless driving and preaching against it became increasingly obscure. Some crash 
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acts, for instance, exp licitly encouraged audience involvement in the wrecks. In the 
early thirties , as mentioned above, the Beam crew introduced a novel act that directly 
called for spectators to participate in the crashes . Preceding a 1931 show at Roby 
Speedway in Chicago, Beam published a wanted ad in local newspapers in search of a 
" single man to drive an automobile in head-on collision with another automobile ... 
must crash at forty miles per hour or no pay . .. must give unconditional release in case 
of injury or death." 108 Many other similar Beam ads in local papers at the time suggest 
that the incorporation of regular drivers in the head-on col lision became a common 
practice for the troupe throughout the 1930s. Later, early destruction derby events 
called for lay drivers to enter dilapidated cars and participate in the crashing bouts. 
But while Beam encouraged his audience to partake in perilous acts, other 
prominent smashers were advocating safety through their shows. In his li st of driving 
tips, Lynch called on motorists first and foremost to remain calm and collect. "Relax 
while driving, don ' t fight. .. If you are tense and clutch the wheel tightly, you can 
never hope to contro l your car in an emergency." 109 "Use Your Brains Instead of Your 
Break!", ran the instructional title of another interview with Lynch, who promised to 
reveal the " inside tips how the experts avoid tragedy on the highway." 
Such educational messages heightened the inner tension inherent within the 
car crash genre: The producers of auto wrecks were creating the thrill of destruction 
while simultaneously tempering it. At the same time Lynch's rhetoric supported 
safety, his own commercial ads endorsing Plymouth cars lured the potential 
consumers to brush with the excitement of a crash . "Jimmie Lynch has rolled a 1936 
stock Model Plymouth sedan OVER & OVER 21 times", boasted one such ad, ' 'and 
he has never been injured. And this is one of the many reasons you should compare 
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the safety of ' all three.'' 11 0 Joie Chitwood ' s stance on responsible driving exhibited a 
similar double-message. In 1964 Chitwood participated in the CBS hit show The 
National Drivers Test , which examined viewers ' knowledge ofvarious road 
situations. In order to illustrate what happens during ' wrong answers ', Chitwood 
demonstrated spectacular crashes "to spice up the show". 111 The programs thus 
promoted a mixed sense of safety and danger: Careful driving is necessarily achieved 
through hazardous driving, and if one wishes to be secure, one must be reckless. 
Feature stories on thrill shows, written under titles such as 'Breaking Them Up to 
Make Them Better ' or 'Crashing Cars for Safety' and imbued with spectacular 
photographs of auto-destruction, further betrayed this paradox. 112 Car crashes, the 
overall messages seemed to convey, are not game-changing events that lead to a 
reconsideration of American society ' s relationship to motor vehicles, but fertile 
educating platfonns for honing and enhancing automotive skills. One of Lucky 
Teter' s drivers, Ken Arnold, enlightened the readers of a local newspaper by revealing 
that head-on collision are ' 'tame" compared to other car crashes, since "the impact is 
not so great. " He even invited the doubtful to "try and see for themselves ." 11 3 
By promoting notions of complete driver mastery over both the car and its 
wreck, the professional crashers echoed the increasing privatization ofthe nation ' s 
accident problem. Whether they did so knowingly or not, both the explicit and 
implicit missives emanating from the shows ' narrators suggested that accident 
occurrence ultimately boiled down to questions of human control and competence. If 
drivers can deliberately decide to crash cars, these motifs seemed to hint, they can 
undoubtedly decide not to. In a paradoxical twist, tying safety inextricably with the 
need for risk-taking also mirrored dominant industrial assumptions whereby 
247 
accidents, though regrettable, can never be fully eradicated and thus must be accepted 
as an intrinsic, normal , and immutable part of an auto-centered transportation system. 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to illuminate a neglected aspect in the expansive literature on the 
automobile in America . Tying the birth ofthe deliberate car crash show to relevant 
historical contexts provided an explanatory tool to comprehend the sudden turn 
against this iconic technology in the early 1920s. I showed that the purposive 
destruction of the car did not necessarily contradict its mythologization in America, 
but rather complemented it. A professional milieu of wreckers, highly affiliated and 
involved with the economic interests ofthe automobile industry, managed to 
popularize their antic in large part thanks to its symbolic homology with the emerging 
method of planned automobile obsolescence. As such, the ubiquitous destruction of 
cars did not pose a threat to the celebration of the automobile as a working 
technology, but naturalized its dominant dynamic of development through incessant 
change. At the same time, implying complete human control of automobile wrecking 
articulated a narrow individualistic approach to the question of traffic accidents, one 
that upheld the notion of the neutrality of the technology and diverted the spotlight 
away from the industry ' s role in causing road mishaps. In addition, turning the car 
crash into a mass-consumed spectacle contributed to the institutionalization ofthe 
accident as an inerasable fact of modern I if e. 
Thus, at the end of the day, the crash shows ' two central symbolic meanings 
uncovered here- dramatizing planned obsolescence and privatizing accidents- fed 
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into the interests ofthe auto industry. These were potentially powerful statements, 
since both phenomena were not unrelated . Several critics have argued that the rate of 
traffic accidents was directly affected by the policy of annual model change. Since 
most manufacturers altered only a few bodylines and added ornaments and 
accessories, purely functional designs for safety often took the backseat. "Gadgets and 
doodads appeal more, or are supposed to so appeal, than things which would make 
cars safer and more economical to operate", observed one critic only four years after 
the initiation of the yearly changes policy. 11 4 ln fact, as Ralph Nader asserted several 
decades later, novel styles actually generated new hazards. Styling changes created 
impediments in vision, improper brakes, balance and weight problems that hindered 
efficient control in high speeds, deficient steering systems, inadequate tires, and 
protruding interior gadgets and exterior accessories, which increased the risk of 
injuries upon impact. 1 15 The Ford Mustang example is a case in point. Before the 
introduction of the Mustang in the mid I 960s, Ford 's engineering department initiated 
an experimental model consisting of a multitude of safety features such as a 
collapsible steering shaft, a ' fail-safe ' dual braking system, and a roll bar to 
strengthen the roof structure in the event ofrollovers. When the Mustang was finally 
introduced to the market in April I 964, every one of these features had been 
eliminated from the car. 11 6 Furthennore, Nader showed that decisions to phase out 
particular proven hazards are led not by the moral imperative of sav in g lives and 
preventing injuries, but by aesthetic fashi ons and the demands of the yearly renewal 
paradigm. 11 7 Let me, then, connect the dots: Symbolically, planned obsolescence 
greatly accentuated the instability of car production and marketing; materially, auto 
companies provided the consumers cars that in many senses compromised their safety 
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and increased the risks of driving; when accidents did occur, the same industry placed 
the blame on motorists and pedestrians ; the deliberate car crash grew in the midst of 
this cycle and tightened its components by sustaining the production process and 
unquestioning its often deadly consequences . 
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Conclusion 
Taking the public discourse on traffic accidents in the United States as an historical case 
study, the preceding chapters have uncovered several ways by which social groups 
respond to unintended technological consequences within definitional processes of 
constructing a social problem. Weaving across a number of salient historical 
claimsmakers, sites of discourse production, and cultural vehicles of meaning making, the 
thematic analysis has yielded several conclusions. Though by no means monolithic, a 
particular current and direction stands out in this discourse. From the early 
characterization of a polysemic yet undeniably moralistic, political , and reactionary 
approach toward automobile carnage, the problem ' s definition undergoes a gradual 
narrowing in scope and tone toward rational-technical paradigms of assessment and 
remedying, routinization by numerous forms of reproduction, and a neutralization of the 
structural forms of harm vis-a-vis blame deflection and privatization. The powerful class 
of initial technological users and promoters chose to rationalize the accident as a regretful 
yet ineluctable and natural fact of motoring instead of evaluating it within wider socio-
political questions on the moral ramifications of introducing risky material objects into 
vulnerable social environments. The early double association of the mishap as terrifying 
yet exciting and productive aided in instituting it not only as an incident to be averted but 
also an attraction to be invited and reproduced; the treatment of the accident as a 
mechanical-practical impediment to automobiling, and the later dominance of 
quantification in the discourse, embedded the problem within technical and relativistic 
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frameworks that strengthened the bureaucratic ownership of the issue. The multiplying 
divisions of the motoring population into deviant groups continuously shifted the 
responsibility for the problem unto structurally vulnerable circles, thereby masking the 
culpability of institutional and organizational actors. The privatization of accidents 
through disciplinary modes of social control that sought to identify and manage the 
conduct of individuals in traffic obscured the structural and systemic causes that breed 
mass automotive carnage. The routinization of the car crash through entertainment took 
the sting out of the accident as a potentially critical moment for re-evaluating the role of 
the motor vehicle in modern societies, instead amplifying its value for incessant creative 
destruction. 
This is not to claim that such a general transformation was entirely sweeping or 
categorical , engulfing all involved actors in the field of accident discourse. Indeed, in 
liberal democracies characterized by a strong possibility for conducting open public 
exchanges, 1 it would be surprising to find any social or political issue around which 
congeals absolute consensus and unifonnity of opinion. Rather, in line with a 
constructivist theory of social problems evolvement, I claim that to a great extent the 
traffic accident problem has gradually 'disappeared' in America. Given that in essence a 
problem constitutes definitional processes about a putative troubling condition, its 
disappearance is not physical but conceptual. Specifically, it means that the troubling 
social condition is defined as something to live with, a necessary evil of which there 
seems to be limited ability or desire to substantially affect or eradicate. The sociological 
concept I chose to name this particular trajectory toward problem attenuation is 
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normalization. Applied to the case analyzed here, the findings offer a way to understand 
the processes by which traffic accidents become normalized in America as an acquiescent 
price to pay for the benefits of the automobile. 
A second conclusion relates to the analytical tools of constructivism. Of greatest 
theoretical importance here is my focus on the driving forces behind the direction , 
development, and evolution of a social problem. A final outcome of disappearance-as-
nonnalization occurs not as a result of the issue 's progression into later temporal stages 
of development, as a ' natural history ' model to social problems might suggest. Instead, 
by focusing on the role of the cultural modalities ofconstruction- the actual 
epistemological and discursive devices an issue is passed through by pivotal 
claimsmakers- I have demonstrated that the course of the problem may be determined in 
its early definitional stages, including the "emergence," and not necessarily during the 
chronologically later stages (i.e. after the peak of controversy and claimsmaking activity, 
or policy formulation and implementation).2 In this regard my research has provided a 
theoretical contribution to a central critique aimed at natural history models of social 
problems. While Schneider had called on researchers to examine how the definitional 
process is moved along by the claimsmaking activities in question,3 and Weiner pointed 
to definitional processes ' overlapping, simultaneous, and interactive character,4 the work 
carried out here provides further theoretical insight and empirical content that facilitate a 
deeper understanding of how cultural frames internal to the definitional process may 
operate to affect its end result. Furthem1ore, while previous works have posited the 
element of ' attention' as the main detem1inant for maintaining both a social problem's 
high visibility through time and its move towards successful resolution, I have 
demonstrated that attention is a necessary, yet insufficient condition to arrive at such a 
outcome. In actuality, when intense attention occurs in and through the modalities of 
normalization, the chances that the problem will disappear increase. 
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Lastly, I have demonstrated that these modalities are neither free-floating cultural 
devices, nor Swidlerian ' tool kits ' easily available to social actors upon demand. By 
anchoring them in socio-structural arrangements, I have positioned my approach to social 
problems more clearly in the contextual constructivist school. Detem1ined to uphold the 
definitional quality laden in processes that attempt to make sense of troubling conditions 
while refusing to deny the real and objective seriousness of such ham1ful situations, I 
have supported my discourse analysis in part with a Foucaldian investigation of the 
conditions that make a discourse possible, and in part with a Bourdieuian interrogation of 
the structural positions occupied by various actors involved in struggles over cultural and 
symbolic capital in the field of automobility. In the section below I expand upon this 
theoretical choice, which I call Critical Structural-Constructivism (CSC), as well as the 
particular significance accidents hold for advancing such a framework. 
A Critical Structural-Constructivist Analysis of Social Problems 
Strict constructivism in social problems analysis assumes a clear distinction between real 
conditions and the activities of people in response to these conditions. It believes, 
moreover, that the sociologist possesses the ability to identify and delineate such a 
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division. For example, Gusfield uses various metaphors to account for this move: in order 
a make the definitional process visible apart from putative conditions, constructivi sts 
should, in his words, "drive a wedge" or "bracket out" the reality of conditions, and "take 
the affective starch ... out of the social problem." Constituting a prerequisite to the 
analysis, this separation thus allows the sociologist to view social problems as "matters of 
partisan or professional choice rather than conclusions forced upon us by the nature of 
things. "5 However, the ability to claim that things ' nature does not force any restrictions 
on the dynamics of social problem construction can be made more persuasively when the 
problems are strictly man-made, i.e. social or cultural. These include drug and alcohol 
abuse, poverty, racism and sexism, and various forms ofviolence such as child abuse and 
spouse battering- the main focus of social problems research in general and 
constructivist studies in particular. It becomes more challenging, however, to make 
similar assertions in regards to other categories of conditions that do not lend themselves 
easily to complete human control and creation. Accidents are a primary instance of this 
type. Ontologically speaking, mishaps are liminal events, instances of misfortune that are 
situated somewhere between the controlled pole of active human agency and the 
uncontrollable pole of coincidence and blind chance. Accidents indeed just happen. It is 
the nature of things to deteriorate, to break down, to bite back, to be recalcitrant, to 
malfunction; plans do go awry, errors are routinely made, intentions become frustrated. 
At least at one point or another in our lives, we all really are at the wrong place at the 
wrong time- the only variable being the degree of misfortune. Constructivists ' 
traditional neglect of looking seriously at social problems involving accidents may not be 
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surprising then. Precisely because they do not allow for a clear-cut separation between 
real life conditions and the definitional activities surrounding these conditions, untoward 
events frustrate the underlying epistemological basis of strict constructivism. Sure, a 
traffic accident is human-made in that it has been brought about by individual decisions 
and actions and always involves the machines and infrastructure created by people. In 
this sense, the primary cause of accidents is the invention and use of automobiles. But in 
another sense, accidents also happen in a murkier realm of extra-social circumstances that 
operate out of the reach of the ongoing political claimsmaking activities to define the 
problem. It is the world in which particular and random constellations of error, energy, 
and material combine to continuously produce mishaps, again and again upsetting all 
those well-intentioned attitudes, preventive measures, and sincere precautions. 
Furthermore, by focusing on the definitional activities of claimsmakers and not on 
real conditions, strict constructivists aim to disarm the science of professionals and its 
purported "facts" that sustain an aura of certainty and claim to superior knowledge about 
reality. 6 Yet accidents prove that such exorcism is hard to carry out to its fullest. It is not 
so much the claims of experts on accidents that become difficult to separate from the 
domain of the factual- but thefacticity of the accidental , the one that keeps knocking on 
our doors despite all out best intentions. 7 
Studying accidents as a social problem thus illuminates the advantages of 
employing 'structural-constructivism, ' 8 which grounds the definitional activities 
undertaken by claimsmakers within the contextual and constraining circumstances of the 
socio-historicallandscape.9 It may also aid in overcoming strict constructivism' s 
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inattention to the causal links of social problems with the structural arrangements in 
. 10 SOCiety. 
Interestingly, analyzing a problem construction within structural arrangements 
can also provide an answer to its persistence despite tremendous efforts to eradicate it. 
Some problems are so entrenched in the structural and systemic organization of society 
that the most any intervention methods at the state ' s operative level can achieve is to 
control the extent of the intensity of the problem. 11 From here the choice of designating a 
particular problem a ' necessary evil ' is only a convenient step away. 
From 'Normal' to 'Normalized' Accidents 
Seminal theorists of high-risk such as Charles Perrow, Anthony Giddens, and Ulrich 
Beck have called our attention to the ways in which the organization of society around 
complex technologies and the vested interests of powerful groups in perpetuating the 
reliance on these technologies have borne unprecedented dangers for men and women 
living in contemporary industrial settings. Yet by imputing a relative degree of autonomy 
to these apparatuses and their 'manufactured risks,' these works imply a certain level of 
reification to human-made dangers. Technological disasters and accidents are understood 
as emanating from the intractable material matrix of industrial production and the cultural 
and economic dependencies it has fostered . On the one hand, to claim - as Perrow 
famousl y did- that in such an environment accidents are ' normal ' represents a highly 
subversive and provocative argument about entrenched Modernist notions regarding 
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technology and progress; on the other hand, the term ' normal accidents ' is a tautology 
and thus phenomenologically uninteresting. Tompkins , in one of the few critiques of 
Penow, says that his seminal Normal Accidents "is a contentious, well-written volume 
that can be called neither true nor false. It is an argument, based on probabilities, that 
anives at a certainty." 12 Put differently, though it provides extremely valuable insight to 
the precariousness of living with high-risk socio-technical systems, this literature suffers 
from a lack of theorization on how do cultural and discursive responses to unintended 
technological consequences aid in producing future accidents. 
Situating this critique as a key analytic impetus, the research presented in this 
dissertation has shifted the emphasis to the ways in which accidents- specifically, traffic 
accidents- may become nom1alized. Several scholars have already argued that the 
general public in developed industrial societies tends to accept with relative indifference 
a high rate of automotive death - an observation that, as far as I can tell , has never been 
substantiated through empirical research. 13 A handful of scholars, presupposing the 
public indifference thesis, have attempted to provide an explanation for such an attitude. 
Freund and Martin claim that people adapt to the harmful consequences of the car not by 
denying their existence but by pushing them out of their awareness. Since automobility 
has attained such a high level oftaken-for-grantedness in modem settings, the injurious 
sides of the motor vehicle are necessarily mollified; while seen, they are less noticed. 14 
Others, such as Jean Grimshaw, have provided a socio-psychoanalytic interpretation for 
this phenomenon. According to Grimshaw, the general aloofness toward automotive 
carnage stems from a deep cultural repression, a kind of collective defense mechanism 
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that protects our profound investment in cars and the knowledge that in the end we all 
share responsibility for death and tragedy on the roads. 15 Still , such sweeping asser1ions 
about a public indifference should be treated cautiously. As Freudenberg puts it: "Claims 
about public inationality can be ways to ' frame ' risk issues, and it is at least possible that, 
in making such claims, relevant social actors will emphasize the framings that encourage 
outcomes they consider most desirable." 16 
Instead of assuming a general public callousness toward traffic accidents, I have 
investigated various cultural devices of meaning-making whose employment produce a 
certain definition ofthe issue, which in tum may elicit indifference. As we have seen, the 
normalization of accidents can be explained on the basis of the political economy of 
automobility, whereby power elites shape the carnage in ways that benefit their 
interests. 17 Indeed, privatizing the accident problem by assigning blame to individual 
operators, the disciplining of personal behavior, and the routinization of crashes through 
consumerization ultimately benefit actors interested in establishing and retaining the 
hegemony of the automobile in the existing transportation system. Yet interestingly 
enough, this is more of an overarching consequence than an explanation. Lee Clarke, in 
his studies on how organizations make decisions about acceptable risks, finds that 
decision makers probably do not intend to harm individuals . Rather, "operating under the 
constraints of competitive capitalism, [they] make choices that emphasize organizational 
goals over individual safety." 18 
Take the case of the normalization effects of quantification (chapter 3). What 
motivated such uses of statistics? Can we conclude that political, administrative, and 
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economic elites, especially those with heavy interests in the success of the motorcar, 
intentionally or inadvertently sought to downplay the accident problem? Did they benefit 
somewhat from mollifying the initial indignation toward mass carnage? On one level , 
that may be a plausible line of reasoning. Quantification is undeniably implicated in the 
exertion of social power. With the advent of Modernity, the use of statistics becomes 
what Porter calls a 'technology of power,' a commanding technical art that does more 
than simply enumerate. 19 As the works of Foucault20 have vividly demonstrated, in 
modern times quantification serves as a quintessential means for disciplining both 
individuals and entire populations by gauging and setting visible standards of normalcy. 
The production of numbers thus becomes a sophisticated tool in the hands of 
authoritative actors vying to set social agendas, silence threatening rivals, and advance 
political and economic goals. And though by the turn of 19111 century the United States 
was being swept by the quantified mentality, Cline Cohen also notices that the kinds of 
things that were not counted and calculated spoke volumes about what mattered and to 
whom.21 For instance, statistics consistently ignored such facts as the number of slave 
owners, black mortality, the incidence of crime, and female illiteracy. Furthermore, while 
showing that the rise of statistics came hand in hand with the erosion of pre-modern 
determinism, Hacking also reminds us that indetenninism did not introduce a new liberty: 
"The argument that indetenninism creates a place for free will is a hollow mockery. The 
bureaucracy of statistics imposes not just by creating administrative rulings, but by 
determining classifications within which people must think of themselves and of the 
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actions that are open to them ... The less the determinism, the more the possibilities for 
constraint. "22 
Given that the most visible and vocal organization in the field of traffic safety, 
The National Council, has traditionally had a strong representation from automobile, oil , 
and insurance industries, the elite manipulation thesis becomes a plausible interpretation. 
Though scholarly and popular historical works on the automobile tend to argue that 
within a decade and a half after its advent the motor vehicle established a "here to stay," 
hegemonic hold in America, this claim ' s sweeping nature overlooks long-lasting 
contingencies and uncertainties that made automobility far from entrenched or 
inevitable.23 Well into the 1930s, powerful forces in the car business expressed deep 
concerns over the ramification of the safety problem for the future of their technology. C. 
W. Price, the Council ' s head ofthe automotive department in the 1920s and a leading 
executive for a major manufacturer claimed as late as 1924 that accidents posed a threat 
to the industry as a whole. Price watched wearily as the increase in death causes a 
"reaction against the purpose, use and toleration of motor-vehicles has already set in."24 
This statement, a decade and a half after the initiation of Fordism, speaks volumes of the 
lingering anxiety pervading the industry and its need to employ various strategies to 
ameliorate the accident problem lest it threatens its entire business enterprise.25 
But the exercise of domineering power in the service of special interests may not 
be the only explanation, nor the most convincing one for overwhelmingly subsuming the 
accident discourse under a commensurative framework. While Hacking agrees that 
statistics "may think of itself as providing only infonnation, but [are] part of the 
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technology of power in a modem state,"26 he also acknowledges that not all disciplinary 
consequences of measurement are motivated by intent to discipline. Numbers, he notes, 
do not necessarily dehumanize. In fact , when observing the history of statistics in the 
West one finds that most applications of statistical knowledge were not of evil purpose. 
Rather, they are primarily derivative of the rise of the bureaucratic nation-state and the 
exigencies of population governance, treatment, and control. 
Hacking further notes that the fetishism for numbers and the turning of statistics 
into a dominant mode of applied science was often not a deliberately created order. 
Instead, "There arose a certain style of solving practical problems by the collection of 
data. Nobody argued for this style; they merely found themselves practicing it. One ought 
to ... recognize that politics, commerce, and disease did not of themselves demand that 
everything in the social realm should be a question of counting."27 Moreover, since the 
production of mass statistics requires a bureaucratic facility to support and enable the 
calculator to calculate, its success relies on forming a "calculative network"28 that links 
up researchers, policy analysts, and administrators. Not only does this network package 
and distribute social numbers, it also perpetuates a culture that regards numbers as 
. I .c- I . 1· 29 essentla to 10rmu atmg po Icy. 
Similar dynamics seem to be at play in regards to most quantified strategies 
imbuing the construction of the accident problem. Take the near obsession of forecasting 
deaths observed throughout a great part of the twentieth century. If I am correct in my 
previous conclusion that such predictions constitute forms of 'fantasy documents,' then 
they should be understood not as manipulative lies aimed at strictly shaping public 
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behavior but organizational strategies that converse with intra- and inter-institutional 
needs. While precise foretelling increases the forecasting agency's symbolic capital in the 
field of governance, the ability to stabilize the terms of the debate in the comfortable 
terrains of administrative rational-technical thought further ensures organizational 
legitimacy and survival. As such, fantasy documents' power lays not in their potential to 
deceive but, rather, to "preclude some thoughts from ever arising, stifling objections to 
potentially dangerous or corrupt actions."30 
Making the 'Dispersed Disaster' Visible 
To date, the most compelling social theories of technological accidents have emanated 
from studies of disasters.31 While enormously insightful, the focus on the catastrophic 
also has a limiting effect since it confines the empirical endeavors to consensus-type 
crises that are clearly delimited in time and space. And although considerable variation 
does exists in the conceptualization of the term ' disaster,' 32 the emphasis on the singular 
and easily identifiable event tends to dominate the literature. For example, in an 
influential definition, Quarantelli states that a disaster is "a consensus-type crisis occasion 
where demands exceed capabilities." This means that disasters are "ad hoc, inegular 
occasions that involve a crisis; there is relative consensus that things have to be done, but 
the wherewithal is not enough to meet the demand."33 In another, more recent work, 
McFarlane and Norris define disaster as "a potentially traumatic event that is collectively 
experienced, has an acute onset, and is time-delimited."34 
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Only a handful of scholars have called attention to the conceptual difficulty 
involved when trying to consider diffuse harmful occasions as disasters in the common 
sense. Westgate and O' keefe, for example, have argued that the focus on the specific 
event, as a distinguishable feature, reflects a bias of Western society and is unsuitable for 
identifying disasters in developing countries.35 I extend this criticism by arguing for the 
need to theorize dispersed, everyday, and small-scale accidents, which in a aggregate, 
system-wide perspective equal large-scale catastrophes in magnitude and cumulative 
effect. 36 I further contend that it is this under-theorization that constitutes one reason for 
researchers ' lingering neglect of traffic accidents, since they do not fall neatly into the 
dominant scholarly category of disaster. According to Freund and Martin, one source for 
the lack of a critical evaluation of auto-generated problems lies in their diffuseness and 
ordinariness.37 An oil spill is a major dramatic event, which elicits attention precisely due 
to its singularity and spectacular nature. Pollution from an automobile, in contrast, seems 
a minor and ordinary event, only one of millions alike. Such an inability to chain these 
diffuse multiple phenomena into a larger structural and systemic picture leads experts, 
media, and politicians to trivialize or overlook many of the problems relating to cars. 
Freund and Martin suggest that the lack of structural vision and vocabularies are due in 
part to the separations and splits in various social discourses about work, play, shelter, 
transport, and the quality of life precipitated by the division of labor and the 
compartmentalization of life in the modem era. "They inhibit us from seeing the 
connections between the quality of transport and the quality of our community life, our 
health, our level of empowerment, and our relationship with nature."38 My theoretical 
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corrective to the concept of disaster seeks to rectify this blinded state of mind and make 
traffic accidents visible as a worthy topic for critical sociological scrutiny. 
Accidents such as automobile mishaps deserve a theorizing of mishaps within a 
socio-technical system on the level of social organization. Automobility is a cultural, 
political , and technical organization of space that induces particular kind of collisions. 
They are complex and tightly coupled (by short-term, chance sequences). I submit 
therefore that the analytical definition of disaster should include an element of dispersion 
or diffusion. Disasters can be a dispersed set of events, similar in nature, which are 
induced by a particular socio-technical organization of space and cultural climate. 
Towards a Sociology ofNecessary Evils 
Aligning the findings of this study alongside the existing literature on social 
problems and technological hazards reviewed previously, the closing section that follows 
aims at crafting a hypothetical model of how problems may 'disappear' vis-a-vis what I 
have characterized as a fonn of normalization. In doing so it may be fruitful to tum one 
last time to an empirical case. Under the title "The Price of Progress," a March 1934 
editorial in the Washington Post sums up much of the salient themes produced implicitly 
in the discourse on accidents throughout the twentieth century. Since it is such a telling 
piece, straight-forward in its rationalization of the accident phenomenon, it is worth 
quoting at length. After opening with the mention of a recent string of airplane crashes, 
the text changes direction and gets to the heart of the editor ' s thesis : 
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The American people, however, have always been willing to take serious risks in 
their zeal to force the pace of progress. We paid for that eagerness in numerous 
accidents in the pioneer days of railroading and we are still paying heavily for our 
rush to put an automobile into every home in the land. If drivers had to submit to 
the rigorous and costly examinations to which they are subjected in some 
countries before being pennitted to drive a car, fatal accidents would be fewer, 
but so would the number of automobiles. Mass buying and mass patronage of new 
transport agencies have made possible improvements in automobiles that would 
have been long deferred under a slow and cautious development. 
Similarly, progress in air transport to date has been bought at a sacrifice of 
human life, sometimes avoidable, but often inevitable. We are shocked by the 
recurrent tragedies, but the risks taken mean progress. Disaster is the price paid 
for experience and out of experience knowledge and safety are bom.39 
Responding passionately to a troubling reality that produces mass technological death, 
the writer forges an intriguing argument. He is not oblivious to the moral wrongs of 
automobility. Neither is he downplaying the magnitude of the problem. Indeed, he 
acknowledges that the introduction of the automobile into American life has exacted a 
terrible human toll , what he calls a "price." Furthermore, he realizes that there is nothing 
fatalistic about this reality ; things could have been different (for example, by submitting 
drivers to harsher licensing procedures). A high accident rate is a choice, a specific social 
order selected amongst several possible others. In other words, the author is constructing 
traffic accidents as a ' necessary evil ,' an unappealing situation that some parties opt to 
live with enduringly: despite being considered to have undesirable qualities, the condition 
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is preferable to its absence (i .e. risk in automobiling and car manufacturing has allowed 
to increase auto production and improve safety research) . 
When do social problems become necessary evils? I now examine several 
elements, the presence of which within the construction of a social problem may spell its 
disappearance or normalization. These elements, or modalities of normalization, are 
socio-cultural devices whose employment gives form, content, and direction to a 
problem' s collective definition. As discursive processes, their power lies in the degree of 
affect -not its absolute presence. In other words, when they are salient and dominant in a 
discourse, the likelihood of disappearance increases. Moreover, these modalities may 
imbue the public discussions of the problem in its youngest stages, not necessarily in its 
later ones wherein the waning of the issue becomes highly visible. In fact, it is precisely 
the dominance of these devices in the initial stages, even during the problem's 
'emergence,' that may auger its dampening or disappearance. 
Modalities of Social Problems Normalization 
Technicization 40 
Technicization does not merely refer to the subsuming of social issues under technical 
discourses or to the application of technological fixes to social problems; rather, it 
encompasses these tendencies and more under a broader concept to connote a certain 
relation to the world. It is in essence an application of schematic relation between causes 
and effects that operates independently from the communication of meaning. 
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Specifically, technicization involves the narrowing of experience by abstraction from 
other meanings, the simplification of moves to methods instead of deep sense-making, 
and the following of empty rules instead of full understanding. The result is more 
reliability, tighter coupling of elements, less dependency on contexts, and more efficiency 
of control. Techniques to attain technicized relations are the simplification and 
specification of complex causal relationships by separating, purifying, and schematizing 
the elements, the fixing of the relations by repetition in time or incorporation in matter, 
and the closure of a system by encapsulation and ' black boxing. ' 41 
The more problems are constructed in technicized tenns, the more they are 
removed from the troubling conditions that initially prompted heated claimsmaking 
activities. As local, moral , and political meaning is drowned in generic abstractions, 
cause and effect relations that at first were clear now become increasingly obscure. 
Passions that once ignited broad-based activism are extinguished by technical , cold, and 
dull nitpicking. 
Social Control and Dividing Practices 
Social control refers to society's methods for maintaining social order by enforcing 
approved behavior. By definition, social control aims at achieving stability, consensus, 
and conforrnity.42 In this sense, when applied to social problems the troubling conditions 
are not so much eradicated or solved as they are controlled or managed in ways that fall 
in line with the capabilities and interests of the powerful. When characterized by a 
privatized, blaming-the-victim campaign that finds fault in the individual and not the 
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structural circumstances that led to the problem, the harmful conditions tend to 
continue.43 Once a problem is effectively located in a particular segment of the 
population, this creation of difference may further serve to maintain the legitimacy of the 
dominant values and interests - the pursuits of which bred the problem to begin with- by 
embodying an illustration ofthe penalty suffered by those who ' fail ' to actively chase 
these very values and corresponding goals.44 The status quo is preserved because if an 
intervention method disappoints, this is seen as evidence that the recipient has a difficult-
to-correct personality character ' flaw ' or is ' unwilling to respond. ' 45 Such cultural 
moments of what Stanley Cohen calls an "amplification of deviancy" occur particularly 
in situations of heightened risk, leading to a panicked response and the allocation of 
blame.46 
When a problem is identified and named, the shift of attention is never to the 
entire population - but to segments of it. But if the appearance of new categories of 
violators and/or victims occurs without a net diminution of those previously present, an 
escalation of the rule breaking behavior becomes Iikely.47 Eventually, the perpetuation of 
the troubling social condition by means of dividing practices will entrench a notion of its 
inevitability, or at least a resigned attitude that little can be done to eradicate it. 
Degree of Quantification 
Quantification in itself does not lead necessarily to a problem ' s normalization. Indeed, if 
this were the case than every modem social predicament would have turned into a 
necessary evil. Rather, it is the "creation of illusion"48 that occurs when oversimplified 
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quantification of one or two indexes are presented in isolation as if they stand in for the 
entire complex situation. The danger is found in the promotion of a misguided notion 
wherein the "facts speak for themselves" and "statistics don' t lie"- a "magical"49 idea 
that assigns greater ontological weight to particular frameworks for understanding the 
worldly events while marginalizing others. Questions that do not lend themselves easily 
to quantification are omitted from public discussions or not even contemplated. 5° The 
invariable focus on "how much" or "how many" comes at the expense of moral , political , 
and systemic issues related to the troubling conditions. 
Again, as in the effects of social control, such dominancy of quantification tends 
to reproduce the status quo at the risk of whittling away the socio-political attention the 
problem had attracted during its growth period. Successful measurement requires that 
social entities be stable . By turning transient and amorphous social phenomena into 
forms easily signified, collected, and sorted, statistics stabilizes social action for the 
purpose of counting, packaging, and distributing throughout the state. 51 Once qualities are 
turned into quantities they become routinized; in bureaucracies they become increasingly 
reified and fateful. Their use by politicians, the media, and social scientists gives them 
meaning, consequences, and objectivity. As issues linger and solutions prove insufficient, 
the original construction of the problem as a troubling condition demanding action 
steadily loses its allure to newer problems. 
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Commodification and Consumerization. 
Commodification refers to the process of increasing the realm of what is possible to buy 
and sell . 52 Turning a social issue into a product requires reproducing it in image or 
matter, packaging in appealing form, assigning value, and exchanging its worth for 
further application. The movement through these stages removes the problem from its 
original structural moorings, as initial definitions are digested and re-digested within 
market principles of instrumental use, repetition, destruction, and regeneration. In terms 
of social problems, when the core of the troubling issue, or a part of it, is commodified or 
served onto the market as an item of consumption, the likelihood of the problem' s 
normalization increases. 
In the particular case discussed here, the practice of car breaking converses- through live 
audiences seeking entertainment - with the process of car making: The perpetual 
annihilation and renewal of cars and their drivers/passengers reverberate as a distant 
reminder of the supposed naturalness of incessant auto production and obsolescence as 
commodity. The dominant representations of the deliberate car crash thus institute a 
general attitude of lightheartedness and routinization towards road carnage and auto-
destruction. Not only did such spectacles attach pleasure and joy to automobile wrecks, 
repetitive car smashing also implied that accidents are a normal , inevitable, taken-for-
granted part of the system, in which car crashes, ironically, become something that we 
can live with. 
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